Integrated Report on Individual Forms of Solidarity (WP3)

Deliverable 3.1

TransSOL: European paths to transnational solidarity at times of crisis: Conditions, forms, role models and policy responses

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Solidarity in Europe – European Solidarity: A Comparative Introduction

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Introduction

Solidarity has received heightened attention in recent times due to the various crises that have affected the European Union since 2008. Critical voices have repeatedly raised their concern that solidarity is severely at risk within the EU because of the inability of the European institutions and member states to agree on mechanisms of burden-sharing. This is true in regard to the economic and financial crisis that has affected several European countries. Even though the European Union has developed a number of policy measures (e.g., the 'European Financial Stability Facility', the 'European Stability Mechanism', and the 'Stability and Growth Pact') which have opened the door to financial assistance, the EU remained committed to a bail-out policy package that delegated financial liabilities and risks to nation-states threatened by bankruptcy. As a reaction, most commentators converged upon the conviction that international solidarity was dead (see Habermas 2017, Balibar 2010). A similar conclusion was drawn in regard to the issues emerging in reaction to the increased inflow of refugees from Syria and other regions affected by wars, and the inability of the EU institutions and its member states to agree on a coordinated asylum policy and mechanisms of admission and integration. Consensus could only be reached in regard to the external dimension (e.g., frontier controls, fight against human trafficking), leaving the issue of internal coordination unsolved.

The success of populist parties, the Brexit vote, and the mobilization of Eurosceptic and xenophobic protests across Europe has raised further concerns that European solidarity might be at risk in a more fundamental and all-encompassing manner. In times of crisis, we might not only be witnessing the erosion of cooperation and solidarity between

member state governments, but also the corrosion of solidarity at the level of the European citizenry, thus threatening the social foundations of solidarity on which EU institutions and policies are built. Do these observations and concerns mirror the current situation throughout the European Union? Is European solidarity really on the retreat within the European citizenry? How strongly is solidarity rooted at the individual level, both in terms of attitudes and practices? And which factors seem to contribute to the reproduction and/or corrosion of solidarity in times of crisis?

We are urgently in need of sound empirical evidence in order to answer these questions. Public debates and contentions continue to return to this issue but we have had very little empirical evidence on which to draw to inform this debate to date. To date, diverging facts and observations have been taken into consideration. On the one hand, it seems true that the various crises affecting the EU are putting European solidarity under strain. Possibly, it is easier to profess cooperation and help in times of economic growth and

optimistic economic outlook, while solidarity might turn out to be much more difficult to sustain in times of recession and scarcity. This is particularly true given that populist and xenophobic political entrepreneurs can draw on the exacerbation of citizens' fear and grievances and that the crisis overlaps with a long history of ineffective policies in key domains, such as poverty and unemployment, immigration and asylum. Consequently, political debates are marked increasingly by antagonism, conflict and mistrust between governments and citizens. On the other hand, it remains to say that 60 years of European integration has gradually established feelings of belongingness to the European community, enabled shared identification with European institutions, as well as European and cosmopolitan identities (Delanty and Rumford 2005; Beck and Grande 2007). Moreover, European integration has furthered cross-national experiences and contacts amongst citizens, as well as transnational trust between European peoples (Delhey 2007). Finally, public opinion polls show that, in the midst of the European crisis, a majority of respondents still agree that it is desirable to give financial help to other countries in the name of European solidarity between member states, according to Eurobarometer data (2011, 76.1) and survey data by exploratory studies (Lengfeld et al. 2012).

This report tries to shed systematic light into this debate by presenting findings of a representative survey among citizens of eight European countries. The survey was conducted in the context of the TransSOL project (details provided in the next paragraph). A specialised polling company (INFO) was sub-contracted and the same questionnaire was administered in the relevant languages to approximately 2,000 respondents in each of the countries of the project (Total N 16,000). Respondent samples were matched to national statistics with quotas for education, age, gender and region and population weights are applied in the anal yzes presented in this report. The questionnaire aimed to address the major dimensions of solidarity both attitudinal and behavioural as well as the relevant independent variables.

TransSOL is an EU-funded research project that studies solidarity in Europe and aims to increase knowledge about solidarity within the general population, organized civil society and the media. TransSOL sheds light on the socio-economic, political and legal conditions that may benefit or inhibit solidarity. It identifies best practices and role models for transnational solidarity and develops evidence-based recommendations for policy-makers and civil society actors. More information is available through the project's website, reports, newsletter and policy briefs (website: http://transsol.eu/).

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Contributing knowledge to an established field of research: concepts and objectives

Solidarity is one of the key phenomena studied in the social sciences. For many decades, scholars from sociology, economics, political sciences and psychology, amongst others, have inquired into the forms and conditions of solidarity, even though our knowledge is quite limited in regard to the transnational dimension, i.e., European solidarity. This lacuna is even more serious once we move to the individual level and ask for the attitudes and practices of the European citizenry with reference to European solidarity. How strongly is the idea of solidarity shared by citizens throughout Europe, and how much are they engaged in solidarity-related activities? Is solidarity limited to specific communities or target groups, or do we detect also a universalist or cosmopolitan philanthropy dimension? What can we say about the social traits, beliefs and convictions of people engaged in solidarity activities? And which are the factors inhibiting solidarity dispositions and practices?

Previous research has not addressed these questions in any systematic manner, but a review of available studies is important to lay the groundwork for contextualising the data analyzes presented in this report. Existing evidence helps to grasp the phenomenon under study by identifying relevant dimensions and aspects, and by highlighting explanatory factors that might affect also European solidarity. First of all, previous research is important in conceptual terms, given that we need to agree what the notion of 'solidarity' is all about. In this regard, we converge with a strong strand of research that defines solidarity as the preparedness to share one's own resources with others and/or support state redistributive policies (e.g., Stjerno 2012: 2). This proposal stresses one element that has received much attention in the social sciences: namely, attitudes and dispositions. In fact, most surveys are primarily interested in measuring the readiness of citizens to share some of their resources with others, and here, a recurrent topic was the support of redistributional (social) policies and the willingness of respondents to devote their taxes to these means (Svallfors 1997; Fong 2001; Amat and Wibbels 2009; Rehm 2009; Rehm et al. 2012). This aspect is crucial for European societies, given the prominence of welfare institutions and social policies as institutionalized forms of solidarity.

Research about redistributive preferences among citizens is an important contribution to understanding the extent to which the welfare state is rooted in society. However, our own research needed to enlarge the focus in three directions to grasp the role and place of European solidarity. First, attitudes and dispositions do not determine actual practices. This means that our own survey aimed more explicitly to measure reported activities in order to get a more reliable picture about the extent to which European citizens are committed to supporting others within and beyond their countries and communities. Second, scholarly writing has tended to focus on the (financial) help to the needy, thus privileging the charitable dimension of solidarity. While this aspect is important, it downplays the political dimension of solidarity. In fact, people demonstrate solidarity with other persons in struggle or in need when participating in collective actions (e.g., public claims-making, political protests, communication campaigns) that strive to improve the situation of these groups by mobilizing public support, committing stakeholders and/or changing public policies on their behalf (Giugni and Passy 2001).

Particularly in the context of the EU, it is important to include this dimension of solidarity (Balme and Chabanet 2008; Lahusen 2013; Baglioni and Giugni 2014; Giugni and Grasso forthcoming). European solidarity is already present when people help other European citizens to raise their voice and make it heard, particularly if we are speaking of social groups at the fringes of society that are not only exposed to social exclusion, but also to political marginalization and invisibility in terms of news-coverage and interest representation. Finally, our project confirms previous research that solidarity is of little analytic and practical use when conceived of as a generalized disposition or practice. Studies recurrently highlight that solidarity is conditional and thus tied to specific issues and target groups (Komter 2005). Solidarity is related to ideas about the neediness, deservingness or social proximity of targeted groups. These targets can be vulnerable groups within society, such as the elderly, the unemployed or the disabled (Oorschot 2006), but also entire countries, such as the European Member States affected by the economic crisis (Lengfeld et al. 2012).

The research design of our survey reflected these conceptual clarifications. First, our questionnaire included questions addressing attitudes and dispositions related to solidarity, but also asked respondents to list reported activities. In asking questions about which types of solidarity-related activities individuals performed, we tried to be more demanding than previous studies by assembling information about various activities, ranging from boycotting products to active participation in voluntary associations. Second, the survey was conceived to measure not only the charitable dimension of solidarity, but also the political aspects indicated above. For this purpose, questions were based on a rights-based concept of solidarity by asking respondents whether they actively support the rights of various groups. Additionally, we assembled information on political activities and orientations related to solidarity, ranging from protest participation to policy related issues (e.g., European solidarity measures). Third, the survey aimed at gathering data on the 'vertical' and 'horizontal' dimension of solidarity. To this end, on the one hand, it included questions measuring the support of respondents for

redistributive policies within their country and at the EU level. On the other hand, it asked respondents to indicate their involvement in interpersonal forms of help and support. Finally, the interview guidelines were devoted to assessing whether solidarity dispositions and practices were generalized and/or bound to certain target groups. For this purpose, we differentiated between a spatial dimension (i.e., solidarity with people within the respondents' countries, within the EU, and beyond the EU) and an issue-related dimension by addressing three different target groups (i.e., the refugees/asylum seekers, the unemployed, and the disabled).

These nuances allowed us to gather a data set that measures solidarity within the EU in a systematic and comprehensive manner and on different levels and dimensions. On these grounds, we are able to describe levels of solidarity dispositions and activities within the eight countries under study, and give a nuanced and differentiated picture of various forms of (target-specific) solidarity. Among other things, we are able to contextualize European solidarity and compare it with other (group-bound) forms of solidarity. This descriptive aim, however, was not the only objective of this survey. More than that, TransSOL was geared to shed light on those factors that are beneficial or detrimental for solidarity at large, and European solidarity in particular. Also in this regard, the survey followed knowledge previously accumulated in scholarship on the subject. Since many studies converge in the observation that civic or social solidarity among citizens is highly patterned by a battery of factors, namely socio-demographic traits, social class, political allegiances, social capital, religious beliefs and values among others, we included these variables in our study. Scholarly writing in various areas of research identify these factors. In this regard, three strands of inquiry are of particular relevance for the discussion at hand.

A first source of inspiration comes from empirical research about redistributive preferences. These studies are interested in identifying those factors that guarantee the support of citizens for the welfare state at large, and various social policies in particular, and thus spur the backing of institutionalized forms of wealth redistribution and help (Alesina and Giuliano 2011; Amat and Wibbels 2009; Fong 2001; Rehm 2009; Rehm et al. 2012; Svallfors 1997). Studies have addressed a variety of social policy fields, among them pensions (Jaime-Castillo 2013), poverty (Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Scheepers and Grotenhuis 2005) and immigration (Banting and Kymlicka 2006; Mau and Burkhardt 2009). Evidence suggests that the support for redistributive preferences is influenced by the respondents' position in society, e.g., the 'rational calculations' tied to their state of vulnerability (Iversen and Soskice 2001; Rehm 2009) but cognitive and ideational factor also play a role. Research has pointed to the role of religion and religiosity (Stegmueller et al. 2012; Lichterman 2015), but also general beliefs about the causes of income inequality (Fong 2001) and perceptions of deservingness (Oorschot 2006) seem to play a role. In regard to the latter, research has identified several criteria that influence the judgment of deservingness: (1) the level of perceived responsibility and neediness, (2) social and spatial proximity and identity, including loyalties to ethnic groups, (3) the

recipients' attitudes and the degree of reciprocation (receiving and giving) (Oorshot 2000 and 2006; Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Luttmer 2001).

Second, the extensive field of studies on social capital and social cohesion is relevant for our discussion here since it focuses on topics that are closely interrelated to (transnational) solidarity. In this field, we find studies that are interested in forms of interpersonal help and support, which highlight the importance of (interpersonal and institutional) trust, and which emphasize the importance of memberships and active participation in civic associations and groups (Putnam et al. 2003; Oorschot et al. 2006) for the development of reciprocal trust and the bedrock of well-functioning democratic societies. In all these areas, the assumption is that social capital is the necessary 'glue' for social cohesion (Chan et al. 2006; Jeannotte 2000; Delhey 2007), and thus also essential for understanding the conditions, structures and dynamics underpinning solidarity. Similar conclusions to the above stated research have been made in regard to the conditioning factors: social class, age, and gender play a role, as well as post-materialist values and religious beliefs; societies with social cleavages and political conflicts, as well as more residual welfare state institutions provide a less conducive environment (Kumlin and Rothstein 2005; Oorschot and Arts 2005; Gesthuizen et al. 2008; Gelissen et al. 2012).

Finally, there are also lessons to be drawn from research on political behaviour in general, and social movement and protest participation more specifically. These strands of research focus on the political dimensions of solidarity, and thus help to answer the question of whether political solidarity is determined by similar factors as the ones discussed above. Scholarly writing seems to support some of the research assumptions presented before, by showing how political behaviour is patterned by social inequalities and forms of social exclusion (Brady, Verba and Schlozman 1995; Kronauer 1998). Moreover, studies agree on the fact that solidarity is also highly patterned by political preferences and orientation, e.g., along the left-right scale (Likki and Staerklé 2014). Social movement analysis adds relevant knowledge by pointing to the importance of mobilization processes lead by existing organizations and groups, with the latter considered as collective means of mobilizing, organizing and perpetuating (transnational) solidarity in terms of binding norms, commitments and behaviours (Smith 1997; Balme and Chabanet 2008; della Porta and Caiani 2011; Baglioni and Giugni 2014). That is, being a member or follower of a certain initiative, association, organization or movement implies a commitment not only to specific norms of solidarity, but also to palpable acts as well (e.g., membership fees and charitable donations, joint political protests, events of claims-making).

Based on these insights, the survey included a series of questions that geared to gather data on all these explanatory factors. This information should allow us to identify those variables that tend to boost or inhibit solidarity dispositions and practices along the various dimensions identified before. First, we are interested to see whether solidarity is patterned along cross-national differences. Moreover, gender, age, and other types of socio-demographic characteristics could also be studied. The study of civil societies, for

instance, has shown that voluntary engagement tends to replicate the public/private divide by centring more strictly on male-dominated and 'public' activities, to the detriment of female networks of care and help (Neill and Gidengil 2006; Valentova 2016). It has been shown that younger and older citizens are more active in social movements, following different grades of 'biographical availability' in the life course (Beyerlein and Bergstrand 2013). And we know that migrants are often involved in cross-national networks of support and help (Glick Schiller et al. 1995; Morokvasic 1999; Recchi and Favell 2009). Second, we wish to test whether solidarity is patterned by the differential access of citizens to valued resources and skills, such as income and education, by the respondents' social status and affiliation to social class (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Cainzos and Voces 2010), and by different levels of social exclusion and deprivation (Kronauer 1998). Third, we wish to analyze to what extent solidarity is conditioned by social capital, following the propositions of research devoted to civil society and social movements (Putnam et al. 2003; Oorschot et al. 2006; Jenkins 1983). In particular, we wish to highlight the role of institutional and interpersonal trust, of informal networks and social relations, and of associational involvement in a wide range of social, cultural and political organizations and groups. Fourth, we aim to identify the interrelation between political orientations and behaviours on the one side, and solidarity dispositions and practices on the other. In particular, we try to assess whether relevant factors investigate at the national level – e.g., levels of political participation, political preferences and ideological orientations (e.g. Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003; Amat and Wibbels 2009; Likki and Staerklé 2014), also differentiate citizens with regards to European solidarity. Finally, we wanted to identify the role of ideational and cognitive factors, too, assuming that the collective identities and the attachment to groups and communities might condition levels of (European) solidarity (Luttmer 2001; Komter 2005;) as much as religion and religiosity (Stegmueller et al. 2012; Lichterman 2015), moral norms and visions of a desirable social order (Stets and McCaffree 2014).

European solidarity: a descriptive account of eight European countries

The results from our online survey in eight member states, conducted by the TransSOL-project in November and December 2016, show that European citizens testify a readiness to engage for solidarity. A strong majority of respondents supports the attempts of the EU to help countries outside Europe in fighting poverty and promoting development, with 62% supporting and only 14% opposing these measures (see Table 1). Moreover, a majority of respondents reports having engaged in solidarity activities for people in their country (51%), including donating money or time, protesting and engaging in voluntary associations (see Table 2). Finally, we see that European citizens strongly support solidarity-based (redistributive) public policies (see Table 3), with 68% considering the reduction of big income inequalities as an important goal. In other words, the traditional European social model is not questioned by our interviewees.

TABLE 1: Development aid

"The European Union provides development aid to assist certain countries outside the EU in their fight against poverty and in their development. How important do you think it is to help people in developing countries?" (Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no 649435))

	Not at all (%)	Not very (%)	Neither (%)	Fairly important (%)	Very important (%)	Total N
Denmark	4	8	26	43	19	2183
France	5	9	32	38	16	2098
Germany	3	6	18	46	28	2064
Greece	6	7	21	44	22	2061
Italy	4	7	18	46	26	2087
Poland	5	16	35	35	8	2119
United Kingdom	6	9	27	37	21	2083
Switzerland	3	8	20	44	25	2221
Total	5	9	25	42	20	16916

TABLE 2: Support of other people

"Have you ever done one of the following in order to support the rights of people/groups?" (Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no 649435))

	People in your own country (%)	People in other countries within the EU (%)	People in countries outside the EU (%)	Disability rights (%)	The unem-ployed (%)	Refugees/ asylum seekers (%)	Total N
Denmark	47	23	35	44	27	30	2183
France	47	25	30	50	24	20	2098
Germany	51	31	40	52	27	34	2064
Greece	62	35	36	62	58	36	2061
Italy	47	32	33	49	36	28	2087
Poland	59	35	37	65	40	27	2119
UK	38	19	25	35	19	22	2221
Switzerland	59	34	45	67	33	33	2083
Total	51	29	35	53	33	29	16916

Note: at least one of the following was named: protest, donate money or time, bought or boycotted goods, passive or active membership

TABLE 3: Eliminating inequalities

Eliminating big inequalities in income between citizens (Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no 649435))

	Not at all important (%)	Not very important (%)	Neither (%)	Fairly important (%)	Very important (%)	Total N
Denmark	5.4	12.7	33.1	32.8	16	2,183
France	2.4	5.8	20.3	37.5	34	2,098
Germany	2	6.2	22.8	39.3	29.7	2,064
Greece	1.8	3.5	16.7	35.1	42.9	2,061
Italy	1.4	3	14.9	40	40.7	2,087
Poland	2.6	5.4	21.7	36.5	33.8	2,119
UK	3.6	6.7	28.5	35.8	25.4	2,083
Switzerland	3.2	7.9	22.3	38.9	27.7	2,221
Total	2.8	6.5	22.6	37.00	31.1	16,916

At the same time, however, citizens are less inclined to support European solidarity. Only 29% of the respondents have engaged in activities in support of the rights of people in other EU countries (see Table 2). Moreover, the general public is divided when it comes to the question whether governments and the EU should engage in solidarity measures within the EU. In the case of fiscal solidarity measures in support of countries with public debts the supporters outweigh the opponents only slightly (41% vs. 30%), with 29% undecided respondents (see Table 4). In regard to refugees, the group opposing more funds for EU measures slightly outweighs the supporters (39% vs. 35%), again with a considerable share of undecided (see Table 5). The support is somewhat stronger in countries requiring help in the risis: i.e., the support is stronger in Greece and Italy with regard to public debts, and higher in Germany, Greece and Denmark with regard to refugees.

TABLE 4: Fiscal solidarity: pay public debts

"The EU is currently pooling funds to help EU countries having difficulties in paying their debts. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this measure?" (Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no 649435))

	Strongly disagree (%)	Disagree (%)	Neither (%)	Agree (%)	Strongly agree (%)	Total N
Denmark	14	24	34	23	5	1939
France	15	19	30	28	8	1903
Germany	15	26	25	27	6	1914
Greece	7	4	24	38	26	1975
Italy	5	11	18	47	19	1928
Poland	8	12	42	33	6	1938
United Kingdom	18	23	25	27	7	1861
Switzerland	14	22	31	28	5	1992
Total	12	18	29	31	10	15455

TABLE 5: Fiscal solidarity: help refugees

"Would you support or oppose your country's government offering financial support to the European Union in order to help refugees?" (Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no 649435))

	Strongly oppose (%)	Somewhat oppose (%)	Neither (%)	Somewhat support (%)	Strongly support (%)	Total N
Denmark	16	17	25	27	14	2183
France	26	19	29	21	5	2098
Germany	12	17	24	35	12	2064
Greece	24	15	23	31	8	2061
Italy	21	25	28	23	4	2087
Poland	18	19	33	24	5	2119
United Kingdom	20	18	27	26	10	2221
Switzerland	21	25	20	28	6	2083
Total	20	19	26	27	8	16916

As such, our results show that European citizens are ready to help, but our findings suggest that most citizens are skeptical towards a universalistic and humanitarian conception of solidarity (i.e. solidarity towards human beings as such) that entails unconditional solidarity. On the contrary, the motives of people to support fiscal solidarity within the EU (see Table 6) show that the largest group subscribes to the idea of reciprocity and deservingness. According to these views, solidarity in the EU is an exchange relation of giving and receiving help. Moreover, groups receiving help need to show that they are worthy of being helped. European solidarity suffers immediately, when

citizens have the feeling that support measures are one-sided and potentially misused. This conditionality is confirmed in regard to migrants.

TABLE 6: Fiscal solidarity: reasons

"There are many reasons to state for or against financial help for EU countries in trouble. Which one of the following best reflects how you feel?" Multiple answers possible (in %) (Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no 649435))

	Denmark	France	Germany	Greece	Italy	Poland	UK	CH	Total
Financial help has also beneficial effects for the own country	20	13	15	19	16	24	15	13	17
It is our moral duty to help other member states that are in need	18	16	21	27	20	20	17	15	19
member states should help each other, as somewhere along the way every country may require help	33	37	45	59	52	49	31	42	44
Financial help should not be given to countries that have proven to handle money badly	40	37	40	22	26	38	42	38	35
Don't know	19	17	9	8	13	11	16	12	13
Total N	2183	2098	2064	2061	2087	2119	2083	2221	16916

Table 7 shows that only a minority of 12% is against granting migrants access to social benefits and services. However, access is conditional on two things: they should have worked and payed taxes (42%), and they should become citizens of the country (30%). A minority of respondents (16%) is more generous, granting migrants access more easily.

TABLE 7: Migrants and social rights

When should migrants obtain rights to social benefits and services as citizens do? (Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no 649435))

	Immediately on arrival (%)	After living 1Y (worked or not) (%)	After worked & paid taxes 1Y (%)	After citizenship (%)	Never (%)	Total N
Denmark	7	9	37	36	11	2,183
France	5	9	41	26	18	2,098
Germany	9	13	46	24	7	2,064
Greece	8	8	34	35	15	2,061
Italy	8	7	38	36	12	2,087
Poland	7	8	43	32	10	2,119
UK	6	8	46	27	14	2,083
Switzerland	6	9	52	23	10	2,221
Total	7	9	42	30	12	16,916

Overall, we see that for most citizens, solidarity is rights-based and thus tied to some notion of citizenship, i.e., delimited by legal entitlements and mutual obligations (e.g., such as receiving social benefit and paying taxes or contributions). This might explain why respondents privilege rights-based solidarity within "traditional" national communities, whereas relations of solidarity are weaker across national borders. However, this does not necessarily exclude European solidarity. European citizens seem to insist that people or countries receiving help should be part of a rights-based system of entitlements and obligations because solidarity is a reciprocal relation of giving and receiving. Apparently, Europeans do not see yet the EU as an "accomplished" political community establishing and guaranteeing common rights and mutual obligations. This seems to reflect a general feeling that there is not yet a fair system of rules in place that balance the mutual rights and obligations of the European peoples within the EU. In other words, the promotion of European solidarity requires a conception of social citizenship that is firmly anchored in a political and social union.

European Union membership and attachment

The issue of European solidarity cannot be discussed without reference to the feelings of satisfaction and belongingness with regards to the EU. The results presented in Table 8 show opinions on jobs and employment if the country were outside the EU (in Switzerland we asked if they country were *in* the EU). In all countries, except for Switzerland and Greece, the idea of being outside the EU is seen as detrimental for jobs and employment. In Switzerland, about 50% think that being inside the EU would be bad for jobs (with only 11% thinking that it would be good); in Greece 38% per cent think it would be good to be outside the EU (against 31% thinking it would be bad).

Moreover, the gap between those thinking being outside the EU would be bad for jobs and employment is smaller in the other Southern European countries- Italy and France and the UK. On the other hand, it is quite large, signaling greater positive feelings about EU membership in Denmark, Germany and Poland. Across the countries, a sizeable proportion ranging from about 17 percent in Greece and almost 30 percent in France think it would make no difference and between 14 and 24 percent of respondents are not sure.

TABLE 8: Effect on jobs and employment if country was *outside* the EU (in %)
(Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no 649435))

	Would be good	Would be bad	Would make no difference	Don't know	Total
Denmark	16.2	37.8	21.7	24.3	100
France	23.8	27.6	27.8	20.8	100
Germany	14.4	43.7	26.5	15.4	100
Greece	38.4	31.2	16.5	14.0	100
Italy	25.9	35.4	21.9	16.8	100
Poland	10.6	52.1	18.1	19.2	100
Switzerland*	11.3*	49.6*	25.0*	14.1*	100
UK	26.5	33.0	24.3	16.1	100
Total	20.8	38.9	22.7	17.6	100

*Notes: *in Switzerland we asked if the country was *in* the EU*

Table 9 asks respondents how they would vote if there was a referendum on their country's membership of the EU (in Switzerland we asked about joining). Results show once more that across countries, Switzerland prefers to stay outside and Greece would prefer to leave; there is a very slight preference for leaving in the UK as well. Once more gaps are smaller in Italy and France than in Denmark, Germany and Switzerland.

TABLE 9: Referendum on EU-membership (in %)
"If there was a referendum on your country's membership of the EU how would you vote?"
(Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no 649435))

	Remain (*Become a member)	Leave (*Stay outside)	Would not vote	Don't know	Total
Denmark	47.6	32.1	4.2	16.1	100
France	42.7	30.3	7.6	19.4	100
Germany	61.3	23.5	6.0	9.3	100
Greece	37.7	46.3	7.9	8.1	100
Italy	43.1	36.1	6.4	14.5	100
Poland	64.0	14.8	7.8	13.4	100
Switzerland*	10.5*	74.3*	5.7*	9.5*	100
UK	44.3	45.2	3.7	6.8	100
Total	48.7	32.6	6.2	12.6	100

*Notes: *in Switzerland we asked about joining the*

Table 10 asks respondents if they believe that the UK should remain or leave the EU. A slightly higher proportion of UK respondents felt the UK should leave than those saying it should remain. Reflecting patterns found previously, the Swiss, Greeks, French and Italians all think that the UK should leave whereas the Danes, Germans and Polish think it should stay.

TABLE 10: Should the UK remain a member or leave the EU? (in %)
(Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no 649435))

	Remain	Leave	Don't know	Total
Denmark	45.1	34.5	20.4	100
France	30.3	46.6	23.1	100
Germany	51.7	35.7	12.6	100
Greece	32.2	51.7	16.1	100
Italy	39.8	43.2	17.0	100
Poland	59.0	19.5	21.5	100
Switzerland	26.3	55.1	18.7	100
United Kingdom	45.3	47.1	7.6	100
Total	41.1	41.7	17.2	100

Table 11 presents results from asking respondents whether they feel that on balance their country's membership of the EU was good, bad or neither a good nor a bad thing. In Switzerland, we asked about potentially joining the EU. Reflecting once more the patterns found previously, the Swiss think joining the EU would be bad, and the Greeks think that being members of the EU is a bad thing. On the other hand, all the others think it's on balance a good thing but the gap is smaller in the UK, Italy and France than in Denmark, and particularly Germany and Poland.

TABLE 11: EU-membership good/bad (in %)
"Generally speaking, do you think that your country's membership of the European Union is ...?"
(Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no 649435))

	A good thing	A bad thing	Neither good nor bad	Don't know	Total
Denmark	38.9	25.3	26.3	9.6	100
France	34.4	26.5	29.8	9.3	100
Germany	53.3	15.6	26.6	4.5	100
Greece	30.7	34.0	31.1	4.2	100
Italy	35.8	30.6	26.4	7.2	100
Poland	62.7	9.2	20.9	7.2	100
Switzerland*	8.0*	67.6*	18.1*	6.3*	100
UK	40.3	35.4	18.0	6.4	100
Total	37.8	30.8	24.6	6.9	100

*Notes: *in Switzerland we asked about joining the EU (joining the EU would be…)*

Table 12 presents results asking respondents if they think their country has more directly benefited from being a member of the EU (in Switzerland we asked if they benefited from NOT being members). In Switzerland, over 70% think the country has benefited from NOT being part of the EU. In Greece, Italy and – by a tiny margin – in France, higher proportions think the country has not benefited from membership. Even in the UK a higher % felt they benefited from membership. In Denmark, Germany and Poland again attitudes are very positive in terms of feeling that the countries benefited from being part of the EU.

TABLE 12: Benefited from EU.-membership (in %)

"Taking everything into account, would you say that your country has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?" (Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no 649435))

	Benefited	Not benefited	Don't know	Total
Denmark	48.6	29.8	21.7	100
France	36.2	37.6	26.2	100
Germany	58.5	27.4	14.2	100
Greece	37.2	53.1	9.6	100
Italy	28.2	52.7	19.1	100
Poland	70.9	14.3	14.8	100
Switzerland*	70.3*	13.4*	16.3*	100
UK	43.7	37.0	19.3	100
Total	49.4	32.9	17.7	100

*Notes: *in Switzerland we asked if the country benefited or not from NOT being a member of the European Union*

Table 13 compares attachment to the European Union to other entities including the world/humanity, one's country, region and one's city. It is very clear that the EU scores the lowest levels of attachment compared to the other spatial entities. The strongest attachment to the EU is clearly in Poland, followed by Germany, Italy and France, then the UK, Denmark, Greece and Switzerland. By and large an interesting pattern is that despite quite high levels of dissatisfaction with EU membership Italy and France still show very high levels of attachment to the EU whereas, despite high satisfaction Danish attachment is lower than one would expect it to be.

TABLE 13: Attachments (% fairly and very attached)
"Please tell me how attached you feel to …?" (Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no 649435))

	European Union	The world/humanity	Country	Region	City
Denmark	33.4	64.1	90.8	62.2	80.3
France	47.1	72.7	88.6	80.5	79.0
Germany	53.3	69.0	83.7	79.1	82.1
Greece	32.3	73.8	90.5	85.0	85.0
Italy	49.1	73.4	78.1	80.2	82.3
Poland	65.8	79.9	89.8	87.8	87.6
Switzerland	28.1	74.6	89.1	84.0	81.1
United Kingdom	40.1	67.7	82.5	75.8	79.7
Total	43.5	71.9	86.7	79.3	82.1

Table 14 shows the relationship between feelings of solidarity and attachment to the European Union. This allows us to have a look at to what extent feelings of solidarity coincide with feelings of attachment to the EU. It is clear from the results that those who feel the strongest feelings of attachment to the European Union are also those that are most likely to support the pooling of funding to help countries in debt.

TABLE 14: Solidarity and attachment to the EU (% fairly and very attached)
(Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no 649435))

Agreement with pooling funds to help countries in debt *(see Table 4)*	Attached to the EU
Strongly disagree	18.2
Disagree	31.2
Neither	43.5
Agree	59.0
Strongly agree	58.7
Don't know	30.6
Total	43.5

Attitudes towards migration and the inclusion of migrants

Currently, the discussion about European solidarity also covers the issue of migration. Citizens' attitudes towards immigration are an important indicator of the society's openness towards non-nationals and thus also for the inclusivity of solidarity. In this regard, our survey adopted a series of questions that were geared to measure public attitudes towards groups migrating into one's country from the EU and beyond it. A particular focus was put at Syrian refugees from the most recent crisis affecting these individuals fleeing their war-torn countries.

Table 15 looks first at respondent opinions in terms of the types of measures they think their government should pursue in terms of economic migrants from within the European Union. As we can see, across countries most people tend to accept economic migration in so far as "there are jobs they can do". Lower proportions are more liberal agreeing to "allow all those who want to come". In particular, Greeks and Poles tend to be most welcoming followed by Italians and Germans and Danes, then the French with the Brits and the Swiss being the least welcoming with only 10% selecting this option. Indeed, the Brits and Swiss display the highest proportions of respondents agreeing that there should be "strict limits on the number allowed to come". Up to 8 % of individuals in the UK would completely prohibit economic migration from the EU (8.1% also in France).

TABLE 15: Immigration policies for EU-citizens (in %)
"For each of the following groups, what measures do you think the government should pursue? People from European Union coming to ***COUNTRY*** to work?" (Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no 649435))

	Allow in all those who want to come	Allow people to come as long as there are jobs they can do	Put strict limits on the number allowed to come	Prohibit people from these countries coming here	Don't know	Total
Denmark	14.6	52.1	18.9	3.8	10.7	100
France	13.0	42.2	25.1	8.1	11.6	100
Germany	16.3	46.2	26.1	4.8	6.7	100
Greece	22.0	44.7	23.0	4.2	6.1	100
Italy	16.7	48.5	20.7	5.7	8.3	100
Poland	20.0	44.2	19.1	5.3	11.5	100
Switzerland	7.2	46.4	36.8	4.2	5.4	100
United Kingdom	9.7	41.2	31.8	8.0	9.4	100
Total	14.9	45.7	25.2	5.5	8.7	100

Table 16 presents results from the same question but asking specifically about economic migrants from non-EU countries. Here we see that people are considerably less welcoming across countries compared to the results for EU migrants presented in Table 14 and discussed above. The most welcoming are Italians with about 8% suggesting all the people who want to come should come, followed by 7.8% of Greeks, 7% of Germans, 6.2% in France and Poland, 5.6% in Denmark, 5.3% in the UK and only 4.5% in Switzerland. In Denmark, Italy, Greece, and Poland respondents are more likely to support economic migration provided there are jobs; whereas, in France, Germany, Switzerland and the UK respondents are more likely to prefer putting "strict limits on the number allowed to come" from non-EU countries. Up to 14.5% of people in France want to completely prohibit non-EU people from coming to their country, followed by 12.3% of Germans and about 9-10% in the other nations adopting this very unforgiving position on migration.

TABLE 16: Immigration policies for non-EU-citizens (in %)

”For each of the following groups, what measures do you think the government should pursue? People from non-EU countries coming to ***COUNTRY*** to work?” (Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no 649435))

	Allow in all those who want to come	Allow people to come as long as there are jobs they can do	Put strict limits on the number allowed to come	Prohibit people from these countries coming here	Don’t know	Total
Denmark	5.6	40.3	31.8	10.7	11.6	100
France	6.2	32.8	34.3	14.5	12.2	100
Germany	7.0	32.1	40.3	12.3	8.3	100
Greece	7.8	38.0	37.2	11.1	5.9	100
Italy	8.0	46.6	27.4	9.3	8.8	100
Poland	6.2	34.8	33.7	11.9	13.4	100
Switzerland	4.5	35.3	45.1	9.2	5.8	100
UK	5.3	37.0	37.2	10.5	10.0	100
Total	6.3	37.1	35.9	11.2	9.5	100

Table 17 specifically presents opinions on admitting Syrian refugees fleeing the war relative to the numbers being accepted at the time of survey. Here the UK, Denmark and Switzerland stand out as the countries more likely to say higher numbers should be admitted. In most countries however, the largest proportions of citizens prefer either keeping the current numbers or admitting even lower numbers (the latter is particularly true in Greece and Italy). In Poland 36.3% argued that none should be allowed to come at all, followed by France with 25% taking this harsh position, 22% in Italy, 20% in the UK and around 17% in Denmark and Greece and 12-13 in Germany and Switzerland.

Finally, Table 18 shows the relationship between EU solidarity and attitudes to migration and more specifically Syrian refugees. The results clearly show that individuals who feel attached to the EU are also more generous with regards to refugees, wanting them to be accepted in greater numbers.

TABLE 17: Immigration policies for refugees (in %)

"How do you think your country should handle refugees fleeing the war in Syria? " Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no 649435)

	Admit higher numbers	Keep numbers coming about the same	Admit lower numbers	Should not let any come in	Don't know
Denmark	17.1	29.0	27.0	16.8	10.1
France	10.0	21.1	29.8	25.0	14.1
Germany	9.3	35.8	37.0	12.7	5.3
Greece	8.6	18.9	49.5	16.9	6.1
Italy	8.7	23.4	34.8	22.0	11.1
Poland	9.2	24.5	15.8	36.3	14.2
Switzerland	15.6	38.0	27.3	12.2	7.0
UK	18.1	24.9	24.8	20.0	12.3
Total	12.1	27.0	30.6	20.2	10.0

TABLE 18: Solidarity with Syrian Refugees and attachment to the EU (% fairly and very attached)

(Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no 649435))

What should be done regarding refugees fleeing war in Syria (see Table 17)	Attached to EU
Admit higher numbers	61.0
Keep numbers coming about the same	53.6
Admit lower numbers	38.9
Should not let any come in	29.1
Don't know	38.6
Total	43.5

Conclusion

Solidarity is a pressing issue of our times. The various crises affecting the European Union since 2008 show there is a general need for solidarity between the European people, especially when dealing with the consequences of the Great Recession and/or the welcoming of the refugees fleeing from war, prosecution and poverty. But how strong is solidarity within the European citizenry? And how generalized is the readiness of Europeans to help others in need? This introduction has provided first findings by comparing the levels of solidarity in terms of reported practices and attitudes in the counties under analysis.

The key conclusions of our cross-national assessment of solidarity on several dimensions including attitudes to the European Union and migration. We found that a strong majority of respondents supports the attempts of the EU to help countries outside Europe in fighting poverty and promoting development; a majority of respondents reports having

engaged in solidarity activities for people in their country, including donating money or time, protesting and engaging in voluntary associations; European citizens strongly support solidarity-based (redistributive) public policies with almost three-quarters considering the reduction of big income inequalities as an important goal. In other words, the traditional European social model is not questioned by our interviewees. Anal yzes of the motives of people to support fiscal solidarity within the EU show that the largest group subscribes to the idea of reciprocity and deservingness. Apparently, Europeans do not see yet the EU as an "accomplished" political community establishing and guaranteeing common rights and mutual obligations. This seems to reflect a general feeling that there is not yet a fair system of rules in place that balance the mutual rights and obligations of the European peoples within the EU. In other words, the promotion of European solidarity requires a conception of social citizenship that is firmly anchored in a political and social union.

Moreover, with respect to attitudes to the EU and migration we found that in all countries, except for Switzerland and Greece, the idea of being outside the EU is seen as detrimental for jobs and employment. In the other countries, the gap between those thinking being outside the EU would be bad for jobs and employment is smaller in the other Southern European countries- Italy and France and the UK whereas it is quite large, signaling greater positive feelings about EU membership in Denmark, Germany and Poland. Asking whether they feel that on balance their country's membership of the EU was good, bad or neither a good nor a bad thing reflects the patterns found previously, the Swiss (in Switzerland we asked about potentially joining the EU) think joining the EU would be bad, and the Greeks think that being members of the EU is a bad thing. On the other hand, all the others think it's on balance a good thing but the gap is smaller in the UK, Italy and France than in Denmark, and particularly Germany and Poland. Results also showed that those who feel the strongest feelings of attachment to the European Union are also those that are most likely to support the pooling of funding to help countries in debt. Moreover, across countries most people tend to accept economic migration in so far as "there are jobs they can do". Moreover, with respect to specifically Syrian refugees, the results clearly show that individuals who feel attached to the EU are also more generous, wanting them to be accepted in greater numbers.

This introductory chapter has shown that solidarity is a complex and multidimensional concept that has different meanings and understandings as well as different relationships to adjacent attitudes and concepts. We have also shown that there are important cross-national differences as well as that solidarity, attachment to the European Union and attitudes in favour of migration are interlinked. In what follows, the national-focused chapters will further aid to shed light on who is most committed to overt solidarity and who is more strongly opposed as well as show mechanisms underlying solidarity in contemporary Europe.

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Universalism versus deservingness: Reconsidering solidarity in the Danish welfare state

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Introduction

The Danish (and Scandinavian) welfare model is based on the principle of universalism: providing equal services in the form of tax-financed benefits to all citizens independently of their individual contributions. Solidarity traditionally has a high value in the small and egalitarian Scandinavian societies and can rely on the homogenous composition of the populations in terms of ethnic, religious and linguistic unity. This is generally seen as generating high levels of support for the welfare state. At the same time, a strong and omnipresent welfare regime can be said to release citizens from the need to invest in substantive support action. The basic needs of vulnerable groups like the unemployed, disabled or refugees are served by the universal welfare state as a centralized care-taker for the wellbeing of society.

At the same time, the traditional inclusive welfare regime in Denmark has over the last decade undergone an important, and often unnoticed, transformation. In a series of reforms by the liberal-conservative coalition which governed the country from 2001 to 2011 and, again since 2015, welfare services have, in general, become more conditional and distinctions between various layers of need have been introduced. The new conditionality of welfare services applies, for instance, in the labor market with an emphasis on 'flexicurity' and the measurement of individual contributions on which unemployment and welfare benefits are made dependent (Strøby-Jensen, 2011). The inclusiveness of welfare state services has also been questioned with regard to the Europe of free movements, where the same rights apply indiscriminately to all EU citizens moving to and residing in Denmark.

In this chapter, we analyze attitudes in support of the welfare state and engagement in solidarity actions in support of marginalized groups within the Danish population. We first provide an overall picture of the level of involvement of Danes in solidarity actions towards different kinds of vulnerable groups at the local, national, European and global level. Secondly, we test out, how Danes contest solidarity towards these groups at different levels, and, in particular, whether Danes apply criteria of deservingness to distinguish between the needs of different vulnerable groups in society and the urgency to take solidarity actions towards them. The overall question to be analyzed is the extent of support for the welfare state in a traditionally welfare-generous country in the backdrop of a European context that faces the challenges of migration, economic recession and increasing competiveness. It is argued that universal welfare states are put under pressure by such developments, first by external challenges and the necessity to respond to demands of new and increasingly diverse groups in need of assistance; and

secondly, by the internal contestations of citizens who withdraw their support, oppose a further extension of welfare services and redefine solidarity.

To the extent that a formally universal welfare state is upheld, Danes also continue to be proud of a high-taxed, universal welfare regime, even though in practice many welfare services have become conditional and criteria of deservingness are applied when deciding about the needs of diverse groups of people. The question to be analyzed is whether, in line with recent welfare state adjustments, the new conditionality of the welfare state is also reflected in Danish views of welfare and solidarity. In the context of the Europe of free movement, we can further ask whether countries based on universal welfare principles and with high levels of protection are more inclined to apply criteria of deservingness. And how do Danish citizens perceive deservingness with regard to different groups of receivers of welfare services (the unemployed, disabled and migrants/refugees)? Through our survey, we can measure whether Danes are still satisfied with the welfare services offered, whether they trust authorities to provide adequate welfare services and whether the equal access to welfare benefits for all persons in need is still considered as something positive.

Contextualizing solidarity: the Danish case

High-tax welfare states, like Denmark, arguably rely on strong ties of solidarity (Jöhncke, 2011). The kind of solidarity ties that support redistributive welfare regimes must go beyond schemes of charity and include a notion of reciprocity in terms of sympathy felt towards co-citizens and a notion of shared responsibility in terms of acting together as a political community (Habermas, 2013). Solidarity that supports redistribution therefore typically goes hand in hand with a strong civil society and with civic associations that promote trust and mutual support among the members of the political community (Banting and Kymlicka, 2017; Hall, 2017; Calhoun, 2002). To make a strong welfare state sustainable, citizens would not only support the principle of reciprocal solidarity in abstract terms, but also put it into practice in daily interactions of mutual support and ties of sympathy among the citizens.

The advance of neo-liberal market economies with a stronger emphasis on individual responsibilities has posed a threat to this idea of civic solidarity. Liberal market policies have been backed by all Danish governments over the last two decades and, in particular, by the liberal-conservative coalitions which have governed the country since 2001. As a consequence of such policies, Denmark has experienced a general retreat of universal welfare services with a new emphasis on individual responsibility (Jensen and Torpe, 2016; Larsen et al., 2015). The weakening of social provisions of redistribution and a cutting down of welfare services can be expected to correlate with a decline of solidarity. Taxation as a core indicator to reciprocal solidarity (Stjernø 2004: 2) is challenged as fewer people are prepared to share resources with others, or simply because the capacities of the welfare state to redistribute income are limited. Strong and universal welfare states are in this sense particularly vulnerable, when their solidarity is tested by global

developments or pressures of European Market competition (Martinsen, 2005). Globalization and also EU liberalization can do greater damage to solidarity in homogeneous and high-tax welfare states than in liberal, individualized market economies. Such damage to traditional forms of centralized, welfare-state based solidarity does not however preclude the possibility that at the same time, and parallel or in direct response to Europeanisation and market liberalization, new forms and practices of decentralized solidarity develop. European integration is in this sense perceived by some groups within Danish society both from the right and from the left as a major threat to national solidarity, but it might as well stand for a general reorientation of solidarity practices. As such, solidarity becomes increasingly contested by new organizations and new forms of civic mobilization addressing European and global issues and increasingly operating at a European and global scale. In Denmark, such new solidarity contestations are pushed, on the one hand, by the Danish People's Party (*Dansk Folkeparti*) which is Denmark's second largest party, gaining 21,1 percent of the vote in the 2015 general elections and supporting the current right-liberal minority government in Parliament. The Danish People's Party defends an exclusive notion of national solidarity as a community of belonging based on strong ethnic ties. It is opposed to strong and centralized welfare regimes emphasizing instead individual responsibility, subsidiarity and the need to cut down the high tax burden in Denmark. In the European Parliament, the Party joined the Eurosceptic European Conservatives and Reformists group opposing EU sovereignty transfers, EU redistributive policies and European and global solidarity engagement. On the other hand, solidarity contestations are pushed by the political left, in particular by the Red-Green Alliance (*Enhedslisten*) gaining 7,8 percent of the vote in the 2015 elections. The left opposition emphasizes the fight against social inequality and poverty as one of their main priorities and is in favour of strengthening and expanding the welfare state. This includes solidarity towards marginalised groups, including foreigners and refugees. As such, *Enhedslisten* combines a perspective of national and global solidarity but is explicitly anti-EU and campaigns for a withdrawal of Denmark from its European commitments.[1]

Civil society associations have reacted to the new conditionality of the welfare state by shifting orientation and providing new services to the increasing number of those who are falling through the security net. As we are able to show in our survey of Danish civil society activism, solidarity action by COS is shifting from being supplementary of state based services to becoming more substantial and also more confrontational. Instead of assisting the state in implementing welfare, civil society is found to increasingly replace the state and to fight in opposition to state imposed restrictions and financial cuts (refer to WP2 and WP4 findings).

The economic and financial crisis that was triggered in 2008 marks some further modest changes but not a radical rethinking of the Danish welfare regime. In general terms,

[1] See, for instance, their statement on 'Europe in the crisis' with an explicit reference to solidarity and welfare in the wider Europe and the world (http://org.enhedslisten.dk/tema/europa-i-krise-fakta-og-muligheder last accessed May 10, 2017).

Denmark has turned more restrictive towards vulnerable groups in society cutting welfare state expenditures and putting a stronger emphasis on the obligation to work. As a result of the most recent policy changes, social benefits for the unemployed, refugees and disabled persons have been cut or have become more conditional with preference given to measures that seek to reintegrate welfare recipients into the labour market[2]). This is however in line with the tradition of the Danish welfare state, which has always combined a generous social safety net and free education with the obligations to pay high taxes and to contribute actively to the wealth of society through work, volunteering and social responsibility (Christoffersen et al., 2013).

This robustness of the welfare system in times of crisis can be explained by Denmark's efficient crisis management and quick economic recovery after suffering from recession in the initial crisis years. Macro-economic data shows, in fact, that the country and its population did not suffer from a substantial loss in wealth and, while recession or economic stagnation endured in many parts of Europe, Denmark could soon profit again from economic growth (refer to WP1 report). Denmark does not only continue to be the country with the most equal income distribution in Europe, its average annual wage is also one of the highest in Europe while inflation is at a historical low.[3] Unemployment is steadily declining since 2011 with a current unemployment rate (December 2016) of 6.5%, which is below the EU28 average of 8,3% and far below the rate of countries most hit by crisis like Italy (11.9%), Spain (19.1%) and Greece (23,1). Youth unemployment is with 10 % in 2016 far below the average in other European countries were the youth unemployment rate is generally double or more than double, than unemployment rates for all ages.[4] This downwards trend indicates the recovery of the labor market which offers job opportunities for young adults not only from Denmark but increasingly also for young mobile EU citizens. More recent periods (2011-2014) saw a strong increase in intra-EU mobility flows towards Denmark (+44 %), made up mainly by young adults in the East, South-East and South of Europe who escape economic hardship by moving to Denmark (European Commission 2014: 20-21).

In the field of immigration and asylum, we observe over the last five years a shift in the number of incoming migrants from non-EU to intra-EU mobility, the former group discriminated by new restrictive legislation and the latter group profiting from the principle of non-discrimination of EU citizenship and attracted by labour and education opportunities.[5] These circumstances have become a concern for the Danish government and society, which – according to Jørgensen and Thomsen (2013) – is reflected in an increasing negative tone in the media towards both groups: EU and Non-EU migrants. A

[2] See our overview of most recent policy changes and restrictions in the field of unemployment, disabilities and immigration/asylum in Duru et al, 2017.
[3] http://www.dst.dk/da/Statistik/nyt/NytHtml?cid=22577
[4] http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Unemployment_statistics#Recent_developments_in_unemployment_at_a_European_and_Member_State_level
[5] https://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/D7322BD4-B6ED-43D7-AFEA-00F597BE0800/0/statistical_overview_2013.pdf

more recent change is marked by the arrival of refugees which has led to a political controversy about the humanitarian obligations of Denmark and about solidarity within the EU. The Danish government's restrictive policies in the autumn of 2016 were criticized by neighboring Sweden and Germany and ultimately led to the suspension of *Schengen* rules of free movement and border control, which still persist today.

Despite these general challenges and tendencies in the transformation of the welfare state, Denmark remains exceptional in the European context in terms of the modest economic impact of crisis and *de facto* economic growth over the last few years. This might explain why the economic crisis also left only a low imprint on the attitudes of Danes, which remain strongly supportive of the high tax and welfare regime, express high trust in the state, political parties and parliamentary representation[6] and according to the World Happiness Report published annually by the United Nations Sustainable Development Solutions Network continue to be among the world's 'happiest nations'. Happiness, trust and life satisfaction have become a matter of national pride and the good comparative rankings of Denmark are widely publicized and commented upon in the media and by political representatives. Our survey confirms these patterns, in terms of high life satisfaction, which is also backed by material gains: 72.5% of all Danes are satisfied or highly satisfied (6-10 on Likert scale) with their life (compared to 36% in Greece) and the great majority of Danes (86.7%) declare that they have financially profited over the last five years (better or much better off (6-10 on Likert scale), compared to 11.4% in Greece).

In line with this image of Denmark as the worlds' happiest nation, a strong emphasis is placed on solidarity, which has two components: (1) support of redistribution measured, e.g. in the willingness to share income through taxes and (2) trust and civic virtue, measured, e.g. in the willingness to engage in solidarity action and contribute actively to the well-being of the community of citizens. This is often paired with an attitude of moralizing solidarity, i.e. to emphasize the duties of active contributions to communal life and blame deviators. Solidarity is a civic virtue but it is also a moral obligation. An attitude of moralizing solidarity can, in fact, be used as a justification of exclusive practices towards 'non-deserving' groups of society, an argumentation often used by populist-right parties. This raises the question whether there is a widening gap between perception of Denmark as the happiest country in the world and practices of exclusion towards growing numbers of poor or persons deprived of rights. The Danish pride in welfare and solidarity might thus nourish an illusion, if Danes continue to belief in the uniqueness of their welfare system and continue to trust in the state's capacities of care taking while at the same time failing to recognize important systemic changes that put pressures on people in need, push more and more Danes into private insurance schemes or exclude them from the net of social security. As has been noted in a recent report published by a NGO active in the field:

[6] Trust in political institutions and impact on the crisis on political attitudes is measured by Standard Eurobarometer (http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm)

> Although Danish society claims to uphold the basic principles of a welfare state – solidarity among citizens and provisions for the needy – in practice, public discourse and government policies have been creating a more libertarian, individualistic model that strays from its founding principles. Until the Danish people stop moralizing about solidarity and acknowledge the changing nature of their welfare system, Denmark's poor and excluded will grow in number to fill this dangerously widening gap between perception and practice.[7]

We have identified and described the changing state-civil society relations and new solidarity practices emanating from it elsewhere (refer to WP2 and WP4 publications). Based on these insights, it is now our task to analyze more closely public attitudes and public attention in relation to these new solidarity challenges and contestations. The question is whether public opinion is leaning more towards a universalistic or an individualistic welfare arrangement and is it aware of negative consequences, such the increasing poverty of sections of the population. Do Danes continue to support universalistic welfare or do they back the new state policies that make welfare conditional of contributions? Are Danes also aware of the European and global dimensions of solidarity and of the challenges and opportunities offered by European market integration? The question is further whether this shift is also noticeable in a reorientation of civic practices (so-called solidarity action). Does solidarity action also turn towards these new people, such as for instance refugees or the long-term unemployed, in need of assistance? Is there a general awareness of the transition of the Danish welfare model from universalism providing services indistinguishably to all persons in need to more conditionality? The question is whether this new conditionality of the welfare state is also supported by general attitudes. Do public attitudes build on criteria of deservingness or do they still support universal welfare schemes? Are, for instance, the needs of new groups of recipients for solidarity recognized by the Danish population? Is there an awareness of global solidarity challenges and possible solutions and are citizens themselves involved in such transnational and local networks or individual forms of solidarity action?

We organize our analysis of reported solidarity practices around an alternative set of hypotheses: the first concern support of the traditional belief systems and the notion of universal welfare and the second concern the conditionality of solidarity based on the notion of deservingness. In the first case, reported solidarity practices and attitudes would uphold the founding principles and distinctive traits of the Danish (Scandinavian) welfare regime. In line with the existing literature, we would expect high levels of support for the welfare state and involvement in solidarity practices to be distributed equally among the population encompassing all age groups, gender, regions and ideological and political

[7] http://www.humanityinaction.org/knowledgebase/59-the-danish-illusion-the-gap-between-principle-and-practice-in-the-danish-welfare-system

affiliations. Such a uniform pattern of solidarity would reflect the homogeneity of Danish society represented by centralized state structures. We would further expect that a centralized, strong and omnipresent welfare regime releases citizens from the need to invest themselves in substantive support action. Danes would trust that the universal welfare state takes care of the basic needs of vulnerable groups like unemployed, disabled or refugees. Mutual support would be voluntary and not required for the subsistence of these persons in need. We would therefore expect Danish civil society to assume a subsidiary function vis-à-vis state centered welfare: solidarity action would often supplement existing services and not be substantive for the well-being or survival of vulnerable groups (in contrast to countries where state solidarity is lacking or inefficient). Citizens would rather opt for indirect instead of direct support actions and their solidarity would encompass several levels: trust and mutual assistance at local and national level and a European and global problem awareness. We would ultimately expect that the universal welfare state releases forces for the mobilization of transnational solidarity, which becomes especially a target of private, individual support action and charity.

In the second case, we would be able to identify patterns of conditionality in the reported solidarity practices. We would be able to describe how Danes distinguish between different recipients of solidarity along criteria of deservingness that justify an unequal distribution of services and differentiated access to welfare. We would further expect that solidarity varies along the lines of the expected contributions of solidarity recipients to Danish society. An instrumental view on solidarity would thus prevail over the inclusive norms of universal welfare. In particular, we would be able to describe, whether solidarity is redefined in a way that either claims of welfare chauvinism or claims of nativism become more legitimate. In the first case, we would assume that Danes support the claims that welfare benefits should become conditional on individual contributions measured in terms of 'having served' for the national community (deservingness based on merit). In the second case, Danes would support the claims that welfare benefits should be reserved only for those considered 'natives' by being born into the national community (deservingness based on ethnic and cultural bonds).

As a result of this shift from universalism to deservingness, we would further expect that solidarity would become more confrontational with citizens either supporting restrictions of welfare through the application of criteria of deservingness or opposing them. This confrontation would follow an ideological left-right cleavage, leading to the polarization of the Danish population shifting from the support of centre-right or centre-left parties to the political extremes. Conditionality in the reported solidarity practices would also encompass several levels, with strong preference given to the local and national enactment of solidarity and more exclusive attitudes towards European and global solidarity action. As regards patterns of transnational solidarity, we would, on the one hand, expect many Danes to be reluctant to extend welfare services to groups of European migrants or refugees and to make access of these groups conditional. On the other hand, following the new confrontational style through which solidarity is

negotiated, we would expect Danes to engage in more political forms of solidarity action in direct opposition of state policies or in response to deficits of state welfare.

In our explanatory analysis we test variation along two sets of variables, arguing that solidarity is mainly shaped by social resources and constraints, and belief systems and normative ideas. We expect that patterns of support or opposition of universal welfare are on the one hand shaped by the social traits of our respondents and the unequal distribution of the means and opportunities to commit themselves to solidarity. We control the impact of social structure along variables such as income, education and social capital. Moreover, we add socio-demographic controls such as age, gender and migration background. On the other hand, we assume that reported solidarity is conditioned also by attitudinal dispositions and preferences. To these factors we count political attitudes (e.g., left-right orientations, political efficacy, authoritarianism), social beliefs (e.g., subjective class position, feelings of deprivation, xenophobia) or cultural orientations (e.g., collective identities, gender roles, religious orientation). To do so, we analyze data from our original survey conducted in all seven countries of the project and described in the first chapter of this report.

Findings

Reported solidarity practices

First of all, we wish to investigate whether reported solidarity practices in Denmark reflect a new conditionality in the way Danish population distinguishes solidarity receivers as deserving or undeserving. As shown in Table 1, approximately half of the population (46.6%%) declares to be engaged in some sort of solidarity action in Denmark, but only about one fourth in the EU (23.9%) and little more than one third (36%) outside the EU. Solidarity action can thus be said to be relatively widespread and to be multi-level, i.e. accounting for needs primarily inside Denmark but also with a strong focus outside of Denmark, both in Europe and globally.

TABLE 1: Engagement in solidarity action at national, European and global level (% participated in some form of action)

National	EU	Outside EU
46.6	23.3	34.5

Table 2 shows the type of solidarity actions that people become involved in at the national level. Among the solidarity actions listed at national level, donating money is by the far the most widespread activity (28.4% of all Danes), followed by buying or refusing to buy products in support of solidarity goals (17.5%), and donating time (12.8%). Engaging as a passive (10.8%) or active (9.6%) member of a solidarity organization ranks lower and

participating in a protest march lowest (9.2%) among the reported solidarity activities (Table 2).

TABLE 2: Type of solidarity action at national level (in %)

	Participated
Attended, a march protest or demonstration	9.2
Donated money	28.4
Donate time	12.8
Bought or refused to buy products	17.5
Engaged as passive member of an organisation	10.8
Engaged as an active member of an organisation	9.6

Low engagement activities like donating money or consumer awareness are expectedly more widespread than more engaging activities like donating time, protesting in the streets or aligning with an organization. This is in line with our hypothesis that the availability of state help for persons in need correlates with more indirect forms of solidarity action. Solidarity action is however not apolitical, as some political awareness is needed, for instance, when consumers decide as citizens to boycott particular products. Explicit political activism in support of solidarity like participation in street protests or active membership in political groups is however not widespread, i.e. only one out of ten Danes engages in such activities.

Looking more closely at conditional factors of solidarity behavior, we first test a number of social structure variables. When it comes to age, we find that solidarity action at national level is equally spread over all generations, but that there are greater differences between younger and older people with respect to solidarity action in the EU and outside of EU, i.e. the younger generations below 35 is generally more engaged in European and global solidarity action (Table 3).

TABLE 3: Engagement in solidarity action at national, European and global level (% participated in some form of action) by age group

	National	EU	Outside EU
18-24	47.6	32.2	41.1
25-34	50.0	30.3	37.7
35-44	44.4	21.1	29.8
45-54	47.6	20.0	32.8
55-64	48.5	22.7	33.6
65 years and older	42.9	18.6	34.2
Total	46.6	23.3	34.5

In other words, young people do not withdraw from national solidarity action and replace it with European and global engagement, but engage more equally at all levels. There is

thus no trade-off between national and European/global solidarity. The higher engagement of young people in transnational solidarity action is even more striking if one considers the necessity to invest higher resources for transnational actions, like time and money that are more easily available for elder generations. Moreover, age differences are more pronounced when it comes to solidarity within the EU. Comparing the young age group of 18-24 with the middle age group of 45-54, their engagement in national solidarity action is identical (both 47.6%), their engagement in global solidarity action is wider (41.1% versus 32.8%) but the widest gap is to be found in European solidarity engagement (32.2% versus 20.0%). These differences are even more pronounced when comparing the young generation with the elder generation (above 65), which shows lowest engagement in EU solidarity (18.6%) but a slight increase in global solidarity action (34.2%). Possible explanations for this EU bias are differences in support of the EU between the age groups that translate into different patterns of national, European and global solidarity. Perhaps generations coming of age during the time of EU consolidation and making use of EU opportunities for education, work and travel feel more solidarity at this level. Other possible explanations refer to differences in support action (like donating money, which typically involves elder age-groups and is more typical for expressing global solidarity and less common as an expression of European solidarity).

There are instead no gender differences when it comes to explaining support action at all levels (Table 4), and no differences when it comes to residence (city or rural areas) (Table 5). On the other hand, education explains higher engagement in solidarity action at all levels, with differences more marked for European/global solidarity action (Table 6). Moreover, there are also important inequalities by occupational class of chief of household with professionals participating in national actions of solidarity at 15 points higher than those in unskilled manual jobs (Table 7). Overall, we can thus conclude that solidarity action is spread relatively equally between genders and places of residence but spread unevenly in terms of education and social class with individuals holding more resources more likely to get involved.

TABLE 4: Engagement in solidarity action at national, European and global level (% participated in some form of action) by gender

	National	EU	Outside EU
Male	46.1	22.9	35.3
Female	47.0	23.6	33.7
Total	46.6	23.3	34.5

TABLE 5: Engagement in solidarity action at national, European and global level (% participated in some form of action) by place of residence

	National	EU	Outside EU
A big city	48.7	27.0	36.6
Suburbs or outskirts	49.4	22.8	36.2
Town or small city	43.8	20.7	32.1
Country village	43.8	19.8	32.7
Farm or home in the c	50.1	29.6	37.5
Total	46.6	23.3	34.5

TABLE 6: Engagement in solidarity action at national, European and global level (% participated in some form of action) by education

	National	EU	Outside EU
University or higher degree	54.6	30.0	45.9
Secondary school	48.1	23.9	35.4
Less than secondary school education	38.6	17.6	24.9
Total	46.6	23.3	34.5

TABLE 7: Engagement in solidarity action at national, European and global level (% participated in some form of action) by occupational class

	National	EU	Outside EU
Professional or higher	56.3	30.4	49.0
Manager or Senior Administrator	52.4	26.6	38.2
Clerical	42.2	17.0	30.4
Sales or Services	47.9	22.5	33.3
Foreman or Supervisor	46.8	30.1	41.2
Skilled Manual Work	46.4	25.5	31.0
Semi-Skilled or Unskilled manual	41.0	18.3	27.3
Other (e.g. farming)	38.2	21.1	26.7
Total	46.6	23.3	34.5

Social capital as measured through sociability i.e. meeting friends is associated with national level solidarity i.e. with those who meet friends regularly also most engaged in solidarity action at the national level (Table 8). Higher social capital does not show a higher likelihood to engage in European and global solidarity, however.

TABLE 8: Engagement in solidarity action at national, European and global level (% participated in some form of action) by social capital (frequency of meeting friends)

	National	EU	Outside EU
Less than once this month	34.0	30.4	49.0
Once or twice this month	45.9	26.6	38.2
Every week	52.9	17.0	30.4
Almost every day	47.9	22.5	33.3
Total	46.6	23.3	34.5

Summing up the social structure variables, we find that solidarity behavior of the Danish population is overall rather uniform and follows expected patters. The preferred action forms for Danes are passive activities like donating money, but still a substantial portion of the population also invests in more engaging and political forms of solidarity. Gender and residence do not impact on solidarity engagement, while there are interesting differences between age groups, educational levels and occupational classes.

TABLE 9: Engagement in solidarity action at national, European and global level (% participated in some form of action) by attachment to country and fellow citizens

	Attached to Denmark			Attached to people in Denmark		
	National	EU	Outside EU	National	EU	Outside EU
Not at all attached	51.0	36.9	42.8	38.5	29.8	31.2
Not very attached	49.5	34.5	45.8	51.4	34.0	46.4
Fairly attached	50.8	25.9	37.5	44.3	21.5	31.6
Very attached	45.9	21.5	33.1	49.2	23.3	37.4
Don't know	15.8	13.6	15.7	46.5	22.3	29.5
Total	46.6	23.3	34.5	46.6	23.3	34.5

Among the attitudinal patters, it is interesting to note that strength of national identity measured in terms of attachment to one's country matters less to explain engagement in national solidarity action, but more to explain European and global solidarity. People who feel least attached to Denmark as a country would still engage in national solidarity and are those most likely to engage in European and global solidarity. Whereas people who feel strongly attached to Denmark as a country are engaged in national solidarity action (even though interestingly to a lower extent that those who feel no attachment), these groups of people are the least likely to engage in European and global solidarity. This is different when the strength of national identity is measured in terms of ethnic belonging: respondents who feel highly attached to other Danes show a very similar pattern of solidarity engagement at all levels with a clear focus on national solidarity compared to the group of respondents who feel a strong attachment to Denmark as a country. People who feel no attachment to other Danes are instead expectedly least engaged in national solidarity but do also show lower solidarity engagement at all levels compared to the

group of Danes that feels attachment to Denmark as a country (Table 9). Strong ties of ethnic belonging thus translate into strong patterns of national solidarity as much as strong ties of territorial belonging generate national solidarity. Weak ties of ethnic belonging instead translate into weak solidarity engagement at all levels, whereas weak ties of territorial belonging go hand in hand with strong solidarity engagement at all levels.

Danes who feel no or little attachment to other Danes born in the country also engage less in national solidarity action compared to Danes who feel a strong attachment to fellow Danish citizens. Yet the ratio of engagement in European and global solidarity between these two groups is the same, i.e. those who feel no attachment to fellow nationals do not compensate their lack of attachment by higher engagement in European and global solidarity, while those who feel a strong attachment to their co-nationals also translate this into solidarity action towards them and engage, to minor degrees in global and European solidarity. Again, we find that there is no trade-off between engagement in national and European/global solidarity, which are not exclusive but complementary. A strong feeling of solidarity with co-nationals is thus also a good predictor for engagement in global and European solidarity, while respondents who feel not attached to co-nationals show low solidarity engagement at all levels (Table 9).

We further find a strong correlation with political interest, which matters at all levels, but most when it comes to global solidarity and least when it comes to solidarity within the EU (Table 10). Political awareness makes it more likely that Danes engage in global solidarity and to a minor degree also national solidarity, but affects least engagement in EU solidarity.

TABLE 10: Engagement in solidarity action at national, European and global level (% participated in some form of action) by political interest

	National	EU	Outside EU
Not at all interested	28.8	14.6	18.0
Not very interested	40.5	18.9	27.4
Quite interested	48.0	21.8	36.2
Very interested	63.8	39.5	51.1
Don’t Know	21.8	13.8	17.7
Total	46.6	23.3	34.5

From the literature, we would expect that in a consociational democracy, like Denmark, ideological cleavages matter less and that citizens, while aligning with political parties, show similar patterns of solidarity and support for the welfare state (Cristopherson et al, 2013). This is not exactly corroborated by our data where a left-right cleavage in solidarity action is clearly visible (Table 11). While members from all political parties are involved in forms of solidarity action to some extent, we find that supporters of right and liberal parties are less engaged in solidarity action than supporters of left and social-democratic parties. The two solidarity poles are marked by citizens who feel attached to the populist

Dansk Folkeparti (Danish People's Party) (39.4% involved in solidarity action) and citizens who feel close to the left-socialist *Enhedslisten* (Red-Green Alliance) (66.4%). This difference between the left and the right is even more pronounced when it comes to engagement with global solidarity with the same poles formed by *Danske Folkeparti* (22.8% involved in global solidarity action) and *Enhedslisten* (57.8%). In the case of solidarity action within the EU, engagement is generally lowest and party differences matter less, but it is interesting to note that the two Eurosceptic parties *Dansk Folkeparti* and *Enhedslisten* form again the poles, with only 16.9% of *Dansk Folkeparti* supporters engaged in EU solidarity action and 42.6% of supporters of *Enhedslisten*.

TABLE 11: Engagement in solidarity action at national, European and global level (% participated in some form of action) by party attachment

	National	EU	Outside EU
Socialdemokratiet	48.9	22.6	38.2
Dansk Folkeparti	38.5	16.3	22.0
Venstre	42.5	21.6	30.7
Enhedslisten.	64.1	41.1	56.2
Liberal Alliance	43.8	25.7	33.2
Det Radikale Venstre	57.6	34.2	53.2
Socialistisk Folkepar	63.4	29.2	48.2
Det Konservative Folk	38.7	24.2	32.1
Other party	55.8	29.6	47.6
No party	39.3	16.2	26.3
Don't know	38.8	18.5	24.5
Total	46.6	23.3	34.5

TABLE 12: Engagement in solidarity action at national, European and global level (% participated in some form of action) by closeness to political party

	National	EU	Outside EU
Not very close	43.0	18.5	32.3
Quite close	51.0	25.3	37.8
Very close	54.7	35.6	46.9
Don't know	36.6	21.3	28.2
Total	46.6	23.3	34.5

The closer you feel connected to a political party, the more likely you are to engage in solidarity action; closeness to a political party impacts on solidarity action most in the case of global solidarity and least in the case of solidarity within the EU (Table 12). In general, it appears that the contours of the field of EU solidarity action are still blurred, while Danish citizens across all variables prefer to engage in solidarity nationally, and to a lower extent invest in global solidarity action (the half-third-fourth model: i.e. 50% national, 33%

global and 25% EU). While Danes have a generally positive attitude towards the EU, their willingness to invest personally in solidarity action within the EU is low, and, in fact, lowest among the supporters of Eurosceptic right-populist parties.

TABLE 13: Engagement in solidarity action at national, European and global level (% participated in some form of action) by opinion on EU membership

	National	EU	Outside EU
A good thing	51.2	27.6	41.6
A bad thing	46.1	20.2	29.7
Neither good nor bad	47.0	23.8	33.8
Don't know	27.7	12.7	20.6
Total	46.6	23.3	34.5

TABLE 14: Engagement in solidarity action at national, European and global level (% participated in some form of action) by opinion on whether country benefits from EU membership

	National	EU	Outside EU
Benefited	51.4	27.7	40.7
Not benefited	45.7	20.9	31.1
Don't know	36.9	16.8	25.4
Total	46.6	23.3	34.5

There is a slight positive bias in engagement in solidarity action amongst those who are more positive about EU membership (Table 13). The same thing is true of those who think the country benefited from EU membership (Table 14). On the other hand, a substantial number (20.2%) of Danes who think that EU membership is a bad thing still engage in EU solidarity action (compared to 23.3% of the whole population and 27.6% among those who think that EU membership is a good thing).

Moreover, opponents of EU redistribution policies engage less in solidarity action at all levels, which either reflects a general non-solidary attitude or a preference of altruistic forms of solidarity action over redistributive ones (Table 15). There does not seem to be a trade-off between solidarity at different levels.

TABLE 15: Engagement in solidarity action at national, European and global level (% participated in some form of action) by support for EU debt relief

	National	EU	Outside EU
Strongly disagree	37.5	13.7	23.4
Disagree	44.1	21.0	27.9
Neither	47.2	22.6	34.7
Agree	57.4	32.2	48.5
Strongly agree	65.9	44.5	58.4
Don't Know	31.2	14.4	22.8
Total	46.6	23.3	34.5

Finally, personal perceptions of justice tend to be linked to a strong focus on engagement in national solidarity action (Table 16). Those who thought they received less than their just share would still be willing to invest in national solidarity, and to some extent global solidarity, but are less likely to engage in EU solidarity action. The biggest differences between those who feel they have more or about their fair share and those who feel they get less are in EU and global solidarity.

TABLE 16: Engagement in solidarity action at national, European and global level (% participated in some form of action) by what the respondent feels they receive relative to others in their country

	National	EU	Outside EU
More than your fair share	51.5	41.9	51.9
Your fair share	49.1	22.7	37.9
Somewhat less than your fair share	49.3	26.7	34.4
Much less than your fair share	47.6	24.0	31.9
Don't know	30.5	13.4	16.7
Total	46.6	23.3	34.5

Our results have shown that a substantial number of Danes who feel strongly attached to their country would still engage in European and global solidarity action. This confirms findings from other studies, which have shown that identities expressed at different levels are not exclusive: people can feel attached to their nations, but at the same time feel also belonging to a European and global community (Risse, 2010). This difference between attitudinal variables and engagement in solidarity action is weakest in the case of support of EU membership.

'Cosmopolitans' and 'Europeanists' differ to some degree from 'nationalists' but are not fundamentally different in their engagement in transnational solidarity action. Instead, we find a strong partisan division line with supporters of extreme left parties being strongly engaged in transnational solidarity and supporters of extreme-right parties weakest. This division is however less visible when comparing supporters of the two

centre-mainstream parties *Social-Democrats* and *Venstre*, showing very similar patterns of national and European solidarity engagement and only some minor deviation in the case of global solidarity engagement. Left-leaning and right-leaning Danes are thus clearly distinct in their solidarity behavior, while the centre-leaning majority displays very similar patterns of solidarity engagement. If polarization happens, this takes place mainly at the fringes of the political spectrum. Given the strong mobilization potential of *Dansk Folkeparti* with a potential to affect the whole population (as in the case of the refugee crisis), such forms of enhanced solidarity contestation still mark an important shift from the consensus orientation that has traditionally characterized Danish society.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have identified a number of factors that condition solidarity practices in Denmark. By putting to test the principled universalism of the Danish welfare state, we found that solidarity practices are relatively widespread across the population in Denmark and that Danes in all age groups and independently of gender, and residence engage in solidarity above all at the national level but to significant degrees also at global and European level (the half-third-fourth model: i.e. 50% national, 33% global and 25% EU). On the other hand, we found some differences by education and occupational class with less resourceful individuals less likely to engage. Apart from these socio-structural variables, we also considered a number of attitudinal variables. Among those, identity (as measured through territorial and ethnic belonging) matters less, but party affiliation is found to be a strong predictor for differences in solidarity behavior with adherents of the right-populist Danish People's Party engaged less in solidarity at all levels and the sympathizers of the Red-Green Alliance engaged most. In a next step, the conditionality of solidarity needs to be also tested with regard to manifestations of solidarity towards different vulnerable groups in society. This would allow for a more systematic identification of conditional factors of solidarity in relation to different levels (national, European, global), and reference groups (unemployed, disabled and immigrants/refugees).

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The social and political dimensions of solidarity in France: A cross-field comparison of unemployment and immigration

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Solidarity in fields of vulnerability: An Introduction

Solidarity has come under heavy strain in Europe over the last decade; at the same time, the Great Recession has had a tremendous impact on the attitudes and behaviours of European citizens (Giugni and Grasso, 2015). Often when the crisis has been represented in the media, it has been accompanied by pictures of human despair. For example, we could mention images poor unemployed people queuing at charity restaurants and sleeping rough (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2015) among the indifference of bystanders (Andersson and Sudin, 2016; Darley and Latane 1968); or immigrants drowning in European waters with their babies due to the negligence of rescue officers, while tourists sunbathe on the closest beaches.[8] These pictures may well indicate that, fifteen years after the global call that 'another word is possible', Europe has entered a new season of *homo homini lupus*. Crucially, such (appalling) pictures call for a more systematic treatment of the concept of solidarity, and the way it is (still) linked to the social and political engagement of Europeans, in order to assess the extent to which Europeans themselves can still rely on this bonding element as a resource for their citizenship community (Burgeois, 1896; Hanagan, 1980; Hyman, 1986).

Extensive public debates on major European affairs have warned European citizens that the Great Recession has provided the best conditions for the rise of various populisms. However, discussion has seldom touched on the idea that bonds of solidarity – which have certainly accounted for the formation of citizenship in Europe – may have lost their grip once and for all, making Europe more an archipelago of interests lacking the flesh and feelings of a true social and political community. As a crude example of recent developments, solidarity has been forgotten, even when Europe has coped with its most difficult moments such as Brexit and Grexit (Berend, 2016; Calhoun, 2017), leading to some serious criticisms of the European project (Dainotto, 2007). This growing 'desensitization' (Arendt, 1984; Wilde, 2013) has gone so far as to call those countries which had little responsibility for global economic crisis 'pigs', in a propagandistic attempt to rewrite history of winners and losers (de la Dehesa, 2006).

Perhaps nowhere more than in France is the study of solidarity crucial to appraise the crossroads at which European solidarity stands. Solidarity is a major pillar of the French constitutional ethos, built into the brick of 'brotherhood' (*fraternité*) and symbolically flagged out in the Revolutionary tricolour and national anthem. But its policies and

[8] See for example the article "11 October 2013 migrant tragedy: Italians navy officers placed under investigation", *The Independent*, 23 October 2016; or the article "Stiamo morendo, per favore: le telefonate del naufragio dei bambini", *L'Espresso*, 9 May 2017.

economic performances have been scrutinised, criticised, and put under pressures to cut down public support and promote a more functional market competition. In particular, this chapter approaches the study of French solidarity through the comparison of two main fields of vulnerability, namely, unemployment and immigration. Our focus on solidarity for the unemployed follows the fact that this group has possibly faced the greatest erosion of welfare entitlements, a declining level of daily social conditions, and falling expectations of being reinserted into the labor market (Chabanet, 2016 and 2014). Immigrants, meanwhile, have been the object of many restrictive measures. This underscores the negative agenda of successive governments, left or right, which have deterred new arrivals, rather than providing solidarity and protection. Our definition of solidarity refers to both attitudes and concrete behaviours, while at the same time cutting across the usual gap that social scientists emphasise between the social and political realms. Indeed, the distinction between the social and the political dimension is useful for the purpose of this chapter, since dynamics of solidarity may refer more strongly either to attitudes and behaviours that take French citizens as a cohesive 'social body' which shares equal rights and mutual acknowledgement, or to attitudes and behaviours that take French citizens as an influential 'political community' which translates its 'general will' into policies and law-making.

This chapter starts by presenting the two fields of unemployment and immigration, and in particular the theoretical foundations for their selection when dealing with attitudes and behaviours of solidarity across the social and the political dimension. We then investigate the main characteristics of solidarity attitudes and behaviours across the two fields of unemployment and immigration. An additional section focuses on the main factors impacting upon the cross-field variations of solidarity. In this case, regression analysis is helpful to assess the extent to which the impact of French citizenship as a social body performs *vis-a-vis* the impact of French citizenship as political community. We also assess the extent to which the impact of these social and political dimensions remains strong, regardless of the effect of usual determinants of individual agency in the social sciences such as as age, gender, and education. In the conclusions, we sum up the main findings, placing extra emphasis on challenges to be tackled by future research.

Solidarity, Unemployment, Immigration

Any study of solidarity must be willing to critically examine the idealised picture of 'brotherhood' that is an unconditional pillar of French Republicanism. No doubt, France is a country where people enjoy shorter working hours compared to many other European countries, where dismissed workers have often united with other altruistic groups under the same banners and at the same demonstrations, and where citizens of immigrant descent (the 'ethnic minorities' in the linguistic and conceptual translation of other European countries) are often selected to lead national and subnational executives, or large corporations such as AirFrance and Renault. But beyond this type of anecdotal evidence, we also know that processes of welfare retrenchment have been going on for a

long while. They have brought about new meanings, rhetoric, and practices of solidarity, as well as changing, possibly, attitudes and behaviour of solidarity.

Undoubtedly, the two fields of unemployment and immigration can be singled out for these processes of welfare retrenchment. Beginning with unemployment, and in consideration with its tighter links with the labor market, the French debate has offered space to examine controversies about (neo)liberalization and the weakening of national work *vis-à-vis* international capital. Emphasis should especially be placed on the growing rates of unemployment, from 7.4% to 10.0% between 2001 and 2015. In particular, throughout the 2000s and the 2010s, different issues such as work "activation", long-term unemployment, and social dumping came to a head with huge protests against a contractualist approach to solidarity and the broader supply-focused trend of EU policies. Conditions governing unemployment benefits have become more restrictive, the use of sanctions has increased, while the latest reform of the French labor market in 2016, the *Loi Travail*, has spelled out many cases where employers can use economic redundancy.

As regards the immigration field, political developments throughout the 2000s and 2010s have equally signalled an overall process of declining solidarity, as well as an increasingly restrictive response from the French state. This restrictive response has included continuous evictions and the final clearing of the 'Jungle', the encampment near the Northern city of Calais; tough border controls at the time of the 'Arab spring' and the Syrian war, thus denying solidarity to the large number of Tunisians and Syrians willing to reach France; as well as an increasingly tough fight against irregular migration. In fact, the hard stance against irregular immigration has gone as far as implementing coercive measures against those who provide spontaneous and individual-based aid to immigrants. These coercive measures have found a legal basis in article L622-1 of the Code for Entry and Residence of Foreigners and Right of Asylum (CESEDA) that bans any action that helps somebody for irregularly entering France. In the eyes of many pro-migrant associations and volunteers, these coercive measures – which have often included the detention of people who have offered shelter or other kind of help to immigrants – have formalised the *de facto* existence of 'solidarity crime' (Müller, 2009 and 2015).

Hence, this decline of solidarity in top-down French law, and policy-making calls for appraising the extent to which similar declining trends can be detected in terms of the bottom-up attitudes and behaviours of French citizens. Accordingly, we aim to identify meaningful characteristics that distinguish people who, by means of their attitudes and behaviours, stand in solidarity with the unemployed and immigrants respectively. Research on attitudes and behaviours of solidarity has so far relied on relatively few empirical accounts that are informed by original comparative data. Yet the focus on attitudes and behaviours 'on behalf of beneficiaries' in the fields of unemployment and immigrants have emerged in some seminal treatments that have dealt with these issue fields (Cinalli 2004 and 2007, Giugni and Passy 2001). In particular, both the headway and the limits of these studies call for a stronger attention to be focused on both the social and the political dimensions of solidarity. We think that the study of these two dimensions

is useful to appraise the intimate nature of solidarity: the way that solidarity is intertwined with citizenship as a social body sharing equal rights and mutual acknowledgement on the one hand, or with citizenship as a political community who speaks and decides politically for itself (Cinalli 2017).

This distinction between social body and political community can be helpful to explain some major characteristics in the way that France deals with the unemployed and immigrants. Take the field of immigration: France takes itself as a "civilising power" (Burrow, 1986), where immigrants are the objects (rather than the subjects) of policy-making, at least until they become fully integrated into the political community of French citizens and its 'general will' (Schnapper, 1994). The force of this Republican norm is in huge contrast, for example, with Britain, where a long-standing tradition of managing and reproducing the plurality of interests gives a much stronger political force to the interests of immigrants and 'ethnic minorities' (Parekh, 2005). French Republicanism, accordingly, is likely to corroborate a stronger impact of main social determinants – namely, social trust in other people and associational engagement – upon solidarity with immigrants, or at least stronger than with the unemployed.

Simply put, people who have lower scores on these social determinants will more likely doubt that immigrants can quickly complete their integration into a cohesive social body of citizens; as a consequence, the social dimension of citizenship will have a stronger impact in the field of immigration, at least by comparison with the field of unemployment. By contrast, the impact of political determinants – namely, political interest and voting – is expected to be stronger in the unemployment field. French citizens who have a strong interest in politics and do participate politically will more likely see the unemployed as a group that needs immediate support to avoid the weakening of the political community of citizens (given that their full rights and acknowledgement in the social body of equal citizens is not the focus of any concern).

Ultimately, we expect that social the social and the political dimension of being a French citizen will account for cross-field variations, which will be distinguishable beyond the simpler expectation that both dimensions are supposed to have an impact that goes in the same direction. This latter more general expectation is in line with a number of scholarly works that have argued that high performances in terms of political attitudes and participation (which here we take as political interest and voting) are especially successful in contexts where associations and social organizations play an important role in linking their members to politics (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Lichterman, 2005). While seminal studies on political engagement have emphasised that social organizations provide the "tool box" and the "training" for political participation (Verba and Nie, 1972: 184), as well as the necessary feelings of efficacy to engage in political activities (Almond and Verba, 1963), social capital scholars have emphasised the idea that associations act as "schools of democracy" that teach skills, civic virtues and instil attitudes that are valuable for political participation and that encourage practices of engagement (Putnam, 1993 and 2000). At the same time, scholars who prioritise the role a good political

community has for the development of a good social body have put the emphasis on the impact that political engagement has on social trust, norms, and exchanges (Tilly, 2008).

A few final words must be said to justify the selection of our main four variables to explain cross-field variations of solidarity. While associational engagement refers to either formal membership or informal participation to associations' activities, the study of social trust includes a number of variables that refer to family, inter-personal friendship, and trust in people in general. The crucial impact of associational 'bonds' on solidarity is clear when considering the sense of shared purpose and common belongingness which they can mobilise. Scholars, however, have also emphasised the importance of exchanges through personal networks that can be accessed on an individual basis (Lin 2001). As regards political engagement, our decision follows that these two variables are almost ubiquitous in all studies that look at the contribution that individuals make to, and take from, the broader political community to which they belong (Nie et al., 1996, Parry et al., 1992), whether these studies establish a positive relationship between political interest and voting (Verba et al., 1995) or question this relationship (Dreyer Lassen, 2005).

Solidarity in France: a cross-field perspective

Using a cross-field comparison, we can ask a number of questions along the social and political dimensions. In particular, we can appraise the extent to which the social trust and associationism of French people are similar or dissimilar across the two fields, and repeat the same type of analysis by focusing on political interest and voting. In a second and more explanatory step, we can ask whether the social and political dimension are related according to some tight patterns across the two fields, and in particular, whether the social dimension is indeed more strongly accounts for solidarity in the field of immigration compared to the field of unemployment. Starting with the analysis of the social dimension, emphasis should be placed on the relatively low percentage of respondents who consider that most people can be trusted.

Concerning associational engagement, findings show that only a small proportion of respondents is a member or volunteer of an association or other civil society organization. The percentage grows to (a limited) 26% when considering individuals who donate money to an association. Similarly, results remain stable when considering participation or assistance to specific activities. Twenty-nine percent of respondents have taken part in activities led by associations or civil society organizations to support the rights of vulnerable groups. A comparison between those who have engaged within structures is therefore in contrast with those who have acted within a structure and also those who support their solidarity causes (National Assembly 2015). However, by taking together the overall amount of volunteers (19%), members (26.7%) and occasional or regular participants to activities of association (29%), it can still be concluded that one individual out of three is concerned by associational engagement.

TABLE 1: Social dimension of solidarity in general

Positive opinion and willingness to help		
	Freq.	Percent
No	2	0.1
Yes	2095	99.9
Total	2098	100.00
Engaged in activities of supporting		
	Freq.	Percent
No	610	29.1
Yes	1487	70.8
Total	2098	100.00
Total proportion of respondents having positive opinion or willing to suppor otherst		
	Freq.	Percent
No	1	0
Yes	2096	99.9

Note: % based on respondents selecting specific answer questions

TABLE 2: Activities and Engagement in Organisations/Associations

Volunteers		
	Freq.	Percent
No	1686	80.4
Yes	411	19.5
Total	2098	100.0
Members		
	Freq.	Percent
No	1536	73.2
Yes	561	26.7
Total	2098	100.0
Participates in Activities		
	Freq.	Percent
No	1485	70.8
Yes	612	29.1
Total	2098	100.00

Note: % based on respondents selecting specific answer questions

TABLE 3: Social Trust (individual based)

% who think people can be trusted		
	Freq.	Percent
No	1618	77.1
Yes	479	22.8
Total	2098	100.0

Note: % based on respondents selecting specific answer questions

The analysis of the social dimension can be complemented with an analysis of the political dimension of political trust and voting. Considerable scholarship in the social sciences has made strong use of these political dimensions to offer a different viewpoint, say, from theories of social capital, with a view to reinforce the link between citizenship 'from below' and decision-making. In relation to this type of bottom-up political dimension, our data show that respondents can be generally characterised as highly politically integrated. First, four out of five surveyed individuals confirmed they have voted in the last elections or they would vote at present if elections took place. Although a narrow 8.2% is a political party member, almost 74% of respondents have taken part in activities or events organised by political parties. The latter comprise i.e. attending meetings, making regular financial donations, signing a petition and participating in strikes, among others. In line with the previous observation, the prevalence of a high interest in politics and political issues is confirmed by the data. The combination of respondents who read the newspaper regularly, have contacted a political party or politician represent more than 90% of the individuals. Those who self-define as highly interested in politics represent 58% of all participants in the survey.

TABLE 4: Political behaviours and attitudes

% voters		
	Freq.	Percent
Does not vote	364	17.3
Votes	1733	82.6
Total	2098	
Political Party Members		
	Freq.	Percent
	172	8.2
Total	2098	100.0
Takes part in activities/events organized by political parties		
	Freq.	Percent
No	545	26.0
Yes	1552	73.9
Total	2098	100.0
Low/High interest in political issues		
	Freq.	Percent
Low	202	9.6
High	1895	90.3
Total	2098	100.0

Note: % based on respondents selecting specific answer questions

However, the examination of political-related data reveals low trust and reliance on public institutions. On the one hand, 66% of the people who participated in the survey agreed that the satisfaction of basic needs is an individual responsibility, compared to 33% who consider it a governmental responsibility. On the other hand, half of the respondents confirmed their dissatisfaction with public institutions' administration of the economy, education, unemployment, health, among others. A clear majority of 85% of French respondents define themselves as "dissatisfied" with governmental action to tackle poverty. Therefore, despite a general culture of disenchantment towards public institutions, French citizens remain interested in politics and support – by means of different collective or individual strategies – people in need.

TABLE 5: Perceptions of state efficiency and role of the government

% Believes public institutions are important to reduce inequalities		
	Freq.	Percent
No	1,391	66.3
Yes	706	33.6
Total	2098	100.0
% Satisfied or dissatisfied on governmental performance (economics, immigration)		
	Freq.	Percent
Dissatisfied	975	46.4
Satisfied	1122	53.5
Total	2098	100.0

Note: % based on respondents selecting specific answer questions

Having concluded that despite a high interest in politics, there is a lack of trust and general discontent with how the government deals with social and economic issues, it is interesting to assess whether the data reflect the same results when interrogating respondents over their personal positions towards economic liberalism or political position. In this case, findings allow for portraying a general landscape on the basis of three main indicators. First, findings indicate high support for the postulate for income equality, since more than half respondents (58%) agree that revenues should be made more equal in France. In contrast, a very significant smaller proportion (29%) of respondents consider that large social inequalities (social positions) are not acceptable, reflecting the majority's inclination to tolerate and/or accept social differences. At the same time, the political positioning between right and left does not elucidate the influence of personal political positioning, since there is a similar repartition between those who consider themselves as right orientated and those who define as left orientated.

TABLE 6: Personal positions towards economic integration and economic equality (in %)

	Mean
Equality of income	3.68
Left/right scale	5.25
Opportunity	2.94

Note: % and means based on respondents selecting specific answer questions

Therefore, our data reveal the overall positive stance of French respondents in general towards beneficiaries, offering some indication of the extent to which solidarity remains constant in France in times of crisis. As a further explanatory step, however, a number of cross-field differences, as discussed in the previous section, call for a more detailed analysis of our two main social *explanans* (social trust and associational engagement), and our two main political *explanans* (political trust and voting). The main challenge is to see the extent to which these four main variables can account for variations in solidarity.

Tables 7 and 8 checks for relationship between potential social determinants on the one hand (social trust and associational engagement) and the willingness to provide solidarity to vulnerable beneficiaries on the other (those who participated in the survey were asked to say if vulnerable beneficiaries should be supported, and if they were willing to help them). In line with our expectations, social trust and associational membership seem to play a role in reinforcing solidarity, especially in the field of immigration. That is, data seem to indicate quite clearly that low social trust relates more tightly with negative perceptions in the field of immigration when compared to the field of unemployment. In fact, the role of social trust in the field of unemployment appears irrelevant for explaining differences in terms of willing to provide solidarity for the unemployed.

TABLE 7: Social dimension and solidarity toward immigrants (in %)

	Social Trust		Associational Engagement	
	Low	High	No	Yes
Negative perception of immigrants	8.5	0.5	6.4	2.6
Positive perception of immigrants	68.5	22.2	51.2	39.5
Total	77.1	22.8	57.7	42.1

Note: % based on respondents selecting specific answer questions.

TABLE 8: Social dimension and solidarity toward the unemployed (in %)

	Social Trust		Associational Engagement	
	Low	High	No	Yes
Negative perception of the unemployed	1.3	0	0.8	0.6
Positive perception of the unemployed	75.7	22.6	56.9	41.4
Total	77.1	22.8	57.7	42.1

Note:% based on respondents selecting specific answer questions.

In particular, our analysis can now try to spell out more clearly the impact of the social and political dimensions at the individual level on variations of solidarity across fields. Previous results have provided a first descriptive indication that the nexus between the social and the political dimension of citizenship (mostly in terms of social integration and social capital on the one hand vs. political interest and participation on the other) and cross-field variations of solidarity stands out as an analysis path that deserves further treatment. Attention should be paid to our two main expectations as stated at the beginning of this chapter. This seems to prove that, in line with our argument, the very fact that immigrants are not part of the French people as a social body – endowed with equal rights and common acknowledgement – makes a situation of low social trust unsustainable for any reasonable level of solidarity.

Tables 9 and 10 criss-cross the political dimension (political interest and voting) with negative and positive perceptions toward immigrants and the unemployed. Overall findings seem to go in the same direction, since the force of the political dimension

combines with that of the social dimension. However, we find no relevant cross-field differences in this case.

TABLE 9: Political dimension and solidarity toward immigrants (in %)

	Interest in Politics		Voter	
	Low	High	No	Yes
Negative perception of migrants	16.3	8.4	7.9	9.5
Positive perception of migrants	83.7	91.6	92.1	90.5
Total	100.0 (202)	100.0 (1895)	100.0 (364)	100.0 (1733)

Note:% based on respondents selecting specific answer questions.

TABLE 10: Political dimension and solidarity toward the unemployed (in %)

	Interest in Politics		Voter	
	Low	High	No	Yes
Negative perception of the unemployed	3.0	1.3	2.9	1.2
Positive perception of the unemployed	97.0	98.7	97.1	98.8
Total	100.0 (202)	100.0 (1895)	100.0 (364)	100.0 (1733)

Note:% based on respondents selecting specific answer questions.

Beside cross-tab analysis, further analysis can be useful to assess the extent to which the social dimension performs *vis-a-vis* the political dimension in accounting for cross-field differences. The impact of these two dimensions (the social and the political) needs to be controlled against the effect of the usual socio-demographic variables used in explanatory analysis. Thus, the analysis of geographical origin shows that 96% of those surveyed were born in France, whereas 14% of respondents have one parent who was not born in France.

Examination of residence shows that one out of three surveyed lives in an urban milieu, related values are 19.8% for those who live in big cities and 17% for those who live in the suburbs of a big city. There is equally a varied repartition of education level, as the highest degree obtained represents four or more years of university education (Bac Pro, Master or PhD) for 24% of individuals. Intermediate education, comprised by those who have completed two to three years of university studies (CAP, *Etudes Pédagogiques*) corresponds to 39.5% of the total, including most the individuals who participated in the survey. Finally, the proportion surveyed who have completed less than two years of university education is 36%. From the latter, those who only have primary or secondary school diplomas represent only 8%. In relation to gender, we can observe an equal repartition between men (47%) and women (52%). Different ranges of age are equally represented in different proportions. One out of three of respondents are 24-years-old or younger, a similar proportion is between 35- and 54-years-old, and a last category of those who are older than 55 years also represents a third of the surveyed. It can also be observed that more than one out of four respondents have received material benefits or

help in the last twelve months, and that a minority of individuals who participated in the survey define themselves as belonging to a group that is discriminated against in France. Social analysis also leads us to observe that, in average, French citizens are neither satisfied nor dissatisfied with their living conditions. Also, results indicate that non-religious people or atheists are most prevalent among those who participated in the survey.

TABLE 11: Social and demographic characteristics of respondents

Main characteristics of respondents			
	Total	%	Mean
Born in France	2003	95.5	
A big city	415	19.7	
Suburbs of big city	362	17.3	
Higher education	507	24.1	
Intermediate education	828	39.5	
Lower education	761	36.3	
Male	1,000	47.6	
Female	1,097	52.3	
18-24 years	177	8.4	
25-34 years	361	17.2	
35-44 years	341	16.2	
45-54 years	369	17.6	
55-64 years	469	22.3	
65 years and older	379	18.0	
Father/Mother not born in France	298	14.2	
Received Benefits (housing, clothes) in the last 12 months	575	27.4	
Living conditions			5.62
Discriminated	342	16.3	
Religiosity			3.83

Note: % and means based on respondents answers

Conclusive remarks

This chapter has provided a description of the developments in welfare and solidarity policies in France over the last two decades, focusing on the fields of unemployment and immigration. No doubt, unemployment and migration are among the main fields of grievance in France. The government has increasingly weakened its commitment to benefits, while the idea of solidarity as the right of vulnerable people to be helped is now a thing of the past. Ongoing developments have indeed brought to finalization a long-term trend that has established a new approach to welfare rights, where solidarity becomes a two-way process involving some strong responsibilities on the side of welfare

recipients (in fact, sometimes inversing the obligation of solidarity on the shoulders of solidarity recipients). Indeed, the harsh stand which government and security agencies have sometimes taken against people committed to the humanitarian aid of immigrants, including minor actions of help such as speaking up against undignified conditions of transport or simply recharging the mobile phone of an immigrant in an irregular situation (Allsopp, 2010) has opened room for relativizing the whole concept of solidarity. It may not be by chance after all that France has stood out for the most shocking pictures of some of the worst practices of solidarity, whether this refers to beating up the chief executive officers of big corporations or the shocking picture of Alan Kurdy, who was portrayed as a potential rapist on the first page of special edition of *Charlie Hebdo* to mark the one-year anniversary of the terrorist massacre at the newspaper.

Against this background, this chapter has showed how a series of social and political variables constitute the profile of respondents. In particular, we have showed that the social dimension of solidarity remains constant in France at the time writing. Results obtained by the survey have indicated the importance of social trust in particular, and particularly in the immigration field. Besides the importance of social integration (and associational engagement), however, we have also inquired into the importance of political interest and voting, since French respondents can be generally characterized as politically active. Indeed, we have found that French people vote in elections or they would vote if elections took place. Many respondents have taken part in activities or events organised by political parties.

But data have also revealed low trust and reliance on public institutions. On the one hand, respondents in general agreed that the satisfaction of basic needs was an individual responsibility, compared to a minority who consider it to be a governmental responsibility. On the other hand, half of the respondents assured their dissatisfaction with the public institutions' administration of the economy, education, unemployment and health, among other areas. And a clear majority of French respondents define themselves as "dissatisfied" with governmental action to tackle poverty. Therefore, despite a general culture of disenchantment towards public institutions, French citizens remain interested in politics and support – by means of different collective or individual strategies – of people in need.

Finally, can individual attitudes and behaviours, especially in terms of social trust, associational engagement, political trust, and voting, have a role in slowing down welfare retrenchment by increasing solidarity resilience among the French? Our data give a relatively positive answer that can quickly be represented, as a final note, in the two regressions of Tables 12 and 13, one for each field. The aim is to see how the social and the political dimension maintain an important impact through the effect of the main socio-demographics. Data seem to provide once again some reassuring basis in the fact that, first, the social dimension and the political dimension go in the same direction, and second, that the social dimension has a stronger role to play in the immigration field compared to the field of unemployment. The dynamics by which Republicanism moves

from the constitution of a cohesive social body to the formation of a politically influential general will are still alive in contemporary France.

TABLE 12: Positive solidarity toward the immigrants

Interest in politics	1.600589
Voting	.7201604
Social Trust	4.172078
Associational Engagement	1.55311
Age	.9943913
Gender (where 0 is male)	.9500075
Education (where 0 is lower education)	2.067225
_cons	5.599392

TABLE 13: Positive solidarity toward the unemployed

Interest in politics	2.061141
Voting	1.520352
Social Trust	2.717416
Associational Membership	.80605
Age	1.037599
Gender (where 0 is female)	1.285617
Education (where 0 is lower education)	.5281168
_cons	6.931152

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Appendix

Variable	Questions	Coding	Distribution	Table
France	Have you ever done one of the following in order to support the rights of people/groups in your own country? (Six options)	0=no 1=yes	52.8% 47.2%	Table 1 Table 2
Other EU	Have you ever done one of the following in order to support the rights of people/groups in other countries within the European Union? (Six options)	0=no 1=yes	74.5% 25.5%	Table 1 Table 2
Global	Have you ever done one of the following in order to support the rights of people/groups in countries outside the European Union? (Six options)	0=no 1=yes	70% 30%	Table 1 Table 2
Refugees	For each of the following organisations, please tell me which political activities you have participated in that were organised by these groups in the last 5 years? Refugees' or asylum-seekers (Six options)	0=no 1=yes	79.8% 20.2%	Table 2
Disab	Have you ever done any of the following in order to support disability rights? (Six options)	0=no 1=yes	49% 50%	Table 1 Table 2
Xeno economy	Would you say it is generally bad or good for the French economy that people come to live here from other countries? (0-10)	0=bad; 10=good	Mean = 4.2	Table 7 Table 13
Xeno culture	Would you say that French cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries? (0-10)	0=bad; 10=good	Mean= 4.7	Table 7 Table 13
Help unemp	How attached do you feel towards people who are unemployed? (1-6)	0=not attached 1=attached	67.2% 32.8%	Table 8 Table 14
Unemp Vol	Tell me for each of them which you belong to and which you are currently doing unpaid work for? Unemployed rights organisation (0-2)	0=no 1=yes	91.6% 8.4%	Table 2
Unemp Org	Have you ever done any of the following in order to support the rights of the unemployed? (Six options)	0=no 1=yes	75.8% 24.1%	Table 8
Unemployed	For each of the following organisations, please tell me which political activities you have participated in that were organised by these groups in the last 5 years? (Five options)	0=no 1=yes	88.5% 11.4%	Table 8
Activism	For each of the following organisations, please tell me which political activities you have participated in that were organised by these groups in the last 5 years? (Fourteen options)	0=no 1=yes	71% 29%	Table 1 Table 2 Table 4 Table 13 Table 14
Fair_mig	In order to be considered fair, what should a society provide? Welcoming immigrants and migrants (1-5)	0= not at all important; 5 = very important	Mean = 2.5	Table 7 Table 13
Help Others	To what extent would you be willing to help improve the conditions of the following groups? (Five options) (1-5)	1=not at all; 5= very much	(Means) Migrants= 2.5 Asylum = 2.7 Disabled = 4.1 Unemployed= 3.6	Table 7 Table 13
Fair Society	In order to be considered fair, what should a society provide? (Six options) (1-5)	1= not at all important; 5 = very important	(Means) Income = 3.9 Basic needs = 4.1 Education = 4.3 Jobs = 4.3 Include disabled=4.2 Include refugees = 2.7	Table 1 Table 8 Table 14

Inclusion	How would you feel about having people […] as close kins by marriage/working alongside in your job/as residents living in your city/as citizens in your country? (Five categories)	0= not happy; 1= happy	2% 98%	Table 1 Table 7 Table 13
Tolerance	Please say whether you would mind or not having each of the following as neighbours? (Eighteen groups)	0= I wouldn't mind; 1= I would mind	1% 99%	Table 1 Table 8
Volunteer	Tell me for each of them which you belong to and which you are currently doing unpaid work for? (Fifteen options)	0 = does not belong/volunteer; 1 = belongs or volunteers	66.9% 33. 1%	Table 1 Table 2 Table 8 Table 13 Table 14
Age	How old are you?		Mean = 47.8	Table 11
Education	What is the highest level of education that you have completed? (ISCED-list)	Lower Education Intermediate Education Higher Education	36.3% 39.5% 24.2%	Table 11
Gender	Are you male or female? 1=male, 2=female		Males = 47.7% Women = 52.3%	Table 11
Residence	Which of the following best describes the area that you live in? (5 options)		Big city = 19.8% Suburbs of big city= 17.3% Town = 34% Village = 25% Farm = 3.9%	Table 11
Place of Birth	Were you born in France?	0=no; 1=yes	4.4% 95.5%	Table 11
Migrant origin	Born in other country; Parents born in other country	0=father and mother born in France; 1=mother or father immigrant	85.7% 14.2%	Table 11
Social Class	Which of the following classes do you feel that you belong to?	Standardized	Upper class = 0.8% Upper middle class=7.9% Middle class=36% Lower middle class =23.7% Working class =17.7% Lower class =1.1% Other class = 6.5%	Table 12
Class (identification)	Which option best describes the sort of paid work you do. If you are not in paid work now, please tell us what you did in your last paid employment?	Standardized	Professional or higher technical work = 9.9% Manager/Senior Administrator =14.5% Clerical= 23 % Sales or Services = 12% Foreman or Supervisor of Other Workers= 7% Skilled Manual Work= 8.3% Semi-Skilled or Unskilled Manual Work = 9.6% Other= 11% Not in employment= 4.5%	Table 12
Opinion (income equality)	Incomes should be made more equal. / We need larger income differences as incentives (1-10)	0=incomes should be made equal; 10= there should be larger income differences	Mean = 3.6	Table 6
Opinion (social positions)	Even very large differences in social position between people are acceptable since they simply express what one has made of his/her opportunities. To what	1= strongly agree; 5=strongly disagree	Mean = 2.9	Table 6

	extent do you agree or disagree?			
Social trust	Most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful (0-10)	0=you can't be too careful; 10= most people can be trusted	Mean = 3.6	Table 3 Table 8 Table 13 Table 14
Religion	How religious would you say you are? (0-10)	0= not at all religious; 10=extremely religious	Mean = 3.8	
Attachment unemp	How attached do you feel towards people who are unemployed? (1-4)	1=not attached; 5 =very attached	Mean = 3.2	Table 8 Table 14
Living Conditions	Compared to the rest of the people living in France, please place the following on a scale your current living conditions (1-10)	0=worst; 10= best	Mean = 5.6	Table 6 Table 11
Benefits	During the past 12 months have you used or received any of the following kinds of public support or benefits? Unemployment benefit or free skills training; Social housing or housing support/benefit; Child/maternity/family/one parent family support/benefit"; Sickness/mobility/invalidity/disabled person's pension/benefit; In-kind support (e.g. food/free meals/clothing); Help from home care services (e.g. family assistant/social worker)	0=no;1=yes	72.5% 27.4%	Table 11
Discrimination	Do you feel that you belong to a group that is discriminated against in France?	0=no; 1 =yes	83.7% 16.3%	Table 11
Vote 2012	Some people don't vote nowadays for one reason or another. Did you vote in the national election from June 10 to 17, 2012?	1 =yes	72.8%	Table 4 Table 9
Vote	If there were a general election in France tomorrow, for which party would you vote?	1 =yes	77.5%	Table 4 Table 9
Political Party Vol	Tell me for each of them which you belong to and which you are currently doing unpaid work for? Political party (1-3)	0=no; 1 =yes	91.8% 8.2%	Table 4
Left-Right Scale	People sometimes talk about the Left and the Right in politics. Where would you place yourself on the following? (0-10)	0=left; 10=right	Mean = 5.2	
Politics Actions	When have you LAST done the following? Boycotted certain products for political/ethical/environment reasons (online or offline); Attended a demonstration, march or rally; Attended a meeting of a political organisation/party or action group; Signed a petition/public letter/campaign appeal (online or offline); Discussed or shared opinion on politics on a social network site e.g. Facebook or Twitter; Joined a strike; Joined an occupation, sit-in, or blockade; Contacted or visited a politician or government/local government official (online or offline); Donated money to a political organisation/party or action group (online or offline); Searched for information about politics online; Deliberately bought products for political/ethical/environment reasons (online or offline); Visited the website of a political party or a politician; Joined or started a political group on	0= Have not done it ; 1 = have done it	26% 73.9%	Table 4 Table 9

	Facebook/followed a politician or political group on Twitter (1-5)			
Politics Interest	How interested, if at all, would you say you are in politics?	1=not interested; 4= very interested	Mean = 2.6	Table 4 Table 9
Newspaper	How do you keep yourself informed about current events? (Seven options) (yes/no)	0=does not read the newspaper; 1=reads the newspaper regularly	51.6% 48.4%	Table 4 Table 9
Government Competence	People/the government is responsible to provide basic needs	1= people; 10=government	Mean = 4.3	Table 5
Government Satisfaction	How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way in which the French government is dealing with the following? Childcare; Disability support; The economy; Education; Healthcare; Immigration; Poverty; Precarious employment (e.g part-time, temporary employment); Refugee crisis; Unemployment (0-10)	0= dissatisfied; 1= satisfied	46.5% 53.5%	Table 5

Solidarity activism in Germany: What explains different types and levels of engagement?

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Introduction

During the summer of 2015, an unprecedented wave of solidarity with incoming refugees from Syria and other countries of the Middle East, Africa and Asia swept through Germany. Innumerable initiatives and individual citizens committed to what was called the new German 'welcoming culture'. These initiatives did not only engage in the provision of immediate help (e.g., clothing, food, shelter, language courses and assistance with German administration), but also rallied for migrant and refugee rights. The inability of German authorities to handle the inflow of migrants, and the growing mobilization of populist, right-wing and in part xenophobic groups, dampened the 'welcoming culture' considerably and boosted conflicts about the correct policies for the German administration to pursue. As a consequence of these conflicts, solidarity itself became a contested issue. While some rallied for a solidarity with all people in need of help – the refugees included – and insisted that "we can do this" (Schiffauer et al. 2017), others proclaimed the need to refrain from unlimited assistance and for exclusive support of Germans, fearing that the multiple crises in the world would eventually hit Germany as well. Consequently, it seems as though solidarity has become a contentious field that separates people with different political orientations, cultural beliefs and potentially social standing.

Given this background, it is important to map the field of solidarity within the German population. For this purpose, we will make use of the survey data provided by the TransSOL project. The aim is to answer the following series of questions. How diffused is the disposition to engage for solidarity within the German population, and are there differences in the degree of reported activities when distinguishing between various targets? What can we say about those people who report being committed to solidarity activities when compared to those indicating they abstain? Are there specific social traits (e.g., socio-demographic characteristics, social standing, attitudinal dispositions or cultural values) that distinguish one group from the other? In order to answer these questions, the chapter will proceed as follows. First, we will introduce briefly previous research on solidarity dispositions and activities in order to identify the core social traits that play a role in distinguishing the 'actives' from the 'inactives'. Secondly, we will describe the frequencies of different solidarity actions in regard to various target groups: on the one hand, with reference to spatial entities (people in the respondents' own country, within the EU and outside the EU), and on the other hand, in regard to three issue-field specific target groups, namely refugees, the unemployed and people with disabilities. Thirdly, we will conduct a series of multinominal regression analyses in order to identify the social profile of the 'actives' and thus to validate the various research

assumptions about relevant social, economic, or cultural differences between the groups acting and not acting on behalf of others. In this context, we will also deal with issue-field specific motivations and beliefs that might explain why people decide to engage for specific target groups. Finally, we will summarize and briefly discuss the core findings of this chapter.

Theories of solidarity activism

Our analysis of solidarity in Germany requires a brief summary of previous research findings in order to identify those potential traits that might enable us to distinguish the active from the in-active citizens, and thus to identify those social traits that might increase the probability of being engaged in solidarity activities. Relevant insights come from different strands of research because social solidarity touches the study of public support of redistribution and redistributive policies, of social capital and social movements, among others. Many of these studies tend to paint a similar picture of solidarity related activities. First of all, we know from research on political behaviour and social movements that resources, skills and opportunities do matter (Brady et al. 1995; Verba et al: 1978; Jenkins 1983), which means that the socio-demographic characteristics of citizens determine to a certain extent their readiness to engage in political and social activities. Age, for instance, matters in terms of biographical availability (Beyerlein and Bergstrand 2013), since people might reduce their social and political activities in times of personal constraint, e.g., due to full-time employment, marriage or family responsibilities. The unequal access to resources and skills (e.g., income and education) impinges on levels of political and civic engagement as well, meaning that socially excluded people might be more affected by a lower degree of social and political engagement (Verba et al. 1978; Kronauer 1998). Finally, we need to look at the effect of migration, because research has shown that migrants might be involved in (cross-national) forms of solidarity in support of ethnic diasporas or communities (Morokvasic 1999; Schulze 2004).

Building on these observations, we might expect – secondly – that social class might be a relevant factor, too (Cainzos and Voces 2010). Following the findings of other studies, we expect the middle classes to be overrepresented in political and social activism, as this reflects their preferences, civic norms, and their economic, cultural and social capital (Kriesi 1989; Eder 1993). At the same time, however, we know from studies on the support of redistributional policies that vulnerability and deprivation do impinge positively on solidarity disposition (Iversen and Soskice 2001; Rehm 2009), at least in regard to target groups exposed to similar risks of social exclusion and degradation. In this regard, we thus need to measure the potential effect of several variables that are related to social class and social exclusion. For this purpose, we will deal with the subjective class affiliation and with feelings of deprivation. Beyond that, we will look at the living situation (housing situation and number of friends from different countries) in order to assess whether social isolation might be negatively related to social solidarity.

A third set of expectations is related to ideational factors, such as feelings of collective identity, political orientations, religiosity and trust. In the first instance, we know that dispositions to engage in solidarity activities and support redistributive policies are closely interrelated with religiosity, given that religion generally supports the idea of helping others (Stegmueller et al. 2012; Lichtemann 2014). Moreover, we assume that solidarity is determined by collective identities, in the sense that feelings of belongingness to certain collectivities might increase the readiness to support members of these (imagined) communities. National identities should thus be interrelated to forms of solidarity with fellow citizens, European identifications with solidarity activities in support of people living in other European member states (Bauböck 2017). Additionally, we expect that political preferences and orientations make a difference in regard to solidarity. In general terms, solidarity might be more diffused among respondents with leftist political orientations and preferences for multiculturalism, while xenophobic, right-wing and populist dispositions might be more probable among the in-actives, as corroborated in regard to public policies (Likki and Staerklé 2014). However, the latter ideological preferences might be linked to certain forms of group-bound solidarity, e.g., within nations or specific target groups (e.g., the unemployed). Finally, solidarity could also be more common among people with higher levels of interpersonal trust, when considering research on social capital that highlights the importance of trust, the memberships and active participation in civic associations and groups (Putnam et al. 2003; Oorschot, Arts and Gelissen 2006).

A final set of factors to be taken into consideration is related more strictly to specific issue fields. This last group follows the basic idea that solidarity is not necessarily a universalist disposition of support related to anybody, i.e., to all human beings. Possibly, solidarity is always group-bound, meaning that citizens tend to centre their engagement to certain groups to which they feel particularly attached. This argument puts an emphasis on the fact that solidarity needs to be activated (against potentially detrimental factors such as lack of resources, social exclusion or apathy) and that this is more probable in regard to people to whom one feels personally attached. Feelings of social proximity between oneself and the target groups seems to play a role here (Oorschot 2006; Stegmueller et al. 2012), which means that empathy to significant others is thus an important 'opener' that helps to mobilize support. At the same time, however, this means that solidarity might be – *per se* – limited to specific groups, a predisposition that has been called philanthropic particularism (Komter 2005). Hence, we expect feelings of attachment towards specific groups and beliefs regarding that a fair society implies inclusion of and assistance for specific groups to increase solidarity activity towards them.

Measurement

Our analysis draws on an original dataset of 2,064 respondents (aged 18+) in Germany matched for age, gender, region and education level quotas to national population statistics. Weights were applied in all descriptive analyses and all models control for age,

gender and education. Data retrieval was conducted as part of the Horizon2020 project TransSOL using CAWI method (Computer Assisted Web Interviewing) and took place between December 2016 and January 2017[9]. The dependent variables intend to measure reported solidarity activity on behalf of different groups and on different levels. The phrasing repeats for all groups ("Have you ever done one of the following in order to support the rights of ..."). We report all variables used for modelling, including recoding procedures, in the Appendix.

Findings

In this section we present findings on solidarity actions in Germany across three levels (national, EU, outside EU) as well as three fields of solidarity, namely the support of refugees and asylum seekers, of the unemployed, and people with disabilities. We begin with descriptive findings along the six dimensions (3.1). In the second part (3.2), we present findings of multinominal regression analyses identifying socio-structural and ideational factors that influence the probability of people choosing to engage in solidarity actions. In a third subsection (3.3), we turn to group specific motifs and beliefs to better explain engagement in solidarity activities.

Frequencies of Solidarity Action: Descriptive Results

Table 1 shows two patterns: first, solidarity depends on proximity since engagement is more frequent in support for people and their rights in the respondent's own country than abroad and support for people outside the EU is also quite frequent, but focused on activities like donating money and buycotting/boycotting products. Moreover, our data allows us to distinguish between the support for our three main target groups: asylum seekers/refugees; unemployed and disabled people. Here we observe the highest frequencies in the field of disability rights. Support of refugees is more limited but still exceeds support of the unemployed. This shows that solidarity is not a generalised disposition or practice, but that it is linked to specific issues and target groups. In this respect, the findings provide a first hint to the fact that solidarity is shaped by feelings of attachment to particular groups. We will return to this issue in the third part of our analysis.

[9] Further information is available at the project website www.transsol.eu.

TABLE 1: Frequencies of engagement over levels and fields of solidarity (in %)

	Attended march	Donate money	Donate time	Buycott/ boycott	Passive member	Active member	None	r^2
Support of rights/people in own country	12.7	24.0	19.0	20.7	5.5	10.2	49.0	0.58
Support of rights/people in other EU country	6.5	13.4	8.8	15.0	3.4	4.7	68.6	0.59
Support of rights/people in country outside EU	5.8	20.8	9.3	19.0	3.0	4.1	60.0	0.50
Support rights of asylum seekers/refugees	5.3	15.2	14.1	9.2	2.8	6.3	65.9	0.50
Support rights of unemployed	4.7	8.2	10.2	9.6	2.6	4.9	73.0	0.49
Support disability rights	3.9	26.5	19.0	18.6	5.4	7.5	48.4	0.44
r^2	0.68	0.51	0.74	0.73	0.59	0.67	0.81	

Beyond the pure descriptive frequencies, we were interested in the connections between different solidarity actions people engage in and also similarities across fields (i.e. solidarity towards the unemployed, disabled, and refugees). Some types of action may be considered more demanding, e.g. in terms of resources, than others. Likewise, some fields may be more prone to attract civil engagement because of current media attention or differently perceived proximity to the target group. Moreover, activists who join certain activities may do so across levels and across fields. In a next explorative step and following these considerations, we conducted principal factor analyses for both the fields and levels of solidarity and the activities across fields. In regards to the activities within levels and fields, we found – to some surprise – that at no level and in no issue field did the analysis reveal more than one factor[10]. There does not seem to be different types of activist, e.g. those who protest more on the one hand and those who spend time and money on the other hand. In this respect, we may expect little variation between the activities chosen but rather between those opting to engage and those acting not at all. Similarly to the fields of activity, we could not find any differences within action types across fields. This suggests that people who protest or spend money do so with – to this point – no obvious difference across fields. Simple bivariate regression shows e.g. a correlation between protesting for unemployed and protesting for refugees. We may conclude that people protesting for one group are also prone to protest for another.

This does not mean, however, that the same people are likely to engage in all different types of solidarity action and for all groups at the same time. It is more likely that actions

[10] The results were very clear for all analyses conducted. Still, in addition to the principal factor analysis we also conducted principal component analyses as well as iterated principal factor analyses but did not find any hints for another factor.

just vary enough to not reveal any more specific pattern – other than that solidarity activities in one field and one type are likely to go together with activity in another field and also with another activity. Following on from this, Table 2 shows the intensity of engagement, thus revealing if and to what extent active persons are engaged in several forms of action[11]. On first sight, the table provides a rather obvious picture with the frequencies declining along with the intensity of engagement. However, we also observe that only a very small minority engages more deeply in either field and on either level of solidarity. If we consider the threshold for engaging in one activity only as relatively low (e.g. it could be a one-time action of donating five Euros to an integrative school project with no further involvement and, more importantly, no indication of repetition), the percentage of people engaging considerably in solidarity activities is between 10 to 20 % and thus not very high.

These findings led us to choose the summary frequencies in the different solidarity fields as our dependent variable for further analysis[12]: We decided to differentiate between three groups: those not engaging at all, the one-action activists, and multiply engaged respondents. Even though different action forms were only moderately interrelated in each of the fields and on each of the levels (with *Cronbach's alpha's* at only around 0.5, see last column of Table 1), the usage of summary variables, while making sure through factor analyses that there are not different dimensions involved, seems to be an acceptable compromise.

[11] Nota bene: we did not ask people how often they engaged in the activities. We instead combine the different activities in the following, arguing that engaging in multiple activities equals higher solidarity. This does not mean that one cannot be involved deeply in one activity expressing solidarity in this way. We account for this in the following analyses by including the one-action activists as an extra group.

[12] Regressions for single Items did not produce clearer patterns.

TABLE 2: Multiple forms of actions over levels and fields of solidarity (in %)

	None	One activity	Two activities	Three activities	Four activities	Five activities	All six activities
Support of rights/people in own country	49.0	28.1	11.9	6.2	2.7	1.8	0.3
Support of rights/people in other EU country	68.6	19.5	6.4	3.7	1.1	0.5	0.2
Support of rights/people in country outside EU	60.0	25.5	9.4	3.2	1.3	0.4	0.2
Support rights of asylum seekers/refugees	65.9	21.5	8.5	2.7	0.9	0.5	0.1
Support rights of unemployed	73.0	18.1	6.0	1.9	0.7	0.2	0.1
Support disability rights	48.4	32.9	11.8	4.3	1.8	0.8	0.1

Comparing the active and the inactive: socio-structural and ideational factors

Following the findings of our descriptive analysis, we opted for multinominal regression models. This allows us to compare those who do not engage, which we took as the base outcome, with the "one-action activists" as well as those who engage in different activities. This was done without assuming linearity of our dependent variable, which might not hold considering the small Cronbach's alpha. We will present different models, including different sets of variables and will focus in this subsection on the comparison of the different fields and levels of solidarity. Thus, we calculated each of the models (1 to 3) separately for the different fields and levels of solidarity (indicated by a to f).

In a first step, we only included socio-economic variables (as well as the country weight). While increasing age may come with more opportunities to engage in solidarity activities, income and education can be interpreted as variables indicating resources. Thus higher income and higher education may increase the probability of engagement, as well. We include gender merely as a control variable. Migrant background sometimes comes with additional social capital, but also vulnerability. Thus, we may expect a positive influence on solidarity activities. As Table 3 shows, we find a lot of significant correlations, but there are some differences we will need to point out. First, age is significant across all fields and levels, excluding the support of disability rights, if we compare those engaging in one activity with those not engaging. Moreover, the effect suggests that the younger people are, the more likely they are to engage. If we compare with those engaging in at least two activities, however, the effect is only significant for engagement for people outside of Europe. In this case, the effect for solidarity with people with disabilities is reversed: those engaging for the rights of this group in various forms are more likely to be older. Income is positively correlated with engagement for both groups, the "one-action" activists and

the “multiply active”. However, the effect is not significant for both groups concerning the rights of the unemployed. Moreover, education is for “one-action” activists only relevant if they engage on the European or global level. But for the “multiply active” we find that higher education leads to more engagement on all fields and issues. Gender has only a very limited impact overall. Migrant background, finally, has no impact on single-activity engagement, but it increases chances to be multiply active on the European and global level, on behalf of refugees and also on behalf of the unemployed. Thus in sum, resources seem to play an important role and the young are more frequently engaged, but we must also emphasize that the explained variance through these variables is very low. This means that other factors must play a role.

TABLE 3: Multinominal regression models 1a-1f (socio-economic variables)

		Germany	Other EU	Global	Refugees	Unemployed	Disabilities
One action	Age	-0.169**	-0.217**	-0.164**	-0.236**	-0.224**	0.039
	Income	0.121*	0.139*	0.184**	0.122*	0.114	0.189**
	Ed.	0.109	0.131*	0.214**	0.092	0.080	0.037
	Male	-0.005	0.137	-0.228*	-0.004	0.150	-0.001
	Migrant	0.008	0.213	0.160	0.088	0.151	0.123
	_cons	-0.510**	-1.329**	-0.695**	-1.084**	-1.444**	-0.369**
Multiple actions	Age	-0.029	-0.127	-0.179*	-0.103	-0.006	0.166*
	Income	0.115	0.181*	0.242**	0.238**	0.028	0.110
	Ed.	0.289**	0.190*	0.393**	0.213**	0.174*	0.286**
	Male	-0.067	0.212	-0.330*	-0.165	0.333*	-0.014
	Migrant	0.198	0.388*	0.537**	0.500**	0.556**	0.277
	_cons	-0.753**	-1.926**	-1.358**	-1.701**	-2.328**	-0.975**
N		1,800	1,800	1,800	1,800	1,800	1,800
Pseudo-R^2		0.0117	0.0151	0.0263	0.0159	0.0130	0.0122

* $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$

In a second series of calculations, we added further and also subjective socio-structural variables to our model (see Table 4). Age remains significant for the one-action activists (with the exceptions of global solidarity and disability rights), and education underlines its importance for all issue fields and solidarity levels. Self-placement in a lower social class reduces only solidarity on the European level for one-action activists – which is in line with current observations in the EU (e.g. Brexit). However, income loses its limited effect almost entirely and there are no clear effects across fields. Material resources do not seem to play a dominant role, and this observation seems plausible, because the type of activities we asked our respondents to comment on are not particularly costly.

If we turn to the perception of (collective) resources, this changes only on first sight: for the one-action activists, positive perception of living conditions in Germany seems to mobilize for solidarity in and beyond Europe as well as for the unemployed and people with disabilities. However, this result does not hold for our second group, those who engage in multiple activities. Here, having friends from other countries spurs solidarity towards refugees, disabled people but also people within the country in general. The experience of relative deprivation increases the chances of multiple activism on behalf of the unemployed (and vice versa), but has no effect on other fields of solidarity. Overall,

we find very few patterns and thus we still have only a very limited insight in the question what people engage (frequently) in solidarity actions.

TABLE 4: Multinominal regression models 2a-2f – socio-structural determinants

		Germany	Other EU	Global	Refugees	Unemployed	Disabilities
One action	Age	-0.124	-0.182**	-0.101	-0.181**	-0.237**	0.013
	Income	0.047	0.002	0.158	-0.054	0.111	0.084
	Ed.	0.064	0.126	0.163*	0.086	0.057	0.030
	Male	-0.005	0.084	-0.199	0.037	0.199	-0.053
	Migrant	-0.034	0.259	0.169	0.115	0.086	0.008
	Social-class	-0.004	-0.229**	-0.025	-0.099	0.046	-0.001
	Reldep	0.012	-0.140	0.031	0.148	-0.111	0.028
	Living in DE	0.094	0.230**	0.141*	0.137*	0.253**	0.164**
	Friends-diff	-0.089	-0.060	0.000	0.002	-0.116	0.058
	Live alone	-0.052	-0.062	0.056	-0.192	-0.325	-0.190
	East	-0.222	0.073	-0.041	-0.209	0.159	0.109
	_cons	-0.359**	-1.239**	-0.634**	-0.967**	-1.387**	-0.197
Multiple actions	z2age	-0.018	-0.133	-0.125	-0.090	-0.067	0.140
	Income	0.028	0.068	0.208	0.126	0.010	-0.152
	Ed.	0.275**	0.200*	0.408**	0.209**	0.211*	0.317**
	Male	-0.121	0.101	-0.403**	-0.218	0.258	-0.116
	Migrant	-0.012	0.279	0.467*	0.349	0.475*	0.033
	Social-class	-0.082	-0.139	-0.048	-0.120	-0.093	-0.175*
	Reldep	-0.026	-0.084	0.004	0.029	-0.322**	-0.047
	Living in DE	-0.002	0.076	0.140	0.077	0.094	0.091
	Friends-diff	0.145*	0.091	0.125	0.178**	-0.055	0.138*
	Live alone	0.140	0.075	0.336	0.403*	-0.203	-0.380*
	East	-0.413*	-0.037	-0.296	-0.579*	-0.494	-0.439*
	_cons	-0.548**	-1.768**	-1.273**	-1.543**	-2.046**	-0.574**
N		1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500
Pseudo-R^2		0.0153	0.0202	0.0287	0.0269	0.0279	0.0190

* $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$

In a third series of calculations, we included variables that encountered for cultural and ideational factors (see Table 5). Overall, the already limited effects of socio-structural determinants are weakened. For example, the living conditions in Germany are now only a significant factor for solidarity with unemployed and European solidarity, having friends from different countries is not significant anymore, etc. Only the effect of relative deprivation particularly on solidarity with unemployed is actually stabilized. A lower score marks lower self-placement (and thus higher deprivation), a higher score means people feel better off. If people think they are better off, they are considerably less likely to engage in multiple actions on behalf of the unemployed. But this effect, too, is not significant for the one-action activists.

TABLE 5: Multinominal regression models 3a-3f – cultural-ideational determinants

		Germany	Other EU	Global	Refugees	Unemployed	Disabilities
One action	Age	-0.128	-0.168*	-0.134	-0.186*	-0.259**	-0.030
	Income	0.053	0.022	0.217*	-0.000	0.048	0.115
	Education	0.004	0.114	0.127	0.034	0.002	-0.025
	Male	0.161	0.085	-0.236	0.030	0.176	-0.035
	Migrant	-0.056	0.256	0.100	0.044	-0.070	-0.154
	Socialclass	-0.088	-0.235*	-0.021	-0.108	-0.046	0.007
	Eeldep	-0.144	-0.237*	-0.132	-0.114	-0.248*	-0.134
	Living in DE	0.026	0.225**	0.143	0.065	0.184*	0.054
	Friends-diff	-0.069	-0.170	0.036	-0.012	-0.089	-0.003
	Live alone	-0.018	-0.033	0.032	-0.210	-0.415	-0.186
	East	-0.153	0.110	-0.135	-0.100	0.178	0.099
	Attached DE	-0.143	-0.229*	-0.116	-0.185	-0.147	0.043
	Attached city	0.156	0.025	0.112	-0.073	0.041	-0.209
	Attached reg	0.074	0.170	-0.044	0.056	0.140	0.175
	Attached EU	0.085	0.269**	0.237*	0.376**	0.284**	0.157
	Attached hu	0.081	0.015	0.006	-0.137	-0.047	0.150
	Social trust	0.196*	0.232**	0.217**	0.261**	0.304**	0.223**
	Religiosity	0.199**	0.300**	0.117	0.265**	0.170*	0.172*
	Identity	-0.017	-0.030	0.092	0.026	0.035	0.079
	Left self	-0.091	-0.094	-0.145	-0.084	-0.158	0.041
	Demsat	0.011	-0.099	-0.056	-0.017	-0.080	-0.012
	Multicult	0.104	0.032	-0.055	0.377**	-0.150	0.118
	Populism	0.041	-0.022	0.070	0.097	0.293**	0.177*
	Xeno_econ	0.039	0.095	0.040	0.057	0.066	0.016
	Xeno_cult	0.044	-0.063	0.243*	0.316*	0.172	-0.002
	_cons	-1.624**	-2.680**	-1.399**	-1.565**	-2.579**	-0.864
Multiple actions	Age	-0.080	-0.165	-0.165	-0.118	-0.128	0.085
	Income	0.118	0.157	0.334**	0.359**	0.052	-0.030
	Education	0.193*	0.119	0.313**	0.129	0.184	0.258**
	Male	0.036	0.183	-0.413*	-0.139	0.312	-0.030
	Migrant	-0.122	0.121	0.206	0.161	0.244	-0.237
	Socialclass	-0.068	-0.091	0.056	-0.054	-0.113	-0.160
	Reldep	-0.209*	-0.365**	-0.164	-0.259*	-0.457**	-0.173
	Living in DE	-0.040	0.052	0.105	0.010	0.017	-0.003
	Friends-diff	0.113	0.029	0.184*	0.162	-0.041	0.101
	Live alone	0.169	0.040	0.161	0.365	-0.146	-0.393
	East	-0.272	0.147	-0.122	-0.274	-0.355	-0.252
	Attached DE	-0.096	-0.189	-0.168	-0.253*	-0.205	-0.083
	Attached city	0.104	-0.149	-0.139	-0.058	-0.220	-0.058
	Attached reg	-0.024	0.120	0.010	-0.018	0.089	0.008
	Attached EU	0.094	0.071	0.255*	-0.014	0.252	0.028
	Attached hu	0.169	0.252	0.188	0.025	0.020	0.271*
	Social trust	0.183*	0.354**	0.239*	0.265*	-0.013	0.081
	Religiosity	0.348**	0.339**	0.384**	0.576**	0.332**	0.363**
	Identity	0.050	0.077	0.048	0.007	0.168	0.103
	Right self	-0.264**	-0.114	-0.103	-0.346**	-0.089	-0.088
	Demsat	-0.107	-0.066	-0.235*	0.215	-0.057	0.028
	Multicult	-0.008	0.133	0.198	0.366*	-0.046	0.137
	Populism	0.061	0.049	0.087	0.127	0.246*	0.262**
	Xeno_econ	0.220	0.335*	0.353*	0.265	0.464**	0.232
	Xeno_cul	0.159	0.137	0.135	0.398*	-0.046	-0.019
	_cons	-1.653**	-2.866**	-2.149**	-1.771**	-2.413**	-1.358*
N		1,265	1,265	1,265	1,265	1,265	1,265
Pseudo-R^2		0.0528	0.0789	0.0849	0.1397	0.0709	0.0548

* $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$

Motifs and beliefs explaining solidarity actions?

So far, there are only a few variables that seem to be relevant across dimensions. Above all, religiosity and social trust increase the likelihood of people engaging in solidarity actions but also, to some degree, education and (younger) age. Beyond that, there are factors that show significance for specific dimensions but the patterns are hard to identify. We take this as a reason to engage in further analyses that include variables that could be relevant per field. In particular, we will focus on issue specific motifs and beliefs that may increase the likelihood of respondents to have been engaged in solidarity actions on behalf of refugees, unemployed, disabled people, and citizens in other European countries[13]. Moreover, we will now switch the mode of presentation and describe the results for the issue fields separately and with comparisons of different models per issue field in order to focus more directly on the explanatory power of individual variables. As the second last rows of the following tables show, for the following models we used only those cases in our survey that would remain in the most inclusive model (missings in individual variables lead to the exclusion of a case) in order to ensure a proper comparison of the models.

Table 6 presents the results for solidarity actions on the European level. We included four items that asked for the motivation to grant financial help to other European countries and that aim to measure reciprocity and deservingness as determining factors for this specific type of solidarity. In other words, we wanted to test whether redistributive attitudes are connected to individual solidarity activities. Surprisingly, none of these have a significant effect on actual solidarity activities of people on the micro level. This could be explained by the fact that people actually differentiate between financial aid and redistribution on the macro-level and within the European Union on the one hand, and solidarity actions on behalf of other people living in these other European countries on the micro level on the other hand. What seems to impact European solidarity activities is agreement on the policy suggestion to "pool funds to help EU countries" (M = 2.82, see Appendix). If respondents agree to this statement, they are more likely to engage themselves. However, this effect is not significant for those acting in multiple ways if we control for all other variables introduced above. In the controlled model, the feeling that Germany benefits from its membership in the EU (68 % of our respondents believe so, see Appendix) becomes significant. In sum, solidarity actions increase only slightly if people agree on political steps for (fiscal and financial) integration, the two topics – financial transfers on the macro level and solidarity with people on the micro level – seem to be rather disentangled from each other. This could be explained by considering the harsh preconditions that are tied to the "help" for countries in difficulties.

[13] Since solidarity actions on behalf of people in Germany and on behalf of people in non-European countries are more difficult to isolate, we exclude them from the following analysis.

TABLE 6: Multinominal regression models for European level solidarity

	Model 4c		Model 5c	
	One action	Multiple action	One action	Multiple action
Age	0.836**	0.829**	-0.136*	-0.202**
Income	1.092	1.008	0.0586	0.112
Education	1.158*	1.189*	0.102	0.111
Male	0.966	1.110	0.0402	0.194
Migrant	1.166	1.405	0.168	0.199
EUhelpmotiv_1	0.990	1.363	-0.0966	0.269
EUhelpmotiv_2	0.851	0.957	-0.164	-0.157
EUhelpmotiv_3	0.918	1.099	-0.0833	0.108
EUhelpmotiv_4	0.869	0.893	-0.0185	0.198
EUaid	0.956	1.398***	-0.0648	0.124
EUdebt	1.371***	1.220*	0.216**	0.0877
EU benefits D	0.836	0.797	-0.291	-0.424*
Socialclass			-0.204**	-0.0390
Reldep			-0.200*	-0.368***
Living in DE			0.232***	0.0216
Friendsdiff			-0.163	0.0596
Live alone			0.0304	-0.0423
East			0.148	0.168
Attached DE			-0.161	-0.204
Attached city			0.0250	-0.0800
Attached reg			0.144	0.115
Attached EU			0.244**	0.141
Attached hum			0.00621	0.187
Socialtrust			0.221**	0.388***
Religiosity			0.274***	0.306***
Identity			-0.00269	0.0612
Lrscale			-0.136	-0.149
Demsat			-0.0905	-0.0438
Multicultural			0.0362	0.0957
Populism			-0.0537	0.0343
Xeno_econ			0.118	0.306**
Xeno_cult			-0.145	0.137
Constant	0.426***	0.188***	-2.183***	-2.923***
N	1,144	1,144	1,144	1,144
Pseudo-R^2	0.0304	0.0304	0.0828	0.0828

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

In recent years, the influx of large numbers of refugees has challenged German civil society. People organized to help newcomers in many places. Table 7 presents two models for this issue field of solidarity action. The feeling of attachment to refugees (M = 2.74, see Appendix) seems to play an important role explaining why people are active on their behalf. Moreover, satisfaction with the way the government deals with refugees (M = 3.32, see Appendix) increases activity, as do beliefs that it is Germany's moral responsibility to accept refugees (M = 3.35) and that the government should be supporting them financially (M = 3.16). Satisfaction with the European response to the refugee crisis (M = 3.80) only is significant in one model. Given the controversies on the European level on how to deal with refugees it comes as no surprise that most respondents to our survey were dissatisfied (on a scale from 0 to 10). In the case of solidarity activities supporting refugees we can conclude to see a clearer picture of why

people engage. This is probably due to the fact of the heightened attention the topic had in the months before the survey was conducted.

TABLE 7: Multinominal regression models for solidarity with refugees

	Model 4d		Model 5d	
	One action	Multiple action	One action	Multiple action
Age	0.881	0.870	-0.0948	-0.134
Income	1.040	1.142	-0.0306	0.289**
Education	1.092	1.284***	0.0508	0.211**
Male	1.071	0.836	-0.00677	-0.165
Migrant	1.225	1.694**	0.0772	0.252
Attached refu	1.465***	1.813***	0.399***	0.678***
Satgov_refu	1.269***	1.093	0.243**	0.104
Fair_refu	1.199	1.792***	0.198	0.576***
Fair_mig	1.152	0.993	0.114	-0.0554
Refugeesupp	1.107	1.118	0.129	0.140
Refugeemoral	0.906	1.093	-0.122	-0.0733
Refugeecrisis	1.370***	1.038	0.312***	-0.00918
Syrian refugees	0.860	0.812	-0.0856	-0.106
Inclusivity	1.045	1.041	0.00293	-0.0467
Socialclass			-0.147	-0.0922
Reldep			-0.102	-0.224*
Living in DE			0.0296	0.0171
Friendsdiff			0.00440	0.166*
Live alone			-0.241	0.272
East			-0.171	-0.253
Attached DE			-0.144	-0.193
Attached city			-0.116	-0.140
Attached reg			0.0994	0.0774
Attached EU			0.300***	-0.0525
Attached hu			-0.276**	-0.165
Socialtrust			0.223**	0.191*
Religiosity			0.202**	0.536***
Identity			-0.146	-0.248**
Lrscale			-0.00764	-0.246**
Demsat			-0.232**	0.136
Multicultural			0.226*	0.139
Populism			0.144*	0.223**
Xeno_econ			-0.0721	0.108
Xeno_culture			0.122	0.185
Cons	0.312***	0.143***	-0.983*	-1.287*
N	1,236	1,236	1,236	1,236
Pseudo-R^2	0.144	0.144	0.1870	0.1870

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 8 presents the results of our regressions with solidarity towards unemployed people as the dependent variable. Again we seem to get a much better picture if we include variables measuring motivations and beliefs. Above the ideational-cultural items already included in previous analysis (see section 3.2), attachment to unemployed (M = 2.93, see Appendix) has a very clear impact on people choosing to act in solidarity and also dissatisfaction with the government's policies on unemployment (M = 4.93) leads to more activism. Solidarity activity on behalf of this group can thus be observed more likely when

people identify with the unemployed and feel that they are treated unfairly (see also the positive effect of populism and deprivation). The populism index we used includes statements like 'Politicians in the parliament need to follow will of the people' and 'Political differences between the elite and the people are larger than among people' (see Appendix) and thus expresses discontent with the political system. Populism in this analysis should thus be read as a sign of political deprivation – people are not feeling connected to politics that neglects the issues of unemployed people.

TABLE 8: Multinominal regression models for solidarity with unemployed people

	Model 4e		Model 5e	
	one action	multiple action	one action	multiple action
Age	0.791***	0.887	-0.234***	-0.148
Income	1.102	1.074	0.0579	0.103
Education	1.065	1.278***	0.0260	0.193*
Male	1.191	1.327	0.115	0.293
Migrant	0.937	1.507*	-0.0770	0.252
Attached unemp	1.666***	1.469***	0.483***	0.352***
Satgov_unemp	1.042	0.739***	0.0836	-0.333***
Fairsocietey_jobs	0.910	0.960	-0.0806	-0.00152
Inclusivityunemp	1.020	1.255**	-0.0314	0.173
Socialclass			-0.0553	-0.154
Reldep			-0.217**	-0.382***
Living in DE			0.117	0.0265
Friendsdiff			-0.0531	-0.0257
Live alone			-0.429**	-0.167
East			0.192	-0.325
Attached DE			-0.131	-0.199
Attached city			0.0173	-0.243
Attached reg			0.163	0.101
Attached EU			0.277**	0.282**
Attached hu			-0.0868	-0.0236
Socialtrust			0.278***	-0.0257
Religiosity			0.166**	0.335***
Identity			-0.145	0.0213
Lrscale			-0.139	0.000612
Demsat			-0.144	0.0248
Multicultural			-0.172	-0.0876
Populism			0.268***	0.164
Xeno_econ			0.0727	0.491***
Xeno_cult			0.148	-0.0832
Constant	0.244***	0.119***	-2.445***	-2.361***
N	1,261	1,261	1,261	1,261
Pseudo-R^2	0.0503	0.0503	0.0958	0.0958

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Finally, Table 9 summarizes the results of two models calculated to explain variance regarding solidarity actions on behalf of people with disabilities. Education stays a relevant factor explaining solidarity actions on behalf of people with disabilities. Beyond the already reported variables, we find again the feeling of attachment to the specific group (M = 3.40, see Appendix) to be important in explaining solidarity activity. The belief, a fair society should include people with disabilities (M = 4.24) is relevant for people active in multiple ways. Overall and in comparison to the other issue fields investigated so far,

we confirm that solidarity with disabled people is less contentious. For example, only 2.42 % of the respondents saw it as “not at all” or “not very” important, that people with disabilities are included in public life. Similarly, the attachment (reported mean) is higher than with refugees and the unemployed. Thus, in comparison and as expected, questions on refugees and their rights were answered more diversely.

TABLE 9: Multinominal regression models for solidarity with people with disabilities

	Model 4e		Model 5e	
	one action	multiple action	one action	multiple action
Age	0.791***	0.887	-0.234***	-0.148
Income	1.102	1.074	0.0579	0.103
Education	1.065	1.278***	0.0260	0.193*
Male	1.191	1.327	0.115	0.293
Migrant	0.937	1.507*	-0.0770	0.252
Attached unemp	1.666***	1.469***	0.483***	0.352***
Satgov_unemp	1.042	0.739***	0.0836	-0.333***
Fairsocietey_jobs	0.910	0.960	-0.0806	-0.00152
Inclusivityunemp	1.020	1.255**	-0.0314	0.173
Socialclass			-0.0553	-0.154
Reldep			-0.217**	-0.382***
Living in DE			0.117	0.0265
Friendsdiff			-0.0531	-0.0257
Live alone			-0.429**	-0.167
East			0.192	-0.325
Attached DE			-0.131	-0.199
Attached city			0.0173	-0.243
Attached reg			0.163	0.101
Attached EU			0.277**	0.282**
Attached hu			-0.0868	-0.0236
Socialtrust			0.278***	-0.0257
Religiosity			0.166**	0.335***
Identity			-0.145	0.0213
Lrscale			-0.139	0.000612
Demsat			-0.144	0.0248
Multicultural			-0.172	-0.0876
Populism			0.268***	0.164
Xeno_econ			0.0727	0.491***
Xeno_cult			0.148	-0.0832
Constant	0.244***	0.119***	-2.445***	-2.361***
N	1,261	1,261	1,261	1,261
Pseudo-R^2	0.0503	0.0503	0.0958	0.0958

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Conclusion

Our investigation set out to describe the frequency of solidarity activities in Germany, investigate socio-economic and cultural-ideational determinants and, last but not least, test for issue specific motifs and beliefs. First, we compared the relative frequencies of solidarity activities. We found solidarity to depend on geographic proximity, as the way and frequency of people engaging varies across spatial levels, and also to depend on issue fields: solidarity activity with disabled people is more common than activity on behalf of

other groups and, at the moment, refugees are addressed more often than unemployed. This finding shows that solidarity is not universalistic, but rather particularistic. Moreover, our results indicate that solidarity depends not only on spatial proximity, but also on social proximity.

Second, while we did not find clear socio-economic patterns that held across levels and issue fields, it seems as if the not-engaged are of diverse age, the one-action activists across levels and issues are often of younger age, and the multiple activists are older. In addition, higher education seems to increase solidarity activity at least in some respects. Furthermore, across issue fields, higher social trust and religiosity seem to provide people with the motivation or (ideational) resources to engage on the behalf of others. Beyond that, our findings are rather scattered pointing to issue specific explanations. For example, we found relative deprivation to increase the support of unemployed people and higher attachment with Europe as well as lower attachment with Germany to increase solidarity with people in other European countries.

Thus, thirdly, we sought to confirm this interpretation by including extra variables for specific issue fields, namely support of other people in Europe, of refugees, of unemployed, and of people with disabilities. We found that indeed attachment to specific groups also increases solidarity activity on behalf of them. In this respect, this finding corroborates that, while we have seen in the first part of our analysis that there is a correlation between acting on behalf of different groups (see section 3.1), showing solidarity is not a universalist behaviour directed to any human being regardless of his or her affiliation or background. Instead, acting in solidarity is rather linked to specific groups to which one feels particularly close or attached. And attachment to different groups differs: it is highest towards disabled people and lowest, comparing our three issue fields, towards refugees (see means in Appendix). In this respect, feelings of social proximity to and empathy with certain target groups are important prerequisites for solidarity engagement in support of others. Furthermore, satisfaction with government policies on a specific issue might increase or decrease solidarity. For unemployment, people who are dissatisfied with the government are more likely to help those unemployed. This further supports our observation that social proximity and empathy help to mobilise support of particular groups because we can assume that people who express discontent with the government's unemployment policies have directly or indirectly experienced the impact of these policies themselves and can thus identify with the situation of the unemployed. For the issue of refugee policies, we observe the opposite relationship. Those who are satisfied with the government are more likely to support refugees themselves. This is obviously a result of the contestation of the government's refugee policies in recent years. Those who feel empathy with refugees and agree to the German "welcome policy" also help them. In comparison, people who disagree with the government's open border policy are also not willing to help refugees. Across the issue fields, social proximity and empathy with certain groups helps to encourage solidarity-like behaviour. What changes is the perception of government policies, which are regarded as being either in favour or to the disadvantage of the respective target groups.

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Appendix

Variable	Item(s)	recoding	distribution
Germany	Have you ever done one of the following in order to support the rights of people/groups in your own country? (Six options)	0=0, 1= one activity, 2 = more than one activity	49.2 %; 27.9 %; 22.9 %
Other EU	Have you ever done one of the following in order to support the rights of people/groups in other countries within the European Union? (Six options)	0=0, 1= one activity, 2 = more than one activity	68.7 %; 19.4 %; 11.9%
Global	Have you ever done one of the following in order to support the rights of people/groups in countries outside the European Union? (Six options)	0=0, 1= one activity, 2 = more than one activity	60.1 %; 25.4 %; 14.4 %
Refugees	Have you ever done any of the following in order to support the rights of refugees/asylum seekers? (Six options)	0=0, 1= one activity, 2 = more than one activity	66.0 %; 21.4 %; 12.6%
Unemplo	Have you ever done any of the following in order to support the rights of the unemployed? (Six options)	0=0, 1= one activity, 2 = more than one activity	72.9 %; 18.2 %; 8.9 %
Disabil	Have you ever done any of the following in order to support disability rights? (Six options)	0=0, 1= one activity, 2 = more than one activity	48.5 %; 32.9 %; 18.7 %
Age	How old are you?	Standardized	M = 48.4 ys
Income	What is your household's MONTHLY net income? (ten decils)	Standardized	-
Education	What is the highest level of education that you have completed? (ISCED-list)	Standardized	-
Male	Are you male or female? 1=male, 2=female	0=female, 1=male	49.9 %
Migrant	Born in other country; Parents born in other country	If (parents) not born in Germany = migrant background	17.6 %
Socialclass	Which of the following classes do you feel that you belong to?	Standardized	Upper to Lower class
Reldep	Own current standard of living compared to parents (0-10); Economic situation of household compared to 5 years ago (0-10); Financial situation of household in the near future (0-10); Your current living conditions (0-10); Living conditions of the people in your neighbourhood (0-10); Living conditions of your friends (0-10)	Index	(alpha >.81)
Living in DE	Still thinking about the living conditions, where would you place each of the following countries? Germany (0-10)	Standardized	M = 5.03
Friendsdiff	How many of your family, friends and/or acquaintances come from a different country?	Standardized	M = 3.96
Live alone	I currently live with… [alone]	-	25.0 %
East	Living in an East German *Bundesland*	-	15.9 %
Attached DE	Please tell me how attached you fell to Germany? (1-4)	Standardized	M = 3.29
Attached city	Please tell me how attached you fell to your city/town/village? (1-4)	Standardized	M = 3.28
Attached reg	Please tell me how attached you fell to your region? (1-4)	Standardized	M = 3.22
Attached EU	Please tell me how attached you fell to the European Union? (1-4)	Standardized	M = 2.59
Attached hu	How attached do you feel towards all people/humanity? (1-4)	Standardized	M = 2.92
Socialtrust	Most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful (0-10)	Standardized	M = 4.38
Religiosity	How religious would you say you are? (0-10)	Standardized	M = 3.34
Identity	How attached do you feel towards people with the same religion as you? (1-4); How attached do you feel towards people from your social class? (1-4); How attached do you feel towards people from your same ethnic group? (1-4); How attached do	Index	(alpha > .88)

	you feel towards people from your country of birth? (1-4); How attached do you feel towards people from your same age or generation? (1-4); How attached do you feel towards people from your same gender? (1-4); How attached do you feel towards people from your same sexual orientation? (1-4); How attached do you feel towards all people/humanity? (1-4)		
Lrscale	People sometimes talk about the Left and the Right in politics. Where would you place yourself on the following? (0-10)	Standardized	M = 4.60
Demsat	On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in Germany? (0-10)	Standardized	M = 5.15
Multicultural	It is a good thing to live in a multicultural society. (1-5)	Standardized	M = 3.37
Populism	Politicians in the parliament need to follow will of the people (1-5; People should make our most important policy decisions (1-5); Political differences between the elite and the people are larger than among people (1-5); Rather be represented by a citizen than by specialised politician (1-5)	Index	(alpha > .76)
Xeno_econ	Would you say it is generally bad or good for the German economy that people come to live here from other countries? (0-10)	Standardized	M = 5.80
Xeno_cult	Would you say that German cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries? (0-10)	Standardized	M = 5.51
EUaid	The EU provides development aid to assist certain countries outside the EU in their fight against poverty and in their development. How important do you think it is to help people in developing countries? (1-5)	Standardized	M = 3.89
EUdebt	The EU is currently pooling funds to help EU countries having difficulties in paying their debts. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this measure? (1-5)	Standardized	M = 2.82
EUmotiv	There are many reasons to state for or against financial help for EU countries in trouble. Which one of the following best reflects how you feel?	-	-
1	Financial help has also beneficial effects for the own country. (0-1)	-	15.2 %
2	It is our moral duty to help other member states that are in need. (0-1)	-	20.5 %
3	The European Union member states should help each other, as somewhere along the way every country may require help (0-1)	-	44.6 %
4	Financial help should not be given to countries that have proven to handle money badly (0-1)	-	40.3 %
EU benefits D	Generally speaking, do you think that Germany's membership of the European Union is ...? (1-2)	Recode: 0 = not benefiting; 1 = benefiting	68.0 %
Attached refu	How attached do you feel towards people who have asked for asylum in this country? (1-5)	Standardized	M = 2.74
Satgov_refu	How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way in which the ***NATIONALITY*** government is dealing with the following? Refugee crisis (0-10)	Standardized	M = 3.32
Fair_refu	In order to be considered fair, what should a society provide? Welcoming refugees and asylum seekers (1-5)	Standardized	M = 3.19
Fair_mig	In order to be considered fair, what should a society provide? Welcoming immigrants and migrants (1-5)	Standardized	M = 3.13
Refugeesupp	Government offering financial support to help refugees (1-5)	Standardized	M = 3.16
Refugeemoral	It is the moral responsibility of Germany to accept	Standardized	M = 3.35

	refugees. (1 to 5)		
Refugeecrisis	How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the degree of cooperation in the European Union to handle the refugee crisis? (0-10)	Standardized	M = 3.80
Syrian refugees	How do you think Germany should handle refugees fleeing the war in Syria? (1-4)	Standardized	M = 2.56
Inclusivity	How would you feel about having people from a different country/ethnic background as citizens in your country? (happy-not happy) How would you feel about having people from a different country/ethnic background as residents living in your city? (happy-not happy) How would you feel about having people from a different country/ethnic background working alongside you in your job? (happy-not happy) How would you feel about having people from a different country/ethnic background as close kins by marriage? (happy-not happy)	Index	(alpha > .91) M = 0.72
Attached unemp	How attached do you feel towards people who are unemployed? (1-5)	Standardized	M = 2.93
Satgov_unemp	How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way in which the ***NATIONALITY*** government is dealing with the following? Unemployment (0-10)	Standardized	M = 4.93
Fairsocietey_jobs	In order to be considered fair, what should a society provide? Providing jobs for all citizens (1-5)	Standardized	M = 4.21
Inclusivityunemp	How would you feel about having people from families with one or more unemployed people as citizens in your country? (happy-not happy) How would you feel about having people from families with one or more unemployed people as residents living in your city? (happy-not happy) How would you feel about having people from families with one or more unemployed people working alongside you in your job? (happy-not happy) How would you feel about having people from families with one or more unemployed people as close kins by marriage? (happy-not happy)	Index, Standardized	(alpha > .88) M = 0.71
Attached disab	How attached do you feel towards people who have disabilities? (1-5)	Standardized	M = 3.40
Satgov disab	How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way in which the German government is dealing with the following? Disability support (0-10)	Standardized	M = 4.95
Fairsocietey_disa	In order to be considered fair, what should a society provide? Including people with disabilities into public life (1-5)	Standardized	M = 4.24
Inclusivity disab	How would you feel about having people with disabilities as citizens in your country? (happy-not happy) How would you feel about having people with disabilities as residents living in your city? (happy-not happy) How would you feel about having people with disabilities working alongside you in your job? (happy-not happy) How would you feel about having people with disabilities as close kins by marriage? (happy-not happy)	Index, Standardized	(alpha =.84) M = 0.90

Volunteering for Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Greece

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Introduction

Forced displacement hit a record high in 2015 (UNHCR, 2016). Worldwide, 65.3 million individuals – including refugees[14], internally displaced people[15] and asylum seekers[16] – were forcibly displaced due to persecution, conflict, generalised violence and human rights violations. Over four million people have been displaced by the conflict in Syria, while we have seen rapid increase in refugees/asylum seekers from African countries affected by war and violence. Consequently, European countries have struggled to cope with the influx of people and how to deal with resettling them (UNHCR, 2016).

According to Frontex[17], the main migratory routes into Europe through the Mediterranean include the Western Mediterranean route to Spain, the Central Mediterranean route to Italy and the Eastern Mediterranean route to Greece. By the beginning of 2015, the main gateway to Europe was through the Central Mediterranean route; however, by the end of 2015 the total number of registered arrivals of refugees/asylum seekers in Greece reached the record figure of 821.000. The bulk of the flow was directed towards the Greek islands bordering Turkey (IOM, 2015)[18]. The large-scale arrival of refugees/asylum seekers and the resulting transformation of the asylum landscape in the country has challenged Greeks to cope with a dual crisis: the current refugee crisis as well as economic depression which has severely affected the country over the last six years.

[14] A refugee is someone who has been forced to flee his or her home country and is unable or unwilling to return due to fear of persecution. The 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees gives refugees legal protection under the international refugee law. In the first article of the Convention, a refugee is defined as a person who "owing to well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it" (Article 1(A2)). The Convention also established the principle of non-refoulement (Article 33(1)), according to which "No Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion".

[15] Internally displaced individuals include those who were forced to flee their home but they did not cross a state border.

[16] Asylum-seekers include individuals who have made a claim that they are refugees and are in the process of waiting for it to be accepted or rejected.

[17] FRONTEX, Migratory routes map. Available at: http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/migratory-routes-map/ [Accessed 15th April 2017].

[18] FRONTEX, Eastern Mediterranean route. Available at: http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/eastern-mediterranean-route/ [Accessed 15th April 2017].

While the European response has been characterised by confusion and lack of universal policy (Tramountanis, 2017) and traditional donors delaying funding, thousands of ordinary people have joined efforts to provide services and support to refugees/asylum seekers arriving to Greek shores. The role of volunteers in responding to the refugee crisis has been remarkable. Volunteers have provided a plethora of solidarity activities including food supplies, collecting and sorting clothes, providing medical aid, legal and financial support, rescuing people from the sea, cooking, setting up laundries, building shelters and so on. (Evangelinidis, 2016; Gkionakis, 2016; Humanitarian Practice Network, 2016). As Latimir underscores (2016, p.30).

A striking characteristic of the response has been the remarkable mobilization of Greek voluntary organizations and individuals providing aid to migrants, despite facing unprecedented levels of unemployment and poverty themselves.

Several media reports emphasize that despite the acute economic crisis, Greek volunteers have stepped into covering for the gap left by the Greek state and EU leaders to support for refugees' humanitarian needs[19]. Ordinary citizens have been working behind the scenes and shown astonishing generosity in helping refugees/asylum seekers stranded in Greece[20].

It should be noted that previous research has consistently underpinned the lower levels of volunteering in Greece (e.g. European Commission, 2007; European Commission, 2010; European Commission, 2011) along with a weaker civil society (Mouzelis, 1995; Lyrintzis, 2002) compared to other European countries. Despite such arguments, other scholars emphasize that there is a vibrant, informal, non-institutionalized and often non-registered Greek civil society sector which does not fall into the normative definitions; hence, it is not captured in official statistics (Karamichas, 2007; Rozakou, 2011). This informal civil society usually tends to be distant from the state and primarily aims to protect vested interests in specific local areas or volunteer to help people in need (Sotiropoulos, 2004).

Although past international research has produced numerous and valuable insights into volunteering, the domain of volunteering specifically for refugees/asylum seekers has been little explored. Exceptions involve Erickson's study (2012) in Fargo, North Dakota during 2007-2008, which investigates how volunteers embrace and contest hegemonic forms of 'worthy' citizenship. A recent study conducted in Hungary shows that the recent refugee crisis had a strong mobilizing effect for almost three per cent of the Hungarian population; some volunteers have altruistic motivations whilst others are mainly driven as a response to the political situation (Toth & Kertesz, 2016). In Germany, recent empirical evidence underpins that since 201,5 volunteering for refugees/asylum seekers

[19] The Guardian, 12 March, 2016. Refugee crisis: How Greeks opened their hearts to strangers. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/12/refugee-crisis-greeks-strangers-migrants. [Accessed 18th March 2017].

[20] The Huffington Post, 6 June, 2016. The Hidden Heroes of Greece's Refugee Crisis. Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/volunteers-with-greek-refugees_us_574f54b3e4b0eb20fa0cb52c [Accessed 7th April 2017

has become a widespread phenomenon with thousands of people donating money, distributing food, medicines, clothing and other essentials (Karakayali & Kleist, 2015, 2016; Rose, 2016).

The recent explosion of refugees/asylum seekers fleeing conflict and persecution and the pivotal role of volunteers to tackle the refugee crisis has led to a drastic increase of scientific interest in the field. To the best of our knowledge, previous studies explore neither the prevalence of volunteering for refugees/asylum seekers in Greece, nor the profiles of volunteers using nationally representative data. The data collected within the TransSOL project provides a unique opportunity to explore volunteering as a form of Greeks' transnational solidarity with thousands of refugees/asylum seekers fleeing repression and conflict zones to seek safety in Europe.

Theoretical background and hypotheses

Volunteering is considered a complex and multidimensional phenomenon embracing different definitions, meanings and functions developed in different disciplines (Musick & Wilson, 2008; Hustinx, Cnaan & Handy, 2010). For instance, sociological approaches emphasize different forms of capital or resources, such as human and social capital in explaining volunteering (Wilson & Musick, 1997a; Wilson, 2000). Psychologists focus on key traits of personality such as extraversion, agreeableness and resilience that impact on individuals' predisposition to volunteer (Bekkers, 2005; Matsuba, Hart & Atkins, 2007). For political scientists, volunteering acts as a critical form of civic engagement and an expression of democratic values (Theiss-Morse & Hibbing, 2005), underlying the critical impact of citizens' political engagement on volunteering (Bekkers, 2005). Economic scientists adopt a rational-based approach, viewing volunteering as a form of unpaid labour where volunteers undertake activity depending on the consuming resources and the rewards they may gain (Wilson, 2000; Musick & Wilson, 2008; Hustinx, Cnaan & Handy, 2010; Wilson, 2012).

The present paper adopts a hybrid approach. It explores volunteers' profiles based on their demographic attributes; their human and social capital developed in sociological approaches; and their political conventional and unconventional behaviours developed in political approaches.

Literature has shown that, generally, people with different demographic characteristics vary in their propensities to volunteer (Wilson, 2000; Musick & Wilson, 2008; Hustinx, Cnaan & Handy, 2010). With respect to gender, previous research shows different rates and patterns of volunteering (Wilson, 2012). Gaskin and Smith (1997) suggest there is no clear pattern of gender differences in volunteering across European countries. However, other scholars suggest that gender does make a difference in specific domains of volunteering, since women tend to have higher rates in informal volunteering activities associated with more caring tasks and lower rates in political activities (Thompson, 1993; Schlozman, Burns & Verba, 1994; Cnaan, Handy & Wadsworth, 1996; Rochester, et al.,

2010). This pattern appears quite consistent across different age groups and countries (Wuthnow, 1995). Gender ideologies, as well as the gendered division of labour, partly explain why women tend to volunteer more in activities associated with caring tasks (*Wilson,* 2000).

Age-related variables are also important in determining volunteering. Some scholars underpin that voluntary participation varies by age or life-cycle stage associated with the different adult roles (e.g., with work, family obligations, etc.) taken throughout the life cycle (*Wilson,* 2000; Musick & Wilson, 2008; Smith & Wang, 2016). The empirical evidence shows that volunteering is generally higher among middle-aged citizens compared to the elderly and youth (Wymer, 1998; Curtis, Baer & Grabb, 2001; *Pho, 2008*). However, Wilson (2000) argues that high-risk volunteering activities primarily attract younger people compared to older people. Moreover, he suggests that different types of volunteering activities become more or less attractive in different life-cycle stages. For instance, younger citizens mainly volunteer in organizations related to self and career-oriented activism; middle-aged volunteers primarily engage in community-oriented work; older volunteers participate to "service organizations, recreational clubs and agencies to help the elderly" (Wilson, 2000:227).

From a sociological perspective, individuals' decision to volunteer is influenced by various types of resources or capital, such as human capital and social capital (Wilson & Musick, 1997a; Wilson, 2000; Musick & Wilson, 2008). The former primarily involves educational attainment, income, employment status and occupational class (Wilson & Musick, 1997a; Wilson, 2000). A plethora of scholars emphasize that, *at least in advanced industrial societies,* education is often the most consistent predictor of volunteering *(Brady, Verba & Schlozman, 1995; Nie, Junn & Stehlik-Barry, 1996; Wilson 2000, 2012;* Musick & Wilson 2008; *Huang, van den Brink & Groot, 2009;* Rochester, et al., 2010; Van Ingen & Dekker, 2011*). The critical impact of education on volunteering is associated with the outcomes of educational processes that expose individuals to norms and values favourable to volunteering as well as to civic skills, advanced awareness of problems and stronger feelings of efficacy.*

Whilst volunteering is a form of allocating personal time, hence one would expect that income would not have much effect on volunteering, most empirical evidence across different countries reports that low-income earners are less likely to volunteer than higher earners (Vaillancourt, 1994; Freeman, 1997; Hurley, Wilson & Christie, 2008*). For instance, Pho (2008) explored volunteering in the United States from 2002 to 2005 and found that low- to medium-wage earners are less likely to volunteer than high-wage earners.*

Whether or not someone is employed and the nature of their employment can influence volunteering in several ways. Employment is a prime determinant of social status, it provides opportunities to integrate into society and develop those adequate civic skills that increase the likelihood of volunteering. The relation between employment status and volunteering has been explored by various scholars, underlying that part-time employees

*are more likely to volunteer than either full-time employees or individuals who are not in the labour force (*Johnson, Foley & Elder; L*asby, 2004; Low, et al., 2007;* Hurley, *Wilson & Christie, 2008; Einolf, 2011). Meanwhile,* unemployment status is usually associated with lower levels of volunteering (Pho, 2008; Wilson, 2012).

In Wilson's (2000, p.221) words: "As occupational status increases so does the likelihood of volunteering". Occupational status has been shown to play a critical role in volunteering (Wilson & Musick, 1997b; Hodgkinson, 2003; Rotolo & Wilson, 2007). For instance, Reed and Selbee (2001) found that individuals in Canada with jobs high in occupational prestige, higher income and higher educational attainment are more likely to volunteer. Similarly, Rotolo and Wilson (2007) show that even after controlling for family traits, women with professional and managerial occupations exhibit greater tendencies to volunteer than women in lower occupational jobs. The association between volunteering and high occupational prestige is related to the fact that top managers or professionals are more likely to be asked to volunteer as well as to be socially active as part of their job role (Wilson, 2000; Wilson & Musick, 1997b).

For Putnam (2000, p.19), social capital refers to "social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them". The key resources that form 'social capital' involve social networks or social ties, including friendship networks, organizational memberships as well as trust in others, i.e. elements which tend to foster collective action (Wilson & Musick, 1997a). Much research has been conducted on social capital in recent years, in particular measured as individuals' friendship networks, informal social interactions, organizational memberships and social trust, as correlates of volunteering. For instance, Wilson and Musick (1997a) found a positive association between formal volunteering and informal social interactions measured as frequent conversations and meetings with friends and acquaintances. Past research underpins that individuals who are members in different types of organization/association (such as unions or professional associations, social welfare organizations, political parties, religious congregations, cultural organizations, environmental, community groups, etc.) are more likely to volunteer than non-members (Dekker & Van den Broek, 1998; Hodgkinson & Kirsch, 2000; Hodgkinson, 2003). Individuals' organizational membership provides the associational connections and therefore more direct opportunities to be asked to volunteer compared to non-members (Hodgkinson & Kirsch, 2000).

Brown and Ferris (2007) found that individuals' associational networks, their trust in others and in their community are important determinants of giving and volunteering. Cross-national surveys underpin that social trust is positively associated with volunteering regardless of socio-economic differences (Anheier & Kendall, 2002). It should be noted that some scholars underline that social trust is associated with specific types of volunteering activities which primarily target to provide services to individuals in need. On the contrary, trusting people are "less likely to volunteer in activities that involve confrontation with authorities or working to change the system" (Musick & Wilson, 2008, p.46). In line with such arguments, Greenberg (2001) supports that politically oriented

volunteering associated with government-related activities, among others, is motivated by lack of social trust, whereas service-oriented volunteering including non-governmental activism is motivated by trust in others.

The political approach to volunteering highlights its role as a form of civic engagement and expression of democratic values. Putnam argues that "volunteering is part of the syndrome of good citizenship and political involvement" (2000, p.132). Several scholars report that volunteers tend to be more politically active compared to non-volunteers (Verba, Schlozman & Brady, 1995; Dekker & Van den Broek, 1998; Hodgkinson, 2003; Musick & Wilson, 2008). The grounds of the association between volunteering and political engagement involve, among others, the opportunity to develop specific civic skills (such as the ability to organise a meeting), sharing information and fostering general trust (Verba, Schlozman & Brady, 1995; Stolle, 1998).

*Hodgkinson (*2003), in her study using EVS/WVS 1999-2002 data, found that volunteers are more likely to be politically engaged (in terms of discussing politics and signing petitions) than non-volunteers in the vast majority of the countries under study[21]. Dekker and Van den Broek (1996), using data from five countries (the United States, Great Britain, West Germany, Italy and Mexico), found that active volunteers compared to passive volunteers are more likely to be politically engaged in conventional and unconventional political acts (such as contributing time to political organizations, participation to protests/demonstrations, etc.)[22]. Bekkers' (2005) study in the Netherlands shows that those individuals with a greater interest in politics and post-materialistic value orientations are more likely to be volunteers – also, voting preferences are important since non-voters are less likely to volunteer than voters who prefer leftist or Christian political parties. Similarly, Knoke (1990) found that active volunteering goes along with being active in local politics, including among others, voting in local elections.

Drawing on the theoretical arguments and the empirical evidence discussed, we hypothesize the following:

Hypothesis 1: Individuals with specific demographic attributes, i.e. women and middle-aged individuals, are more likely to volunteer for refugees/asylum seekers.

Hypothesis 2: Individuals' human capital in terms of higher educational attainment, higher income and occupational class is positively associated with volunteering for refugees/asylum seekers. Moreover, part-time employees are more likely to volunteer than either full-time employees or individuals who are not in the labour force.

[21] Exceptions included Hong Kong and Latvia.
[22] In Mexico active members had no differences with passive ones in any measures of political involvement.

Hypothesis 3: Individuals' social capital, in terms of social trust, informal social interactions with friends and memberships in organizational/associational networks are positively associated with volunteering for refugees/asylum seekers.

Hypothesis 4: Individuals' political engagement in conventional and unconventional political behaviours is positively associated with volunteering for refugees/asylum seekers.

Data and Methods

At the European level, a recent definition derived from the Council decision on the *European Year of Voluntary Activities Promoting Active Citizenship* (2011) defines volunteering as follows (European Council 2009 / 2010: Preamble section 5: L 17/43)[23]:

> The term 'voluntary activities' refers to all types of voluntary activity, whether formal, non-formal or informal which are undertaken of a person's own free will, choice and motivation, and is without concern for financial gain. They benefit the individual volunteer communities and society as a whole.

For the purpose of the present study, volunteering for refugees/asylum seekers is defined as those activities performed voluntarily by individuals without receiving financial gains and which aim to assist refugees/asylum seekers arriving in Greece. This can take the form of either directly or indirectly ameliorating their reception conditions and improving their means of subsistence and health care. In this study's questionnaire, one item asks respondents whether they have been involved in different types of activities to support the rights of refugees/asylum seekers, including among others[24] their engagement as active members of an organization, i.e. volunteering in an organization. The dichotomous variable is used to capture volunteering/non-volunteering for refugees/asylum seekers in Greece.

The independent variables involve a set of items capturing demographic characteristics, including gender and age, measures of human and social capital as well as individuals' political behaviors[25]. Human capital is measured with indicators capturing respondents' educational attainment, income, employment status and occupational class. Educational

[23] European Council (2009/2010): Council Decision of 27 November 2009 on the European Year of Voluntary Activities Promoting Active Citizenship (2011) (2010/37/EC). Published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 22 January 2010. Available from: http://ec.europa.eu/citizenship/pdf/20091127_council_decision_en.pdf. [Accessed 7th February 2017].

[24] Such as attending a march, protest or demonstration, donate money, donate time, buy or refuse to buy products in support to the goals, engage as passive member of an organization (pay check membership) (see Table 1).

[25] Variables' recoding are presented in Appendix 1.

attainment is measured with three responses capturing individuals with higher education (i.e. university and above), intermediate education (i.e. upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education) and lower education (i.e. less than primary, primary and lower secondary education). Income is measured with an item asking respondents for their household monthly net income, after tax and compulsory deductions, from all sources. The recoded variable includes three responses measuring lower (i.e., less than 775 euro), middle (i.e., between 776 and 1.425 euro) and higher income-earners (i.e., more than 1426 euro). Respondents' occupational class is measured with a recoded variable including three responses: higher occupational class (professional/managerial workers), middle (clerical/sales or services/ foreman or supervisor of other workers) and low (skilled/semi-skilled or unskilled manual workers) occupational class. Respondents' employment status is measured with a recoded variable including four responses: full time employee, part-time employee, other employment status (such as permanently sick or disabled, retired, community or military service, doing housework, looking after children or other persons) and unemployed. Social capital is measured with indicators associated with respondents' social trust, informal social interactions and organizational memberships. The former is captured with one item measuring on a scale from 0 to 10 respondents' level of trustfulness of people, where higher values indicate higher levels of social trust. The intensity of informal social interactions is measured with one item asking respondents how often, in the past month, they met socially with friends not living in their household. The recoded variable is a dichotomous measure including "Once or twice this month or less" and "Every week or almost every day". Respondents' organizational membership is measured with a summative index including membership (either as active or as passive members) in political parties, labor/ trade unions, development/human rights organizations, civil rights/liberties organizations, environment/animal rights organizations, women's/feminist organizations, LGBTI rights organizations, peace/anti-war organizations, occupy/anti-austerity organizations, anti-capitalist-globalization organizations, anti-racist/migrant rights organizations, social solidarity networks, disability rights organizations and unemployed rights organizations. Higher scores in the composite index indicate higher levels of respondents' organizational/associational membership.

Political engagement is measured with items capturing involvement in conventional and unconventional political behaviors. The former is measured with a question asking respondents if they voted or not in the last Greek national election (on September 20th, 2015). The recoded dichotomous variable captures respondents' engagement or non-engagement in conventional behaviors. Unconventional political behavior is measured with a composite score including respondents' participation (in the past 12 months) in activities such as signing petitions, boycotting products for political/ethical/environmental reasons, attending a demonstration, march or rally,

joining a strike, joining an occupation, sit-in, or blockade[26]. Higher scores of the specific index indicate higher levels of respondents' unconventional political behaviour.

The analysis uses exploratory and explanatory analysis to investigate volunteers' profiles supporting refugees/asylum seekers in Greece. With respect to the former, the *Chi-Square test of Independence* and independent sample *t-test* are used to determine differences between volunteers and non-volunteers in relation to the variables under study. Explanatory analysis involves the application of logistic regression to predict volunteering for refugees/asylum seekers (compared to non-volunteering) based on the variables measuring respondents' demographic traits, human and social capital as well as political conventional and unconventional behaviors. The causal model of the present analysis treats human capital as causally prior to social capital, given that individuals with higher human capital (such as higher educational attainment) usually have higher rates of different measures of social capital, such as informal social interactions (Wilson & Musick, 1997a; Wilson & Musick, 1998). Moreover, it is assumed that individuals' social capital, in terms of social networks, organizational memberships and social trust, enhances civic capacity. Therefore, individuals may become more fully engaged in conventional and unconventional political behaviors. Under such assumptions, the political correlates of volunteering are entered at the final step of the logistic regression model. The data is weighted to match national population statistics in terms of gender, age, and educational level.

Results

Table 1 presents different types of activity that support the rights of refugees/asylum seekers in Greece. As shown in Table 1, 8.1% of Greek citizens have actively volunteered to support the rights of refugees/asylum seekers. Moreover, 8.9% attended a march/protest/demonstration, 11.7% donated money, 15.2% donated time, 12.7% bought or refused to buy products in support for refugees/asylum seekers and 5.4% engaged as passive member of an organization (pay check membership). It should be noted that 63.6% have not participated to any of the activities supporting the rights of refugees/ asylum seekers.

[26] According to Marsh and Kaase (1979, p. 59) unconventional political participation includes petitions, demonstrations, boycotts, rent or tax strikes, unofficial industrial strikes, occupations of buildings, blocking of traffic, damage to property, and personal violence.

TABLE 1: Activities supporting the rights of refugees/asylum seekers in Greece (in %)

Engaged as active member of an organisation (volunteering in an organisation)	8.1
Attended a march, protest or demonstration	8.9
Donate money	11.7
Donate time	15.2
Bought or refused to buy products in support to the goals	12.7
Engaged as passive member of an organisation (paycheck membership)	5.4
None of the above	63.6

Notes: % based on respondents selecting responses on dichotomous variables (Yes/No). Data weighted.
Q: Have you ever done any of the following in order to support the rights of refugees/asylum seekers?

As shown in Table 2, the *Chi-Square test of Independence* indicates that volunteers are significantly more likely to be involved in additional supportive activities supporting the rights of refugees/asylum seekers compared to non-volunteers. For instance, volunteers are significantly more likely to attend a march/protest/demonstration (30.7%), donate money (26.5%) and time (61.1%), buy or refuse to buy products in support to goals associated with refugee/asylum seekers' rights (28.1%) and engage as passive members (pay check membership) of a refugee/asylum seekers organization (31.9%).

TABLE 2: Volunteers/non-volunteers' differences in activities supporting the rights of refugees/asylum seekers in Greece

	Volunteers	Non-volunteers	*Chi-square test*	p-value
	f (%)	f (%)		
Attended a march, protest or demonstration	51(30.7)	133(7.0)	105.397	.000
Donate money	44(26.5)	196(10.3)	38.754	.000
Donate time	102(61.1)	212(11.2)	295.723	.000
Bought or refused to buy products in support to the goals	47(28.1)	215(11.4)	38.999	.000
Engaged as passive member of an organisation (paycheck membership)	53(31.9)	59(3.1)	246.593	.000

Notes: Data weighted

Table 3 and Table 4 present *Chi-Square test of Independence* and independent sample *t-test* results, exploring respectively differences in demographic attributes, social and human capital as well as political behaviors between volunteers and non-volunteers. As shown in Table 3, women (10.3%) are significantly more likely to volunteer with refugees**/**asylum seekers than men (5.7%). A higher prevalence of volunteering is found for older age groups (i.e. more than 55 years old) (9.9%) and younger age groups (18-34 years old) (8.3%) compared to middle-aged ones (6.2%). Significant differences are also

reported with respect to educational attainment: individuals with higher education (14.1%) are more likely to volunteer for refugees/asylum seekers compared to individuals with intermediate (6.7%) or lower education (6.6%). With respect to income, middle-income earners (i.e. 776-1425 euro) have the highest prevalence of volunteering (9.2%) whereas low-income earners (i.e. less than 775 euro) the lowest one (5.9%). Individuals of higher occupational class (i.e. in professional or managerial positions) are significantly more likely to volunteer (13.6%) than individuals of middle (7.9%) or lower occupational class (7.2%).

TABLE 3: Volunteers/non-volunteers' differences in specific demographic attributes, human capital, social capital and conventional political behavior indicators

		Volunteers	Non-volunteers	*Chi-square test*	p-value
		f (%)	f (%)		
Gender	Male	57 (5.7)	937 (94.3)	14.464	.000
	Female	110 (10.3)	957(89.7)		
Age-groups	18-34 years old	40(8.3)	441(91.7)	7.113	.029
	35-54 years old	50(6.2)	752(93.8)		
	More than 55	77(9.9)	702(90.1)		
Education	Higher education	57(14.1)	346(85.9)	24.556	.000
	Intermediate education	49(6.7)	684(93.3)		
	Lower education	61(6.6)	864(93.4)		
Income	Low (less than 775)	39(5.9)	617(94.1)	5.179	.075
	Middle (776-1425)	70(9.2)	693(90.8)		
	High (more than 1426)	34(7.9)	395(92.1)		
Occupational class	Higher class (professional/ managerial)	66(13.6)	418(86.4)	14.346	.001
	Middle class	73(7.9)	851(92.1)		
	Lower class (manual workers)	21(7.2)	272(92.8)		
Employment status	Full-time	34(6.2)	516(93.8)	11.690	.009
	Part-time	22(10.2)	194(89.8)		
	Other	76(10.4)	657(89.6)		
	Unemployed	35(6.2)	527(93.8)		
Informal social interactions with friends	Once or twice this month or less	58(6.3)	869(93.7)	7.351	.007
	Every week or almost everyday	108(9.5)	1026(90.5)		
Conventional political behavior	No voting	22(6.4)	323(93.6)	2.376	.123
	Voting	140(8.9)	1428(91.1)		

Notes: Data weighted

Part-time employees (10.2%) and individuals with other employment status (e.g., retired, housewives, etc.) (10.4%) have higher rates of volunteering compared to full-time employees (6.2%) or unemployed individuals (6.2%). The analysis indicates that respondents with more frequent informal interactions (i.e. every week or almost every day) (9.5%) are significantly more likely to volunteer for refugees/asylum seekers

compared to those with less frequent interactions (i.e., once or twice per month or less) (6.3%). Individuals with specific conventional political behaviors such as voting (8.9%) are more likely to volunteer compared to non-voters (6.4%); however, the reported difference is non-significant.

As shown in Table 4, the *t-test* analysis indicates that volunteers for refugees/asylum seekers are significantly more likely than non-volunteers to score higher in indicators measuring social capital such as social trust and organizational/associational memberships. Moreover, volunteers are significantly more likely to be involved in unconventional political behaviors than non-volunteers.

TABLE 4: Volunteers/non-volunteers' differences in specific social capital and unconventional political behavior indicators

	Volunteers		Non-Volunteers				
	M	SD	M	SD	*t-test*	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
Social trust	4.62	2.75	3.25	2.64	6.418***	.956	1.797
Organisational/associational membership	4.91	3.36	3.17	3.12	6.193***	1.191	2.295
Unconventional political behaviour	2.44	1.19	1.84	1.00	4.672***	.344	.851

*Notes: M=Mean, SD= Std. Deviation, +p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001, Data weighted*

The results of the analysis reported in Table 5 shed light on demographic traits, human and social capital as well as political conventional and unconventional behaviors of volunteers for refugees/asylum seekers in Greece. The first model including the demographic attributes indicates that women and individuals with higher educational attainment compared to lower educational attainment are significantly more likely to volunteer. Moreover, middle-aged (i.e. 35-54-year-olds) and older individuals (more than 55-years-old) are significantly less likely to volunteer than younger age groups (i.e. 18-34-year-olds). The second model including the indicators measuring human capital shows that – controlling for gender, age and education – middle-income earners compared to low-income earners are more likely to volunteer whereas high income earners are less likely to volunteer. However, the reported effects are non-significant. With respect to employment status, full-time and part-time employees are more likely to volunteer whereas individuals with the "other" employment status are less likely to do so compared to unemployed individuals. Higher occupational class individuals such as managers or professionals and those from the middle occupational class compared to those from the lower occupational class individuals (manual workers) are less likely to volunteer. The latter reported effect is significant.

TABLE 5: Binary logistic regression analysis of volunteering for refugees/asylum seekers in Greece

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Gender(Ref. :Male)				
Female	.736*	.853**	.948**	1.063**
	(.297)	(.330)	(.347)	(.364)
Educational attainment (Ref.: Lower education)				
Higher educaion	1.121**	.970*	1.244**	.919*
	(.363)	(.416)	(.438)	(.465)
Intermediate education	.270	.222	.496	.129
	(.378)	(.399)	(.425)	(.453)
Age-groups (Ref.:18-34 years old)				
35-54 years old	-.750*	-.611	-.450	-.489
	(.392)	(.420)	(.444)	(.458)
More than 55 years old	-.812*	-.606	-.159	-.071
	(.349)	(.417)	(.464)	(.477)
Income-groups (Ref.: Low income : Less than 775)				
Middle income (776-1425)		.107	-.085	-.097
		(.365)	(.400)	(.419)
High income (more than 1426)		-.284	-.680	-.721
		(.443)	(.496)	(.518)
Empoyment status (Ref. : Unemployed)				
Full-time		.089	.342	.387
		(.456)	(.496)	(.502)
Part-time		.939+	1.428*	1.473*
		(.503)	(.565)	(.585)
Other		-.020	.006	-.007
		(.461)	(.490)	(.507)
Occupational class (Ref.: Lower occupational class/manual workers)				
Higher occupational class (managerial/professional)		-.276	-.713	-.613
		(.450)	(.489)	(.510)
Middle occupational class		-1.181**	-1.402**	-1.412**
		(.431)	(.460)	(.486)
Social trust			.127*	.118*
			(.059)	(.060)
Informal social interactions with friends (Ref.: Once- twice or less per month)				
Every week or almost everyday			.979*	1.062*
			(.408)	(.429)
Organisational/associational membership			.237***	.207***
			(.046)	(.049)
Unconventional political behaviour				.446**
				(.145)
Conventional political behaviour (Ref.: No vote)				
Vote				.655
				(.496)
Constant	-2.321***	-1.969***	-4.457***	-5.818***
	(.396)	(.496)	(.714)	(.904)
Nagelkerke R^2	.096	.157	.284	.320

Notes: The dependent variable is a dichotomous measure indicating the probability of volunteering (Ref.: non-volunteering) for refugees/asylum seekers in Greece.

Table presents logistic regression coefficients B with standard errors in parentheses

+ p< .10 . p<.05. ** p<.01. *** p<.001.*

Data weighted

Adding social capital indicators to the model, the analysis shows that individuals with a higher level of social trust, more intense informal interactions with fiends and a greater involvement in organizational/associational memberships are significantly more likely to volunteer for refugees/asylum seekers in Greece. In the final model, the political correlates of volunteering are added; the analysis demonstrates that individuals' involvement in unconventional political behavior significantly increases the likelihood of volunteering. Similar results are reported for the conventional political behavior of voting; however, the reported effect is non-significant.

Discussion

Since 2015, the influx of refugees to Europe – primarily from North Africa in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, and from the Middle East due to the civil war in Syria – has challenged Europe to tackle one of the largest movements of displaced people through European borders since World War II. According to Eurostat (2016), in 2015 a record number of over 1.2 million first-time asylum seekers registered in EU member-states. Almost one out of three first-time asylum seekers originate from Syria, while many are also Afghans and Iraqis.

In the context of the recent refugee crisis, Greece has been marked by a fast-paced transit of high numbers of refugees/asylum seekers entering its territory en *route* to wealthier countries in Northern and Central Europe. The large-scale arrival of refugees/asylum seekers and the resultant transformation of the asylum landscape in the country have challenged Greeks to cope with a twofold crisis: the economic crisis as well as the refugee crisis. Concerning the economic crisis, in the last six years Greece has faced the most acute recession in its modern history with devastating socio-economic impacts on individuals' lives echoed in record unemployment and poverty rates (Matsaganis & Leventi, 2014; OECD, 2014). Since 2015, the country has been strained by both economic depression and the massive migration inflows of hundreds of thousands of refugees/asylum seekers.

Despite economic hardship, citizens have been instrumental in providing help (such as food supplies, medical aid, legal and financial support, etc.) to refugees/asylum seekers arriving on Greek shores – simultaneously relieving the state of one of its core roles. Therefore, the government has come to partly rely on the contributions of volunteers in order to tackle the refugee crisis. As Evangelinidis (2016, p.33) argues:

> Where the state apparatus was absent, or its structures were insufficient, civil society organizations in many different forms (e.g. professional NGOs, volunteers, ad hoc groups and collectives) tried to fill the gap. With the central government unable to properly provide for many of its citizens, let alone refugees or migrants, the humanitarian vacuum has often been filled with solidarity initiatives…

Based on a hybrid approach which combines the sociological and political approaches to volunteering, this paper reveals the main attributes of volunteers for refugees/asylum seekers in Greece. The analysis shows that 8.1% of the Greek population has actively volunteered to support the rights of refugees/asylum seekers. Moreover, active volunteers engage in additional activities (such as attending a march/ protest/demonstration, donating money and time, buying or refuse to buy products, engaging as passive members), indicating the plurality of solidarity actions that support refugees/asylum seekers arriving in the country.

The explorative analysis provides some preliminary evidence of volunteers' traits, most in line with past empirical research into volunteering. The explanatory analysis sheds light on volunteers' profiles with respect to their demographic attributes, human and social capital as well as their political engagement. Greek volunteers, in line with past research, are more likely to be women (Schlozman, Burns & Verba, 1994; Cnaan, Handy & Wadsworth, 1996; Rochester, et al., 2010). Similar results are reported in previous studies exploring volunteering for refugees/asylum seekers. For instance, research conducted in Germany shows that volunteers for refugees are predominantly female (Karakayali & Kleist, 2015; 2016). Likewise, in Erickson's study (2012), the majority of volunteers for refugees in Fargo are women. Whilst the reported effects are non-significant, Greek volunteers are more likely to belong to younger age-groups. Karakayali and Kleist's (2015) study finds that volunteers are more likely to be either in their twenties or over sixty, indicating that past empirical evidence supporting that volunteering is more prevalent among middle-aged citizens (Wymer, 1998; Curtis, Baer & Grabb, 2001**;** *Pho 2008*), might not hold for the specific domain of volunteering.

Educational attainment does play a critical role in volunteering (*Wilson, 2000, 2012;* Musick & Wilson, 2008; *Huang, van den Brink & Groot, 2009;* Rochester, et al., 2010; Van Ingen & Dekker, 2011) as higher educated individuals are more likely to engage in active volunteering for refugees/asylum seekers in Greece. However, the logistic regression analysis indicates that some of the indicators capturing human capital provide contradictory outcomes. Although we hypothesise that individuals with higher human capital are more likely to volunteer, the analysis shows that middle- and high-income earners as well as individuals of middle- and higher-occupational classes are less likely to volunteer compared to individuals with low-income and low-occupational positions, respectively. Whilst the majority of reported effects are non-significant, they provide some preliminary evidence that the effect of human capital on volunteering might not be linear. Some scholars underpin that individuals with less human capital, i.e. lower-income or lower-educated individuals are more likely to engage in informal volunteering rather than formal volunteering (Williams, 2002; Hustinx, Cnaan & Handy, 2010). As argued earlier, whilst the official statistics show the low prevalence of formal volunteering in Greece compared to other European countries, different scholars underpin that there is a vibrant informal volunteering sector that has been triggered in different emergency periods but not captured in official statistics (Karamichas, 2007; Rozakou, 2011; Loukidou, 2013). For instance, Sotiropoulos (2004, p.25) argues that "there is an informal civil

society in Greece which may not be as weak as the formal one". Different reports and research emphasize that the collective responses and solidarity movements to support refugees/asylum seekers took place through both formal channels (such as NGOs) and informal autonomous groups (single citizens, informal groups of volunteers and collective initiatives) (Gkionakis, 2016; Humanitarian Practice Network, 2016). We can assume that the main trend of volunteering for refugees/asylum seekers, as it has happened in the past in Greece (Sotiropoulos, 2004; Karamichas, 2007; Rozakou 2011; Loukidou, 2013) has primarily followed the informal path, which is more common among individuals with lower human capital.

In line with our hypotheses, social capital plays a critical role in volunteering, since individuals with higher levels of social trust, intense informal social interactions and organizational memberships are more likely to volunteer with refugees/asylum seekers (Wilson & Musick, 1997a; Hodgkinson, 2003; Brown & Ferris, 2007). Moreover, individuals' political engagement in conventional and unconventional political behaviours is positively associated with volunteering (Verba, Schlozman & Brady, 1995; Dekker & Van den Broek, 1998; Hodgkinson, 2003; Bekkers, 2005; Musick & Wilson, 2008). Such findings hold specifically for unconventional political behaviours, whereas conventional behaviours such as voting have positive whilst non-significant effect on volunteering.

Despite the potential merits of the study, its primary limitation is associated with the cross-sectional design where causal imputation is difficult. Hence, we are unable to determine the direction of specific causal relationships examined, e.g. between social capital and/or political engagement measures and volunteering. It should be noted that concerns over selection bias have consistently plagued the volunteering empirical research (Wilson, 2000).

Nevertheless, the study enriches the scarce empirical research on volunteering specifically for refugees/asylum seekers, by portraying the profiles of volunteers providing solidarity to thousands of refugees/asylum seekers arriving in Greece.

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Appendix

Original survey question	Recoded	%
[agegroups] How old are you? {1.18-24 years 2.25-34 years, 3.35-44 years, 4.45-54 years, 5.55-64 years, 6.65 years and older}	1.18-34 years old (1 through 2) 2.35-54 years old (3 through 4) 3.More than 55 years old (5 through 6)	23.4 38.9 37.8
[class] Which option best describes the sort of paid work you do? {1.Professional or higher technical work, 2.Manager or Senior Administrator, 3.Clerical, 4.Sales or Services, 5.Foreman or Supervisor of Other Workers, 6.Skilled Manual Work, 7.Semi-Skilled or Unskilled Manual Work, 8.Other (e.g. farming, military), 9.Not in employment}	1. Higher occupational class-professional/managerial (1 through 2), 2. Middle occupational class (3 through 5) 3.Lower occupational class-manual (6 through 7)	28.5 54.3 17.2
[mainact] What you have been doing for the past 7 days?{1.In full time (30 or more hours per week) paid work, 2.In part time (8-29 hours a week) paid work, 3.In part time (less than 8 hours a week) paid work, 4.In education, (not paid for by employer) even if on vacation, 5.Unemployed and actively looking for a job, 6.Unemployed but not actively looking for a job, 7.Permanently sick or disabled,8.Retired 9.In community or military service, 10. Doing housework, looking after children or other persons}	1. Full time, 2.Part-time (2 through3), 3.Other (4 and 7 through 10), 4.Unemployed (5 through 6)	26.7 10.5 35.6 27.3
[income_GR] What is your household's MONTHLY net income? {1.Less than 575 EUR, 2. 576 - 775 EUR, 3.776 - 980 EUR, 4.981 - 1.190 EUR,5.1.191 - 1.425 EUR, 6.1.426 - 1.700 EUR,7.1.701 - 2.040 EUR,8.2.041 - 2.500 EUR, 9. 2.501 - 3.230 EUR, 10. 3.231 EUR or more, 11.Prefer not to say}	1. Less than 775 EUR (1through 2), 2.776-1.425 EUR (3 through 5), 3. More than 1426 EUR (6 through 10)	35.5 41.3 23.2
[votenat1_GR] Did you vote in the national election on September 20, 2015? {1. No - but I was eligible to vote, 2. No - because I was not eligible to vote, 3. Yes, 4.Don't know)	1. No- but I was eligible to vote, 2.Yes	18.0 82.0
[metfriends] Met socially with friends during the past month {1.Less than once this month 2.Once or twice this month, 3.Every week, 4Almost every day}	1. Once or twice this month or less (1 through 2), 2. Every week or almost every day (3 through 4)	45.0 55.0

The social and political dimensions of solidarity in Italy

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Introduction

This chapter explores the social and political dimensions of solidarity in Italy, measuring solidarity practices in its various aspects, and explaining them with reference to core socio-demographic and attitudinal factors. The goal is twofold: firstly, the chapter aims to provide a general picture of a variety of solidarity practices in Italy with respect to three target groups (the disabled, the unemployed, and refugees), looking at the interrelations between attitudes and behaviours in order to comparatively assess the specificities of each target group.

Secondly, multivariate regressions models provide pertinent explanation to investigate the (different) determinants of solidarity activities among the three target groups.

Italy, a founding member of the EU, has been strongly affected by both the global financial crisis of 2008, together with the crisis-driven austerity measures which have resulted in drastic cuts to public services, heavy job losses and reduced incomes; and the refugee crisis, strongly affecting a country positioned at the centre of several migration routes in the Mediterranean Sea. In such a difficult landscape, solidarity is under pressure. Indeed, the economic and refugee crisis are international challenges that call for joint action and mutual solidarity at the supra-national level. Yet, economic hardships, social inequalities and lack of collaboration between national governments on the migration issue can increase nationalist sentiments and populist reactions.

Drawing on data generated from an online individual survey conducted in November-December of 2016 (2,087 cases for Italy), this chapter aims to enlarge and deepen knowledge on solidarity by providing new data and analysis on solidarity practices in regard to the three aforementioned target groups and to explain them with reference to social traits of the respondents, their beliefs and political preferences.

The research is grounded on the hypotheses that social capital, political factors, cultural orientations (as religiosity), social beliefs (as tolerance towards migrants), and perceptions of deservingness influence solidarity practices.

The chapter will first provide an overview of the relationships between respondents' solidarity practices and some specific individual characteristics, then it will analyse how these characteristics influence respondents' solidarity-based behaviour towards the three target groups. In this regard, the following variables will be included in the analysis: basic socio-demographic characteristics (age, gender, education) and social traits (subjective class position, social capital); political factors (interest in politics, party attachment, self-placement on the left–right dimension, libertarian vs authoritarian values, voting intentions); cultural orientations (religiosity, attitudes towards EU, collective identities)

and social beliefs (evaluations on vertical solidarity, reciprocity, conditionality, deservingness, xenophobia, feelings of deprivation).

Scholars have tended to confirm the importance of socio-demographic factors and social traits (e.g., age, gender, education, social class) for understanding the conditions, structures and dynamics of solidarity (Hechter, 1988). Education and subjective class position are also a measure of social centrality, usually linked to social capital. Previous research has shown that social capital measures are particularly important for our topic. Indeed, social capital literature focuses on a number of elements crucial also for understanding solidarity: the importance of (interpersonal and institutional) trust, as well as the relevance of memberships and active participation in civic associations and groups (Putnam et al. 2003; Bourdieu, 1986). In all these areas, the assumption is that social capital is the necessary 'glue' of social cohesion (Chan et al. 2006; Jeannotte, 2000; Delhey, 2007), and it is tightly associated with values such as trust in other, and with frequency of, social connections.

Several studies have shown that trust in others is associated with a wide range of positive outcomes in areas such as personal wellbeing (Helliwell and Wang, 2010), crime rates and even mortality rates (Lochner et al., 2003). Also, social trust can determine how much people in a society are willing to cooperate with one another, thus fostering solidarity actions.

Similarly, having a good frequency of social connections fosters higher levels of life satisfaction and happiness (Lelkes, 2010), but can also give people access to a wider range of possible support in times of need, producing positive outcomes at a community level (Halpern, 2005).

Regarding political factors, political involvement in terms of interest in politics and party attachment are often associated with civic engagement (Scrivens and Smith, 2013). The latter is another element that can help individuals to develop their skills and social values (such as trust in others) and, consequently, it can foster solidarity (Putnam et al., 1994).

Regarding ideology in terms of left and right, political values in terms of libertarian and authoritarian attitudes and party preferences, our expectation is that such factors characterise more solidarity towards refugees than solidarity towards the disabled. Indeed, migrants-related issues are divisive issues that are strongly politicized by right-wing populist parties like the Northern League in order to gain votes (Mudde, 2011).

Cultural orientations and social beliefs can play an important role as regards solidarity, too. Concerning cultural orientations, scholars have showed the importance of religious attitudes in studying solidarity (Abela, 2004). Furthermore, positive opinions on Italy's EU membership and, above all, inclusive collective identities (as feelings of attachment towards humanity) can be linked to the third concept of ('universal') solidarity according to Arendt's political theory (1972): its constituent parts are the different 'peoples' who collectively make up humankind

As regards social beliefs, public support of redistributive policies and of fiscal solidarity among EU Member States are taken as a measure for 'vertical solidarity' (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011), and thus for the readiness of people to finance and endorse public programs sharing wealth with the needy. It can be argued that people with re-distributional preferences might be more likely involved in solidarity practices. At the same time, the absence of xenophobic attitudes should foster solidarity activities, being tolerant of diversity is a value usually associated with social trust. Conversely, feelings of deprivation could be an obstacle for involvement in solidarity actions.

Finally, we need to take into account that solidarity is not only attached to abstract communities (i.e., humankind), but to specific reference groups. In particular, specific acts of solidarity seem to be conditional and thus tied to specific issues and target groups. In this regard, previous research has shown that perceptions of reciprocity, conditionality and deservingness can play an important role as regards solidarity among the public (Oorschot, 2000).

Italians and solidarity: an overall picture

What are the socio-demographic characteristics, social traits, the political attitudes, ideologies and voting intentions, social beliefs, and the cultural orientations of Italian people involved in solidarity activities? Answering these questions requires outlining the profiles of people engaged in solidarity with our specific target groups (refugees, the unemployed and people with disabilities), taking into account the above-mentioned individual characteristics.

Prior to this discussion, we need to contextualise solidarity practices in the general picture of solidarity in Italy through the analysis of the dependent variables of the study: reported solidarity practices towards refugees, the unemployed and people with disabilities. Our survey includes a battery of questions that allow comparing levels of solidarity with various reference groups, and painting a differentiated picture of diverse practices (donating time or money, passive and active membership, buying products, protest participation) that help to mirror both the philanthropic and political dimension of solidarity (see Table 1).

TABLE 1: Type of reported solidarity activities in favour of three target groups (in %)

	Refugees	Unemployed	Disabled
Attended a march, protest or demonstration	5.8	11.6	8.4
Donating money	11.0	11.3	26.5
Donating time	7.5	9.0	13.7
Bought or refused to buy products in support to the goals	8.1	11.1	14.5
Engaged as passive member of an organisation	3.5	4.9	6.1
Engaged as active member of an organisation	5.6	6.2	8.3
Total	27.6	35.5	49.4
N	*576*	*741*	*1030*

Note: Table A in Appendix presents the original wording of the survey's questions used for all tables in this chapter

The results show that around half of respondents have been engaged in solidarity activities involving people with disabilities (including donating money or time, protesting and engaging in voluntary associations), whereas 35.5% engage in solidarity activities with the unemployed and 27.6% with refugees.[27] The disability field is the most 'crowded' field in terms of solidarity engagement. If we look at the different type of solidarity practices, political protest-oriented activities are carried out especially in favour of the unemployed (11.6%), whereas the other two fields seem to be less contentious. Conversely, charity behaviour definitely characterises solidarity actions towards the disabled: 26.5% donate money (compared to 11% of those who donate money for refugees or the unemployed) and 13.7% donate time. Similar patterns can be found regarding the active involvement in volunteering, with around 6% volunteering in favour of refugees or the unemployed and 8% in favour of people with disabilities. Regarding solidarity towards refugees, after donating money, the most frequent activity (8.1%) is a relatively more political one, i.e. buying or refusing to buy products in favour of refugees.

Looking at solidarity practices oriented to people/groups in Italy and abroad (see Table 2) makes the picture more interesting.

[27] Weights have been used for all analyses.

TABLE 2: Reported solidarity activities in order to support the rights of people/groups in different contexts (in %)

	Italy
In your country	46.7
In a Country in the EU	31.7
Outside the EU	32.8
Total N	*2087*

Note: At least one of the following actions was named: protest, donate money or time, bought or boycotted goods, passive or active membership

Around half of the Italian sample reports having been engaged in solidarity activities for people in their country, whereas Italian citizens are less inclined to support European and transnational solidarity. One third of respondents has engaged in activities in support of the rights of people in other EU countries or outside the EU.

Moving to describe the attitude towards helping people in developing countries, data show that a strong majority of respondents in Italy supports the attempts of the EU to help countries outside Europe in fighting poverty and promoting development, with 72% supporting and only 11% opposing these measures (see Table 3).

TABLE 3: Importance of the development aid by the EU to assist certain countries outside the EU in their fight against poverty and in their development (in %)

	Italy
Not at all	3.5
Not very	6.9
Neither	18.3
Fairly important	45.6
Very important	25.7
Total	100
N	*2087*

Against this general picture, we focus the analysis on the relationships between solidarity actions and the aforementioned set of individual characteristics: (1) socio-demographics and social traits; (2) political attitudes and behaviours; (3) social beliefs and cultural orientations.

Solidarity actions, socio-demographic characteristics and social traits

Regarding socio-demographic characteristics (see Table 4), we can observe a difference in terms of age between support for refugees and the unemployed (where there is an over-representation of the youngest age groups – 18-35-years-old – with respect to the sample's average) on the one hand, and support for the disabled on the other hand

(where the distribution of age groups is substantially in line with the average). Regarding gender, most people engaged in solidarity activities (in all fields) are male, whereas in the whole sample most respondents are female. The male over-representation is accentuated within the unemployment field (54.3%), while the disability field is the most gender-balanced (50.7% male).

Considering educational attainment, in all the fields almost half of respondents have a low education level. Nonetheless, higher level of education makes it more likely that people show solidarity. This is true especially in solidarity activities concerning refugees and the unemployment. Indeed, the percentage of respondents with higher education is around 18% among people supporting refugees (vs 12.3% of the total population) and around 16% among people supporting the unemployed.

TABLE 4: Solidarity actions towards target groups by socio-demographic characteristics (in %)

		Refugees support	Unemployed support	Disabled support	Total
Age	18-24 years	9.2	8.2	6.6	7.2
	25-34 years	18.4	17.0	13.2	14.3
	35-44 years	18.3	19.8	17.2	17.6
	45-54 years	14.7	17.6	18.6	18.9
	55-64 years	22.5	22.0	24.6	23.7
	65 years and older	17.0	15.6	19.8	18.3
	Total	100	100	100	100
	N	*576*	*741*	*1030*	*2,087*
Gender	Male	51.7	54.3	50.7	48.0
	Female	48.3	45.8	49.3	52.0
	Total	100	100	100	100
	N	*576*	*741*	*1030*	*2,087*
Education	Higher education	17.6	15.8	13.7	12.3
	Intermediate education	33.4	34.9	36.6	35.2
	Lower education	49.1	49.3	49.7	*52.5*
	Total	100	100	100	100
	N	*576*	*741*	*1,030*	*2,087*

Table 5 reports solidarity actions towards target groups by monthly income level (in Euro) and subjective social class. Respondents with the highest income level (3,781 Euro or more per month) are over-represented among people supporting refugees with respect to the average (9% vs 6%), whereas respondents with the lowest income level (0-1305 Euro) are under-represented (24% vs 28%). This pattern is less pronounced in the unemployment and disability fields. Quite interesting patterns emerge if we take "social centrality" into examination, as measured by perceived class belonging. Results confirm the specificity of solidarity activities in favour of refugees. Among people supporting

refugees, the lower class and, above all, the working class are under-represented compared to the total population, whereas the upper middle class is over-represented.

TABLE 5: Solidarity actions towards target groups by income level and subjective social class (in %)

		Refugees support	Unemployed support	Disabled support	Total
Income	0-1305 EURO	24.0	27.4	25.5	28.1
	1306-1920 EURO	27.7	25.6	24.6	26.2
	1921-2665 EURO	21.7	24.6	24.6	22.9
	2666-3780 EURO	17.5	15.4	17.7	16.6
	3781 EURO or more	9.1	7.0	7.6	6.2
	Total	100	100	100	100
	N	*522*	*677*	*922*	*1,803*
Subjective social class	Upper class	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.2
	Upper middle class	7.9	5.4	5.8	4.3
	Middle class	42.1	40.4	42.0	40.4
	Lower middle class	28.9	28.5	28.7	27.2
	Working class	10.6	13.4	12.4	15.9
	Lower class	9.2	11.2	10.0	11.5
	Other class	1.1	1.0	0.8	0.5
	Total	100	100	100	100
	N	*562*	*730*	*1,008*	*2,016*

Finally, our survey includes some specific questions regarding social capital framework. According to the framework adopted by the OECD (Scrivens and Smith, 2013), there are several dimensions of social capital. We focus here just on two aspects: social trust and personal relationships. The first refers to the measure based on the standard question: 'Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?'. Trust is measured on a scale of 0 (minimum trust) to 10 (maximum trust). In order to make cross-tabulations more readable, I have recoded this variable by considering values between 0 and 4 as absence of trust in others, 5 as neutral position, and, finally, those between 6 and 10 as trust in others.

The second aspect of social capital refers to the "structure and nature of people's personal networks" (Scrivens and Smith, 2013: 21), and is concerned with who people know and what they do to establish and maintain their personal relationships. Meeting socially with friends at least once a week is a well-established measure of this phenomenon (e.g. European Social Survey).

Results seem to confirm the relevance of social capital for solidarity actions (see Table 6). As for solidarity actions towards all target groups, people who trust others are clearly over-represented compared to the total population. Indeed, on average 29% of the sample trust in others, whereas this percentage increases at 35% among people

supporting the disabled, at 36% among people supporting the unemployed and at 43% among people supporting refugees. In the latter case, more people trust in others than don't trusts in others. It follows that solidarity towards foreigners is strongly associated with a generalized trust in human beings.

A similar pattern is depicted by the second measure of social capital related to the frequency of social connections. Among people engaging in solidarity activities in favour of all target groups, those meeting socially with friends at least every week are strongly over-represented compared to the total population, whereas those who meet less than once a month are strongly under-represented (especially among those supporting refugees and unemployed).

TABLE 6: Solidarity actions towards target groups by social capital (in %)

		Refugees support	Unemployed support	Disabled support	Total
Social trust	People cannot be trusted	38.8	46.3	46.7	51.2
	Neutral	18.3	18.1	18.6	20.0
	People can be trusted	42.8	35.6	34.7	28.8
	Total	100	100	100	100
	N	*570*	*736*	*1,021*	*2,041*
Frequency of meetings with friends	Less than once this month	22.1	23.5	27.3	33.3
	Once or twice this month	35.4	36.9	36.1	34.4
	Every week	35.1	32.7	30.6	26.9
	Almost every day	7.5	6.9	6.0	5.4
	Total	100	100	100	100
	N	*576*	*741*	*1,030*	*2,087*

Solidarity actions and political factors

It is important to look at the relationship between solidarity actions and politics, in particular looking at respondents' attitudes towards politics, their self-placement along the left–right spectrum and along the libertarian-authoritarian dimension, and their voting intentions.

The respondents' attitudes towards politics are derived from their interest in politics and party attachment (see Table 7). The level of cognitive political involvement of respondents can be measured on a four-point scale by their interest in politics. On average, those that are very or somewhat interested in politics are 64%. This percentage remarkably increases among people who are engaged in solidarity practices: 74% as for refugees, 75% as for the unemployed and 70% as for the disabled. Another measure of involvement in politics is the psychological feeling of attachment towards a party, which is also an important

explanatory variable of voting behaviour (Campbell et al., 1960). Results strengthen what we have previously seen: political involvement seems to be associated with engagement in solidarity actions. Indeed, on average those who say they are close to a party are 76%. Among people engaging in solidarity actions this percentage increases, ranging from 81% within the disability field to 85.5% within the unemployment field. Research has stressed the linkage between cognitive involvement in politics and political participation. For instance, low levels of cognitive engagement in politics and the withdrawal from political parties are important factors explaining young people's lower involvement in institutional (and non-institutional) political participation (García-Albacete, 2014). Political interest is also an important explanatory factor of young people's voting behaviour (Maggini, 2016). Our data show that political involvement is also associated with civic engagement through solidarity activities. This is not surprising, given that civic engagement refers to "actions and behaviours that can be seen as contributing positively to the collective life of a community or society" (Scrivens and Smith, 2013: 28), including activities such as political participation.

TABLE 7: Solidarity actions towards target groups by political involvement (in %)

		Refugees support	Unemployed support	Disabled support	Total
Political interest	Not at all interested	6.0	6.4	7.0	11.5
	Not very interested	20.0	18.4	22.7	24.5
	Quite interested	46.8	47.9	45.8	43.7
	Very interested	27.2	27.2	24.6	20.3
	Total	100	100	100	100
	N	*565*	*730*	*1011*	*2,024*
Party attachment	No party	15.7	14.5	19.0	23.9
	Close to a party	84.3	85.5	81.0	76.1
	Total	100	100	100	100
	N	*537*	*690*	*967*	*1,911*

At this point, what about the relationship between political self-placement on the left–right scale and solidarity actions in favour of different target groups? The political self-placement of respondents has been measured from 0 to 10, with the value of 0 corresponding to the far-left and the value of 10 corresponding to the far-right. Consequently, I have considered values between 0 and 4 as "centre-left", 5 as "centre", those between 7 and 10 as "centre-right", and, finally, missing values as "not self-placed" (see Table 8). These data show that the ideological character of people supporting the disabled is very similar to the total population's. There is a substantial equilibrium between centre-left and centre-right people. Conversely, centre-left people are over-represented among people supporting the unemployed (37% vs 33% of the whole sample) and, especially, among people supporting refugees (41% vs 33%). This confirms our hypothesis that disability is not a divisive issue in political terms, whereas solidarity engagement in the other two fields is more related to political-ideological elements. Once

again, the field of refugees is singled out for its specificity: here, centre-left people are by far the largest category. Finally, it is worth noting that people not self-placed on the left-right scale are under-represented in all fields, signalling again the positive linkage between political involvement and civic engagement in solidarity actions.

Table 8 shows the relationship between the libertarian-authoritarian index and solidarity actions, too. Electoral studies have showed that new political issues linked to the authoritarian–libertarian dimension have become salient for voters (Thomassen, 2005), besides the traditional lines of political contestation (left–right and religion). In our survey, there are several questions connected to a broader libertarian-authoritarian divide, as confirmed by a factor analysis.[28] Consequently, I created an additive index linked to a unique factor component. This index is an indicator of libertarian values and I recoded it classifying values between 0 and 4.4 as "Authoritarian", values between 4.6 and 5.4 as "Neutral" and values between 5.6 and 10 as "Libertarian". Findings confirm that disability is not a divisive issue in political terms, whereas solidarity engagement in the unemployment field and, above all, in the refugees field is more related to political values. Indeed, in the latter field people with libertarian values are by far the largest category, whereas within the whole sample people with authoritarian values are the largest category.

TABLE 8: Solidarity actions towards target groups by left-right self-placement and libertarian-authoritarian index (in %)

		Refugees support	Unemployed support	Disabled support	Total
Left-right self-placement	Centre-Left	40.7	37.0	35.5	33.4
	Centre	17.9	16.3	17.0	15.6
	Centre-Right	31.1	34.1	34.4	33.0
	Not Self-Placed	10.4	12.6	13.0	18.0
	Total	100	100	100	100
	N	*576*	*741*	*1030*	*2,087*
Libertarian-authoritarian index	Authoritarian	34.1	39.5	41.1	42.1
	Neutral	25.3	22.6	23.9	22.3
	Libertarian	40.6	37.9	35.0	35.7
	Total	100	100	100	100
	N	*490*	*626*	*871*	*1,726*

[28] In particular, I have run a principal component factor (PCF) analysis including variables measuring respondents' opinions on 0-10 agreement scales linked to several values-related issues: on "women career" vs. "children care", on "freedom of abortion" vs. "prohibition of abortion", on "child adoption for homosexuals" vs. "prohibiting child adoption", on "tougher sentences to fight crime" vs. "tougher sentences bring nothing", on "parenting authority" vs. "child independent judgement". We detected just one statically significant dimension. Factor loadings were particularly high (between 0.85 and 0.93) for all items and the reliability scale was very high (alpha test 0.93). Hence, relying on the five above-mentioned items it is possible to build an additive index of libertarian values.

Focusing on voting behaviour (see Table 9) confirms previous analysis: a difference between centre-left and right-wing parties' voters emerges only among people carrying out solidarity activities in favour of refugees. Indeed, people who vote for centre-left parties (Democratic Party and radical left parties) are over-represented compared to the total population, whereas right-wing voters of Northern League are under-represented. This is in line with our expectation. Regarding the Five Star Movement, its voters are over-represented among people engaging in solidarity actions. According to several studies, indeed, the Five Star Movement is a web-populist party (Corbetta and Gualmini, 2013) appealing for direct democracy and crosscutting the traditional left-right dimension (Maggini, 2014; Tronconi, 2015). This also means that among its voters there are people with left-wing values (pro-refugees) as well as right-wing people (anti-migration). The Five Star Movement is the most over-represented among people supporting the unemployed. This is consistent with the over-representation of this party among the unemployed, especially young people. Radical left parties are also over-represented in this field, but centre-right voters are in line with the average. Conversely, Democratic Party voters are under-represented. Thus, in the unemployment field there is not a clear distinction in terms of left and right, but a more contingent distinction between voters of opposition parties and voters of the main governing party[29]. Finally, there is no significant pattern in terms of voting choices regardint solidarity actions towards the disabled.

TABLE 9: Solidarity actions towards target groups by voting intentions (in %)

	Refugees support	Unemployed support	Disabled support	Total
Italian Left (SI/SEL)	3.0	3.3	2.9	2.3
Democratic Party	20.6	16.8	19.1	18.0
Five Star Movement	26.7	30.8	26.2	23.9
Popular Area	3.1	2.6	2.2	1.3
Forward Italy	6.4	6.3	6.5	5.9
Northern League	8.3	10.1	10.6	10.6
Brothers of Italy	3.5	4.1	3.5	3.2
Communist Refoundation Party	2.9	2.9	1.8	1.5
Other party	4.4	3.6	3.7	3.2
Do not know	21.1	19.6	23.6	30.2
Total	100	100	100	100
N	*576*	*741*	*1030*	*2,087*

Solidarity actions, social beliefs and cultural orientations

In order to provide a complete picture of people engaged in solidarity, it is necessary to also take into account respondents' social beliefs and cultural orientations.

[29] The Democratic Party is in government with minor allies since 2013.

First, it is interesting to see relationships between solidarity actions and some social beliefs, such as economic and cultural xenophobia and feelings of deprivation (see Table 10). The first two attitudes have been measured by asking interviewees if immigration is generally bad or good for the Italian economy and cultural life, self-positioning on a 0-10 scale where 0 means "Bad effect on economy/Cultural life undermined" and 10 means "Good effects on economy/Cultural life enriched". These variables have been recoded classifying values between 0 and 4 as "bad effects", 5 as "neutral" and values between 6 and 10 as "good effects". As was predicted, the absolute majority of people engaged in solidarity actions in favour of refugees thinks that immigration has good effects on the Italian economy and cultural life (54.5% and 57.8%, respectively). Conversely, within the whole sample, those who think that immigration is good for Italian economy are fewer (39.5%) than those who think it is bad (43%), whereas feelings of cultural xenophobia are not in the majority but nevertheless are remarkably high (37.3%). In general, attitudes towards immigration are more favourable in the other two solidarity fields compared to the total population, especially as regards feelings of positive effects on cultural life (50.6% among people supporting the unemployed and 48.8% among people supporting the disabled), though one third of respondents remains sceptical towards immigration.

Finally, on average, one third of respondents shares feelings of deprivation (i.e. people who think that they receive much less than their fair share). This feeling of deprivation is less widespread among people engaged in solidarity actions in favour of the disabled and, above all, among those supporting refugees (26.4%). Conversely, people supporting the unemployed are in line with the average.

TABLE 10: Solidarity actions towards target groups by social beliefs: economic and cultural xenophobia, feeling of deprivation (in %)

		Refugees support	Unemployed support	Disabled support	Total
Economic xenophobia: effect on economy by foreigners	bad effects	29.9	37.6	38.3	43.0
	neutral	15.6	18.0	17.6	17.6
	good effects	54.5	44.5	44.1	39.5
	Total	100	100	100	100
	N	*567*	*731*	*1,015*	*2,018*
Cultural xenophobia: effect on cultural life by foreigners	bad effects	25.1	32.3	32.9	37.3
	neutral	17.1	17.1	18.3	17.8
	good effects	57.8	50.6	48.8	45.0
	Total	100	100	100	100
	N	*569*	*731*	*1,006*	*1,998*
Compared to others living in this country, you receive:	More than your fair share	4.7	3.5	2.8	2.2
	Your fair share	28.9	23.4	25.1	23.9
	Somewhat less than your fair share	40.1	40.5	42.9	41.1
	Much less than your fair share	26.4	32.6	29.3	32.9
	Total	100	100	100	100
	N	*540*	*707*	*969*	*1,897*

Moving to attitudes towards 'vertical' solidarity, Italian citizens strongly support solidarity-based (redistributive) public policies (see Table 11), with 81% considering the reduction of big income inequalities as an important goal. In other words, the traditional

European social model is definitely not questioned by our interviewees. Curiously, this overwhelming level of agreement decreases among people active in the field of refugees. The percentage remains very high (74%), but is lower than those observed in the unemployment field (not surprisingly) and in the disability area. This could be a signal that solidarity towards refugees is something slightly different from social justice.

Italians are inclined also to support solidarity-based policies among EU Member States, even if to a lesser extent. A large majority supports fiscal solidarity measures towards countries with public debts (65% vs. 16%), with 18% undecided respondents, probably because Italy has the second largest public debt in the EU. Therefore, this might be a self-interested solidarity attitude, and there is no significant variation among people active in the three fields.

TABLE 11: Solidarity actions towards target groups by social beliefs: evaluations of solidarity-based public policies (in %)

		Refugees support	Unemployed support	Disabled support	Total
Importance of eliminating big inequalities in income between citizens	Not at all important	1.8	1.5	1.3	1.4
	Not very important	6.3	5.0	3.8	3.0
	Neither	17.9	14.7	13.2	14.9
	Fairly important	35.9	38.6	39.9	40.0
	Very important	38.1	40.3	41.8	40.7
	Total	100	100	100	100
	N	*576*	*741*	*1030*	*2,087*
Agreement on EU pooling funds to help EU countries	Strongly disagree	5.0	5.5	4.9	5.2
	Disagree	8.4	11.1	12.1	11.2
	Neither	19.9	17.8	16.1	17.6
	Agree	46.4	46.5	49.0	47.4
	Strongly agree	20.3	19.1	17.9	18.7
	Total	100	100	100	100
	N	*557*	*719*	*986*	*1,928*

Conditionality and deservingness can play an important role regarding solidarity among the public (Oorschot, 2000). Table 12 presents the reasons for fiscal solidarity: 52% of respondents subscribe the idea of reciprocity and deservingness. According to these views, solidarity within the EU is an exchange relation of giving and receiving help; moreover, groups receiving help need to show that they are worth being helped. This vision is shared by people engaging in solidarity actions, with no substantial differences among target groups. Only a minority of 20% states that is a moral duty to help other Member States in need. Noticeably, this unconditioned form of solidarity is more widespread among people involved in solidarity activities, especially among those helping refugees (27%).

As shown in Table 12, this conditionality is confirmed regarding migrants. Only a minority of 8% is in favour of granting migrants access to social benefits and services immediately on arrival. This is a lower share compared to those who would never grant migrants access

to social benefits and services (12%). Hence, access is conditional on two aspects: they should have worked and paid taxes (38%) and they should become citizens of the country (36%). A minority (6.5%) is more generous, granting migrants access more easily after one year staying in Italy (having worked or not). Conditionality decreases among Italians involved in solidarity activities, especially those active in the field of refugees (as it was predictable). In fact, among people supporting refugees, 28% show the most generous attitudes compared to 14.2% among the total population (22% among people supporting the unemployed and 18% among those helping the disabled). Symmetrically, those who say "never" are under-represented in all fields. In addition, among people supporting refugees, those who claim the requisite of citizenship are around 10 percentage points below average. Noteworthy, the largest category remains "after have worked and paid taxes for one year", even in the pro-refugees solidarity field (40%). To sum up, according to our interviewees, solidarity definitely entails entitlements and mutual obligations; this conditioned solidarity prevails even among those helping people who are not part of the national community as refugees.

Concerning, deservingness (see Table 12), children are by far the most preferred group for charity donation (49%), followed by the disabled (24%) and the unemployed (21%). For Italian citizens, refugees and migrants are definitely the groups less deserving (4% and 2%, respectively). Of course, these percentages increase among those supporting refugees, but even in this case, children, the disabled and the unemployed are by far more deserving than migrants and refugees. Looking at people supporting the disabled and the unemployed, a stronger correlation emerges between the type of solidarity field and the preferred group for donation, even if children are still the most preferred group. Again, these data confirm that groups receiving help need to be perceived as worth being helped. In this regard, foreigners deserve to be helped to the extent that they become part of the national community, at least through work and paying taxes.

TABLE 12: Solidarity actions towards target groups by social beliefs: conditionality, reciprocity and deservingness (in %)

		Refugees support	Unemployed support	Disabled support	Total
Reason to state for financial help for EU countries in trouble	It is our moral duty to help other member states that are in need.	26.8	24.5	23.4	20.2
	Total N	*576*	*741*	*1030*	2,087
	EU member states should help each other, every country may require help someday	50.6	52.0	54.3	51.8
	Total N	*576*	*741*	*1030*	*2,087*
Conditionality: when should migrants obtain rights to social benefits and services?	Immediately on arrival	13.3	10.2	8.5	7.7
	After living 1 year (worked or not)	14.9	11.5	9.7	6.5
	After worked & paid taxes 1 year	40.3	39.3	41.0	38.3
	After Citizenship	26.5	31.2	33.5	35.7
	Never	5.0	7.8	7.2	11.8
	Total	100	100	100	100
	N	*576*	*741*	*1030*	*2,087*
Preferred charity group for donation	Unemployed	20.5	25.8	18.7	20.9
	People with disabilities	22.5	23.3	27.4	23.8
	Migrants	6.2	4.5	3.5	2.4
	Refugees	8.1	5.0	4.9	3.8
	Children	42.6	41.4	45.5	49.1
	Total	100	100	100	100
	N	*543*	*708*	*979*	*1,898*

Finally, the profile of solidarity actions towards target groups can vary according to cultural orientations like religiosity[30], universalistic feelings of attachment towards humanity and opinions on Italy's EU membership (see Table 13). Findings show that among Italians involved in solidarity activities, religious people are definitely over-represented compared to the average, being in all fields around 57%. Regardless of the target group, attachment towards humanity is more widespread compared to the average. This pattern is remarkable among people supporting refugees: 43.1% say they feel very attached towards humanity (vs. 32.3% of the whole sample). This confirms the universalistic approach of solidarity towards refugees. Indeed, among people helping refugees, those who think that EU membership is positive for Italy are over-represented compared to the average (39.8% vs. 35.8%) and exceed by 10 percentage points those who think it is negative. This pattern does not occur at all in the other two fields, especially among those supporting the unemployed.

To some up, solidarity towards refugees shows some specificities compared to solidarity towards other groups: it is more selfless, oriented towards humans being as such, linked to pro-Europe attitudes and to leftist/libertarian values.

[30] This variable measures how religious the respondent is on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 stands for "not at all religious" and 10 for "very religious". This variable has been recoded in order the make cross-tabulations more readable by classifying values between 0 and 4 as "not religious", 5 as "neutral" and values between 6 and 10 as "religious".

TABLE 13: Solidarity actions towards target groups by cultural orientations: religiosity, universalistic feelings and attitudes towards the EU (in %)

		Refugees support	Unemployed support	Disabled support	Total
Religiosity	Not religious	30.0	30.4	29.9	33.4
	Neutral	12.4	12.9	13.2	13.0
	Religious	57.6	56.8	57.0	53.6
	Total	100	100	100	100
	N	*573*	*739*	*1024*	*2,050*
Attachment towards humanity	Not at all attached	4.9	5.2	4.6	5.6
	Not very attached	13.3	15.3	15.1	17.7
	Fairly attached	38.7	42.7	44.5	44.5
	Very attached	43.1	36.9	35.8	32.3
	Total	100	100	100	100
	N	*565*	*727*	*1000*	*1,998*
EU membership for Italy is:	A good thing	39.8	35.5	37.1	35.8
	A bad thing	29.9	33.0	32.7	30.6
	Neither good nor bad	24.8	26.6	24.9	26.4
	Don't know	5.4	5.0	5.3	7.2
	Total	100	100	100	100
	N	*576*	*741*	*1030*	*2,087*

Explanatory factors of solidarity actions towards refugees, the unemployed and disabled

This section outlines the results of a multivariate logistic regression analysis. Reported solidarity activities in favour of each target group is the dependent variable. In other words, we have three dichotomous dependent variables (for which 0 signifies 'no action', 1 'at least one action') for each target group. The goal is to investigate the (different) determinants of solidarity activities among the three target groups. Which factors tend to promote or inhibit solidarity at the individual level? Is there variance comparing the target groups?

Four models for each target group have been created to answer our research questions. The results of estimation for the first three models are presented in Table 14, which includes odds ratios (with standard errors) as well as goodness-of-fit statistics (AIC and BIC coefficients, pseudo-R-squared values of Nagelkerke). In logistic regression, the odds ratio compares the odds of the outcome event (providing solidarity) one unit apart on the predictor. We have reported the selected independent variables31 by blocks: first, the

[31] In order to select independent variables, we have looked at the bivariate Pearson's correlations between variables introduced in the previous section for cross-tabulations. According to the strength of the associations (Cohen, 1988), we have excluded some variables (e.g. income level, voting choices, economic xenophobia) in order to avoid items picking up on the same covariance component. Finally, before running logistic regression models, independent variables have been

socio-demographic variables and social traits (social capital, subjective class position); secondly, political factors (political interest, party attachment, left-right self-placement, libertarian-authoritarian index) controlled for basic socio-demographics (age, gender, education); thirdly, social beliefs (cultural xenophobia, feelings of deprivation, evaluations on 'vertical' solidarity, reciprocity, conditionality, deservingness) and cultural orientations (religiosity, opinions on EU membership, collective identities like attachment towards humanity), again controlled for basic socio-demographics. Thus, it is possible to assess the contribution given by each group of variables to the model's goodness of fit, compared across target groups. Finally, Table 15 presents results for the full model with all independent variables for each target group.

Let us start with the first model. The overall predictive power of model A is quite low, explaining 7% of variance as for support of refugees, and 4% as for disabled and unemployed support. It means that socio-demographic variables and social traits do not explain sufficiently the solidarity-based behaviour of the respondents. Looking at the p values of the predictors, clearly social traits prevail over basic socio-demographics. Indeed, for each target group measures of social capital (social trust and frequency of social connections with friends) are both very significant with p at 0.1%. Furthermore, these variables show the highest odds ratios: higher level of social trust and social connections increase the odds of engaging in solidarity actions.

Regarding subjective social class, some categories are very significant with p at 0.1%: working class supporting refugees and the disabled and middle class support for refugees (whereas it is significant with p at 1% for disabled support).

Here, a first difference between target groups emerges: social class is not related to solidarity towards the unemployed, whereas it seems to be related to solidarity towards refugees and the disabled. In the latter instance, all the social class dummies are significant with respect to the reference category (upper/upper middle class). Looking at the odds ratio, belonging to classes different from the highest class decreases the odds of supporting refugees and the disabled.

Concerning socio-demographic characteristics, a high education level (with respect to the low level) increases the odds of supporting refugees and the unemployed (significant with p at 5%), whereas education does not matter in support for disability. Age is very significant (p at 0.1%) for disabled support and it is significant for unemployed support (p at 5%), but the direction of the effect is the opposite: ageing increases the odds of supporting the disabled and decreases the odds of supporting the unemployed. Finally, gender is significant (p at 5%) only as for unemployed support: being male increases the odds of supporting the unemployed.

If we move to model B, the contribution of political factors (controlled for basic socio-demographics) to the model's goodness of fit is low, with a clear difference between

normalised trough rescaling.

solidarity towards the disabled on the one hand and solidarity towards the other groups on the other. In fact, the model explains 5% of the variance as for refugees and unemployed support and only 2% of variance as for the disabled. This confirms our hypothesis: solidarity towards the disabled is not related to political features, with the exception of the level of cognitive political involvement as measured by interest in politics, which is very significant and positively correlated with solidarity actions in favour of all target groups. The other measure of political involvement (party attachment) is very significant (p at 0.1%) for unemployed support and for refugees support (p at 1%). Finally, political values in terms of libertarian and authoritarian attitudes (p at 5%) and, above all, ideology in terms of left and right (p at 1%) are significant only regarding refugees support. The direction of the effect is in line with our expectations: moving to the right of the political space decreases the odds of supporting refugees, whereas the latter is positively associated with libertarian values. This means that solidarity towards refugees is the most characterised in political terms. This confirms that migration is a politically divisive issue.

So far, social traits and political factors (considered as separate blocks) are not sufficient to explain the solidarity-based behaviour of the respondents, and we have to move to Model C including social beliefs and cultural orientations, again controlled for basic socio-demographics. This model has a better predictive power, especially regarding support of refugees: 16% of the variance is explained, compared to 8% for unemployed support and to 7% for disabled support. Looking at p values and odds ratios of predictors, we can notice similarities and differences between target groups as for explanatory factors of solidarity practices. Concerning similarities, it seems that religiosity is a good predictor of involvement in solidarity actions, regardless of the target group. Indeed, it is always very significant and odds ratios are high.

Another common predictor is the absence of cultural xenophobic attitudes: people more inclined to recognise the positive effects of immigration on national cultural life are more likely to practise solidarity. Unsurprising, the significance (p at 0.1%) and the strength of the association is stronger for refugees compared to the unemployed and disabled (p at 1%).

Concerning migrants' entitlement to social benefits, people against the integration of migrants are very unlikely to be engaged in solidarity actions, regardless of the target group. Unsurprising, this occurs especially for actions in favour of refugees (p at 0.1%). Indeed, solidarity towards refugees is clearly an unconditioned form of solidarity: with respect to the reference category (granting access to social benefits and services immediately on arrival), both requisites of working/paying taxes and citizenship decrease in a significant way the odds of supporting refugees. Conversely, such dummies are not statistically significant for unemployed and disabled support. In addition, a tenuous form of conditionality (granting rights after living in Italy for a year) increases the odds of supporting the unemployed and people with disabilities, whereas this dummy is not statistically significant for support of refugees. In this regard, a tenuous form conditionality is a factor that somehow distinguishes solidarity with different target

groups, but in general the absence of conditionality is a factor favouring practices of solidarity.

Considering children as reference category, we notice that citing as preferred charity group one of our target groups strongly increases the odds of supporting such a group. This occurs especially for the least preferred group by respondents, that is, migrants. Indeed, regardless of the target group, this dummy is always significant and odds ratios are all very high. This means that a pro-migrants attitude helps solidarity actions in general. Finally, there is a difference between our target groups. Concerning support of refugees, deservingness plays a role only for migrants and refugees dummies (with respect to children). Similarly, as for disabled support, only the migrants dummy is significant in addition to the disabled dummy. Conversely, as for unemployed support, all dummies are significant (except refugees).

Differences between target groups emerge if we look at three variables: attachment towards humanity, opinions on redistributive policies and on Italy's EU membership. First, universalistic feelings of attachment towards humanity increase the odds of supporting refugees. Conversely, this variable is not significant for the other target groups. Also, opinions on redistributive policies are not significant, except when considering support for refugees. In this instance, taking a neutral position compared to a negative opinion decreases the odds of supporting refugees. Thus, supporting refugees is not closely tied to the support of redistributive policies. Finally, opinions on Italy' EU membership are not significant, except for disabled support. In this instance, thinking that EU membership has not been good for Italy compared to neutral opinions increases the odds of supporting disabled. Thus, support towards the disabled does not seem to be tied to pro-Europe attitudes.

TABLE 14: Estimated effects on solidarity actions towards different target groups for some predictors, separated models by blocks of variables

	Refugees		Unemployed		Disabled	
	Odds Ratio	s.e.	Odds Ratio	s.e.	Odds Ratio	s.e.
Model A						
Age	0.613	0.159	0.589*	0.138	2.397***	0.544
Gender (female)	0.979	0.104	0.762**	0.0738	0.909	0.0854
Intermediate education	0.880	0.108	1.003	0.111	1.054	0.111
High education	1.424*	0.220	1.388*	0.202	1.173	0.17
Social trust	6.508***	1.438	2.196***	0.429	2.399***	0.439
Frequency of meeting with friends	2.428***	0.444	2.317***	0.390	2.247***	0.378
Middle class	0.432***	0.107	0.785	0.181	0.534**	0.126
Lower middle class	0.530*	0.136	0.955	0.228	0.611*	0.15
Working class	0.316***	0.0899	0.758	0.197	0.413***	0.108
Lower class	0.428**	0.126	0.999	0.268	0.523*	0.141
Other class	1.321	1.078	2.44	1.852	2.059	1.781
Constant	0.344***	0.106	0.499*	0.142	0.682	0.194
N	*1982*		*1982*		*1982*	
pseudo R2	*0.074*		*0.036*		*0.035*	
AIC	*2197.8*		*2530.4*		*2668.6*	
BIC	*2264.9*		*2597.5*		*2735.7*	
Model B						
Age	0.377**	0.113	0.315***	0.0884	1.181	0.312
Gender (female)	0.952	0.117	0.769*	0.0896	0.918	0.103
Intermediate education	0.805	0.110	0.856	0.111	1.017	0.125
High education	1.413*	0.234	1.114	0.182	1.054	0.169
Political interest	2.404***	0.550	2.931***	0.650	2.526***	0.524
Left-right self-placement	0.558**	0.123	0.681	0.144	0.948	0.193
Libertarian-authoritarian index	2.522*	0.927	1.419	0.504	0.885	0.296
Party attachment	1.792**	0.330	2.011***	0.357	1.342	0.206
Constant	0.210***	0.0737	0.342**	0.115	0.523*	0.162
N	*1388*		*1388*		*1388*	
pseudo R2	*0.045*		*0.047*		*0.017*	
AIC	*1646.2*		*1764.5*		*1891.3*	
BIC	*1693.3*		*1811.6*		*1938.5*	
Model C						
Age	0.774	0.233	0.434**	0.116	1.988*	0.532
Gender (female)	0.999	0.123	0.718**	0.0796	0.832	0.09
Intermediate education	0.914	0.126	0.982	0.121	1.033	0.122
High education	1.732**	0.313	1.341	0.216	1.157	0.188
Attachment towards humanity	1.831*	0.473	1.428	0.312	1.106	0.233
Religiosity	2.031***	0.431	2.432***	0.468	2.369***	0.433
No cultural xenophobia	4.323***	1.121	1.890**	0.425	1.834**	0.402
EU membership: A good thing	0.894	0.145	0.86	0.124	0.968	0.134
EU membership: A bad thing	1.266	0.210	1.207	0.180	1.468**	0.214
Eliminating big inequalities: important	0.663	0.211	0.752	0.230	0.702	0.208
Eliminating big inequalities: neutral	0.313***	0.0898	0.606	0.169	0.689	0.183
Personal feeling of deprivation	0.645	0.159	1.144	0.250	0.754	0.161
Agreement on pooling funds to help EU countries	0.970	0.252	0.779	0.173	0.697	0.15
EU help motive: moral duty	1.066	0.161	1.204	0.160	1.083	0.146
EU help motive: reciprocity	0.828	0.109	0.850	0.100	1.024	0.118
Conditionality for migrants: after living in Italy for a year	1.611	0.498	1.828*	0.523	2.598**	0.769
Conditionality for migrants: after having worked and payed taxes for a year	0.499**	0.119	0.734	0.163	1.145	0.247
Conditionality for migrants: once obtaining citizenship	0.363***	0.0915	0.664	0.153	0.878	0.194
Conditionality for migrants: never	0.138***	0.0553	0.456**	0.136	0.494*	0.139
Preferred charity group: the unemployed	1.274	0.204	2.033***	0.292	1.047	0.146
Preferred charity group: the disabled	1.230	0.191	1.328*	0.183	1.837***	0.252
Preferred charity group: migrants	7.375***	3.382	4.924***	2.079	3.839**	1.759
Preferred charity group: refugees/asylum seekers	2.260*	0.757	1.317	0.380	1.585	0.460
Constant	0.657	0.325	0.705	0.321	0.626	0.270
N	*1564*		*1564*		*1564*	
pseudo R2	*0.163*		*0.083*		*0.067*	
AIC	*1650.5*		*1970.1*		*2050.3*	
BIC	*1779*		*2098.6*		*2178.8*	

*Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001*

TABLE 15: Estimated effects on solidarity actions towards different target groups for some predictors, full model

	Refugees		Unemployed		Disabled	
	Odds Ratio	s.e.	Odds Ratio	s.e.	Odds Ratio	s.e.
Age	0.852	0.314	0.559	0.185	2.331**	0.764
Gender (female)	1.265	0.186	0.869	0.115	1.078	0.139
Intermediate education	0.752	0.126	0.905	0.134	0.994	0.142
High education	1.276	0.287	1.122	0.216	0.914	0.18
Social trust	3.321***	1.077	1.513	0.423	1.867*	0.506
Frequency of meeting with friends	2.642***	0.687	2.566***	0.603	3.004***	0.705
Middle class	0.434*	0.153	0.943	0.289	0.511*	0.16
Lower middle class	0.618	0.226	1.306	0.416	0.600	0.194
Working class	0.514	0.208	1.623	0.572	0.517	0.181
Lower class	0.573	0.253	1.374	0.508	0.728	0.269
Other class	1.355	1.984	3.144	2.647	2.385	2.203
Political interest	2.023*	0.584	2.847***	0.732	2.373***	0.581
Left-right self-placement	0.882	0.249	0.825	0.206	1.060	0.256
Libertarian-authoritarian index	1.509	0.697	1.247	0.532	0.919	0.378
Party attachment	1.760*	0.401	1.941**	0.399	1.225	0.221
Attachment towards humanity	1.639	0.497	1.074	0.283	1.135	0.285
Religiosity	2.034**	0.548	2.627***	0.629	2.504***	0.58
No cultural xenophobia	3.585***	1.165	1.661	0.457	1.452	0.387
EU membership: A good thing	0.833	0.157	0.777	0.134	0.900	0.144
EU membership: A bad thing	1.173	0.224	1.098	0.191	1.445*	0.247
Eliminating big inequalities: important	1.847	0.771	1.745	0.637	1.477	0.539
Eliminating big inequalities: neutral	0.428***	0.0921	0.805	0.158	0.814	0.157
Conditionality for migrants: after living in Italy for a year	1.509	0.534	1.701	0.545	2.551**	0.872
Conditionality for migrants: after having worked and payed taxes for a year	0.508*	0.138	0.694	0.173	1.211	0.309
Conditionality for migrants: once obtaining citizenship	0.342***	0.0981	0.545*	0.141	0.842	0.221
Conditionality for migrants: never	0.152***	0.0688	0.345**	0.126	0.482*	0.165
Preferred charity group: the unemployed	1.405	0.2600	2.018***	0.338	1.080	0.171
Preferred charity group: the disabled	1.136	0.205	1.327	0.214	1.862***	0.301
Preferred charity group: migrants	3.731**	1.797	3.089**	1.295	2.183	1.022
Preferred charity group: refugees/asylum seekers	3.302**	1.330	1.709	0.536	1.616	0.577
Constant	0.106**	0.0744	0.0852***	0.0532	0.154**	0.0954
N	*1233*		*1233*		*1233*	
pseudo R2	*0.212*		*0.129*		*0.100*	
AIC	*1272.9*		*1493.1*		*1575.8*	
BIC	*1431.5*		*1651.7*		*1734.4*	

*Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001*

Finally, we have built a full model including all independent variables (except those that were not significant for any of the target groups) in order to see if previous results are confirmed when controlling for different blocks of independent variables (see Table 15). This model provides better goodness-of-fit statistics compared to previous models: it explains 21% of the variance for support of refugees, 13% for unemployed support and 10% for disabled support. Furthermore, AIC and BIC coefficients are definitely lower (and thus better) compared to separated models.

In general, results are confirmed for social capital, political interest, religiosity, conditionality, deservingness, opinions on redistributive policies and on Italy's EU membership.

First of all, for each target group both measures of social capital (social trust and frequency of social connections with friends) are still significant, except social trust for unemployed support. Significance is always very high with p at 0.1%, except social trust for disabled support with p at 5%. Furthermore, these variables show high odds ratios: higher levels of social trust and social connections increase the odds of engaging in solidarity actions. This occurs in particular as regards social trust with respect to support for refugees and the frequency of social connections for disabled support: one unit increase in trust in others increases 3.3 times the odds of supporting refugees and one unit increase in frequency of meeting with friends increases around three times the odds of supporting the disabled.

Regarding political factors, the level of cognitive political involvement as measured by interest in politics is a significant variable fostering the odds of being involved in solidarity actions, regardless of the aided group (with high odds ratios between 2 and 2.9). The other measure of political involvement (party attachment) is still significant for unemployed support (p at 1%) and for refugees support (p at 5%). This confirms that political factors are more related to solidarity towards the unemployed and refugees than to disabled support. Nevertheless, an important difference emerges when political factors are controlled for other blocks of independent variables. Indeed, as regards refugees support, the libertarian-authoritarian index and left-right self-placement are no longer significant compared to previous separated model for political variables (Model B). Political values and ideologies are not important predictors of solidarity practices for any of our target groups, contrary to our expectations.

As for cultural orientations, it is conversely confirmed that religiosity is a very good predictor of involvement in solidarity actions, regardless of the target group. Indeed, it is always very significant (with p at 0.1% or at 1%) and odds ratios are high (between 2 and 2.6). Definitely, we can say that Italian religious people are more likely to be engaged in solidarity actions.

With regard to conditionality for migrants' entitlements to social benefits, previous results are generally confirmed: people against the integration of migrants are very unlikely to be engaged in solidarity actions, regardless of the target group, even if this occurs especially for actions in favour of refugees (p at 0.1%). Furthermore, both requisites of working/paying taxes and citizenship decrease in a significant way the odds of supporting refugees. Conversely, such dummies are not statistically significant for support of other target groups. However, this time the requisite of citizenship also decreases the odds of supporting unemployed rights and a tenuous form of conditionality (granting rights after living in Italy for a year) increases only the odds of supporting the disabled. In this regard, a tenuous form of conditionality is a factor that somehow distinguishes solidarity towards disabled people compared to other groups. Anyway, in general, it is confirmed that the

absence of conditionality is a factor favouring practices of solidarity, especially those towards refugees.

Regarding deservingness, again, citing as preferred charity group one of our target groups strongly increases the odds of supporting such a group. Thus, deservingness is definitely a factor fostering solidarity actions in favour of a specific group considered as worth of receiving help. As previously seen, a pro-migrants attitude helps solidarity actions in general. This time, however, this dummy is not significant for disabled support. Thus, for refugees and disabled support, deservingness plays a role only when the preferred charity group is (almost) the same target group that receives solidarity: migrants and refugees for support of refugees; people with disabilities for disabled support. Conversely, the odds of supporting the unemployed does not depend only on the unemployed as preferred charity group. Indeed, both migrants and unemployed dummies are significant, as previously seen. Nevertheless, this time the disabled dummy is no longer significant for unemployed support.

It is also confirmed that opinions on redistributive policies are significant only for support of refugees and that opinions on Italy' EU membership are significant for disabled support. Again, supporting refugees is not closely tied to the support of redistributive policies and support towards the disabled is not tied to pro-Europe attitudes.

Finally, the full model shows also some important differences compared to separated models. First, gender and education are no longer significant for any of the target groups. Therefore, basic socio-demographic characteristics are not explanatory factors of solidarity practices, except for age in the disability field. Ageing significantly increases the odds of supporting the disabled (p at 1%).

Secondly, social class in the full model has lost predictive power. Only being middle class is significant (with p at 5%) for refugees and disabled support, with a negative effect compared to the reference category (upper/upper middle class).

Finally, attachment towards humanity is no longer a significant factor for solidarity practices, nor for support of refugees when controlled for other blocks of independent variables. Conversely, the absence of cultural xenophobic attitudes is still a very important predictor of support for refugees (p at 0.1%): recognising positive effects of immigration on national cultural life increases 3.6 times the odds of supporting refugees. Nevertheless, this variable is no longer a variable explaining solidarity activities in general, being no significant for unemployed and disabled support.

Conclusions

The picture of the solidarity activities' context shows that Italians are open to solidarity and this entails to some extent other Europeans and non-Europeans. Furthermore, Italian citizens support the typical redistributive policies of the European social model. But this social model remains strictly linked to the traditional nation state. Indeed, solidarity has

a strong political element: it requires, in first instance, that the targets of solidarity are part of the (national) community in terms of citizenship. This citizenship, however, is not a purely formal status, but requires shared rights and obligations. Indeed, our findings suggest that most citizens are sceptical about a universalistic and humanitarian conception of solidarity (i.e. solidarity towards human being as such) that entails unconditional solidarity. Overall, for most citizens, solidarity is rights-based and thus tied to the notion of citizenship, i.e., delimited by legal entitlements and mutual obligations (such as receiving social benefits and paying taxes or contributions). Moreover, groups receiving help need to show that they are worth being helped.

Regarding target groups, the disability field is the most 'crowded' field in terms of solidarity engagement, involving around half of respondents. If we look at the different type of solidarity practices, political protest-oriented activities are carried out especially in favour of the unemployed, whereas the other two fields seem to be less contentious, especially the disability field. Indeed, charity behaviour definitely characterises solidarity actions towards the disabled. As regards solidarity towards refugees, after the charity behaviour of donating money, the most frequent activity is a relatively more political one, i.e. buying or refusing to buy products in support to the goals in favour of refugees. Furthermore, the descriptive analysis shows that solidarity towards refugees displays some specificities compared to solidarity towards other groups: it is more selfless, oriented towards human being as such, linked to pro-Europe attitudes and to leftist/libertarian values.

As far as the explanatory analysis of the determinants of solidarity activities towards target groups is concerned, findings show common traits and differences between target groups. As regards similarities, the most important factors fostering solidarity practices in Italy are social capital, religiosity, cognitive political involvement and deservingness. Italians are more likely involved in solidarity activities when they trust in others, have frequent social connections, are interested in politics, are religious, consider the group they are supporting as worth being helped. As regards the most important differences, political factors play a more important role for refugees and unemployed support compared to disabled support. Nevertheless, contrary to our expectations, left-right ideology and libertarian-authoritarian values do not matter when controlled for other variables. Moreover, support for refugees shows more specific explanatory factors compared to other groups. It is closely tied to social beliefs like he of xenophobia and conditionality as regards granting migrants entitlements to social benefits and services. Solidarity towards refugees is clearly an unconditioned form of solidarity. Conversely, people supporting the disabled are more likely to agree with a tenuous form of conditionality when migrants' access to rights is at stake, but strict forms of conditionality for migrants are not significant to explain support for the unemployed and the disabled. Rather, people against the integration of migrants are very unlikely to be engaged in solidarity actions, regardless of field.

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Appendix

Variable and Item(s)	First recoding	Distri-bution	Second recoding	Distribution
[age] How old are you?	1=18-24 years, 2=25-34 years, 3=35-44 years, 4=55-64 years, 5= 65 years and older	7.2%; 14.3%; 17.6%; 18.9%; 23.7%; 18.3%	Standardized	M=0.44
[gender] Are you male or female? 1=male, 2=female	0=male; 1=female	52.0%		
[education_set] What is the highest level of education that you have completed? (ISCED-list)	0=lower education; 1=higher education; 2=intermediate education	52.5%; 12.3%; 35.2%		
[attachcountry_hum] How attached do you feel towards world/humanity? (1-4)	Standardized	M=0.68		
[income_IT] What is your household's MONTHLY net income, after tax and compulsory deductions, from all sources? (ten decils)	1=0-1305 EUR; 2=1306-1920 EUR; 3=1921-2665 EUR; 4=2666-3780 EUR; 5=3781 EUR or more	28.1%; 26.2%; 22.9%; 16.6%; 6.2%		
[refsup] Have you ever done any of the following in order to support the rights of refugees/asylum seekers? (Six options)	0=0; 1=refugees support	27.6%		
[unemprights] Have you ever done any of the following in order to support the rights of the unemployed? (Six options)	0=0; 1=unemployed support	35.5%		
[dissup] Have you ever done any of the following in order to support disability rights? (Six options)	0=0; 1=disabled support	49.4%		
[supotherc] Have you ever done one of the following in order to support the rights of people/groups in your own country? (Six options)	0=0; 1=in your Country	46.7%		
[supEU] Have you ever done one of the following in order to support the rights of people/groups in other countries within the European Union? (Six options)	0=0; 1=in a Country in the EU	31.7%		
[supoutsideEU] Have you ever done one of the following in order to support the rights of people/groups in countries outside the European Union? (Six options)	0=0; 1=outside the EU	32.8%		
[EUaid] The European Union provides development aid to assist certain countries outside the EU in their fight against poverty and in their development. How important do you think it is to help people in developing countries? (1-5)	-	3.5%; 6.9%; 18.3%; 45.6%; 25.7%		
[socialclass] People often say that they belong to the working class, the middle class, upper class and so forth. Which of the following classes do you feel that you belong to? (Seven classes)	0=Upper/Upper middle class; 1=Middle class; 2=Lower middle class; 3=Working class; 4=Lower class; 5=Other class	4.4%; 40.4%; 27.2%; 15.9%; 11.5%; 0.5%		
[polint] How interested, if at all, would you say you are in politics? (1-4)	Standardized	M=0.58		
[metfriends] During the past month, how often have you met socially with friends not living in your household? (1-4)	Standardized	M=0.35		
[conditionality] Thinking of people coming to live in Italy from other countries, when do you think they should obtain the same rights to social benefits and services as citizens already living here?	0=immediately on arrival; 1=after living in Italy for a year (worked or not); 2=only after they have worked and paid taxes for at least a year; 3=once they have become an Italian citizen; 4=they should never get the same right	7.7%; 6.5%; 38.3%; 35.7%; 11.8%		
[givecharity] There are many reasons why people can't give to charity. If you had to choose to donate money to	0=children;	49.1%;		

ONLY ONE charity of the following groups, which one would you choose?	1=unemployed; 2=people with disabilities: 3=migrants; 4=refugees	20.9%; 23.8%; 2.4%; 3.8%		
[EUhelpmotiv] There are many reasons to state for or against financial help for EU countries in trouble. Which one of the following best reflects how you feel? (Four options)	-	-		
2. It is our moral duty to help other member states that are in need. (0-1)	-	20.2%		
3. The European Union member states should help each other, as somewhere along the way every country may require help (0-1)	-	51.8%		
[fairsociety_income] In order to be considered fair, what should a society provide? Eliminating big inequalities in income between citizens (1-5)	0=not important; 1=neither; 2=important	4.5%; 14.9%; 80.7%		
[EUdebt] The EU is currently pooling funds to help EU countries having difficulties in paying their debts. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this measure? (1-5)	Standardized	M=0.66		
[fairshare_myc] In contrast to how others live in this country, do you believe that you receive…? (fair share-no fair share, 1-4)	Standardized	M= 0.68		
[socialtrust] Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? Please state your answer on a scale of 0 to 10	0=People cannot be trusted (0-4); 1=Neutral (5); 2=People can be trusted (6-10)	51.2%; 20.0%; 28.8%	Standardized	M=0.40
[lrscale] People sometimes talk about the Left and the Right in politics. Where would you place yourself on the following? (0-10)	1=Centre-Left (0-4); 2=Centre (5); 3=Centre-Right (6-10); 4=Not Self Placed (999)	33.4%; 15.6%; 33.0%; 18.0%	Standardized	M= 0.50
[libauth] How would you place your opinion on this scale? 0 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right [libauth_career] Children vs. career (0-10) [libauth_abortion] No abortion vs. freedom of abortion (0-10) [libauth_parenting] Authority vs. independent judgement (0-10) [libauth_criminals] tougher sentences vs. no tougher sentences (0-10) [libauth_adoption] no adoption vs. adoption for homosexuals (0-10)	Index, recoded: 0=authoritarian (0-4.4); 1=neutral (4.6-5.4); 3=libertarian (5.6-10)	42.1% 22.3% 35.7%	Index, standardized	(alpha=0.93) M=0.48
[partyattach] Which of the following parties do you feel closest to? (Ten options)	0=No party; 1=Close to a party	76.1%		
[votenowparty_IT] If there were a general election in Italy tomorrow, for which party would you vote? (Ten options: Sinistra Ecologia e Libertà (SEL) /Sinistra Italiana; Partito Democratico; Movimento 5 Stelle; Area Popolare (Nuovo Centrodestra -UDC); Forza Italia; Lega Nord; Fratelli d'Italia Alleanza Nazionale; Partito della Rifondazione Comunista; Other party; Do not know)	-	2.3%; 18.0%; 23.9%; 1.3%; 5.9%; 10.6%; 3.2%; 1.5%; 3.2%; 30.2%		
[religiosity] Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say you are on a scale from 0 to 10?	0=Not religious (0-4); 1=Neutral (5); 2=Religious (6-10)	33.4%; 13.0%; 53.6%	Standardized	M=0.53
[xeno_culture] Would you say that Italian cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries? (0-10)	0=bad (0-4); 1=Neutral (5); 2=good (6-10)	37.3%; 17.8%; 45.0%	Standardized	M=0.49
[xeno_economy] Would you say it is generally bad or good for the Italian economy that people come to live here from other countries? (0-10)	0=bad (0-4); 1=Neutral (5); 2=good (6-10)	43.0%; 17.6%; 39.5%		
[EUmembership_IT] Generally speaking, do you think that Italy's membership of the European Union is...?	0=Neither good nor bad; 1=A good thing; 2=A bad thing	28.5%; 38.6%; 33.0%;		

Solidarity practices and social capital in Poland

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The aim of this chapter is twofold. We present the major descriptive results of the TransSOL survey for Poland. In particular, we provide a depiction of solidarity behaviors of Polish respondents with reference to the three geographical groups of beneficiaries: (1) people living in Poland; (2) people living in other European Union member states; and (3) people living in other countries outside the EU. These results are presented in the first part of this chapter. In this part, we pay particular attention to the distribution of the solidarity behaviors of Poles with reference to the three groups of beneficiaries indicated above across major groups identified on the base of three major socio-demographic characteristics: gender, age and education. This leads us to the comprehensive description of solidarity behavior of Poles.

In the second part of the chapter, we explore the mentioned solidaristic behaviors of Poles from the social capital perspective. We aim to shed light on the relation between types of social capital (in particular its "bonding" and bridging" forms) and general as well as transnational solidarity behaviors in Poland. We conclude that transnational solidarity in Poland is driven by specific combination of individuals' social networks and attitudes which cross cut the distinction into bonding and bridging social capital.

Solidarity and social capital – conceptualization of relations

Poland is a country where the idea of solidarity is primarily associated with the "Solidarity" social movement which had a substantial influence on political change and democratization (Krzemiński 2010, Staniszkis 2010). However, while "Solidarity" as a movement and as a value were very important in the times of the fall of the communist system, the subsequent transformation period is often perceived as a "defeat" of "Solidarity" (Ost 2006) both in the institutional and attitudinal dimensions of public life. A significant literature points to low levels of social solidarity in Poland which is often linked to a relatively weak civic tradition and low level of social capital, in particular trust (Giza et al. 2000, Czapiński 2006, Gliński 2006, Szymczak 2008).

The mentioned bulk of literature and its findings refer to the societal, and, in particular, the civic aspect of social transformation in Poland after the fall of communism. However, contemporary political and economic changes both in Poland and other EU countries call for newer insights into the problems of solidarity in Poland. The economic crisis of 2008, the influx of refugees to Southern European countries and the relocation policy of the EU, as well as political changes in Poland create a new context for solidaristic attitudes and practices in this country. The new conservative government of Law and Justice, which has ruled in Poland since 2015, manifestly uses the rhetoric of solidarity limited exclusively to

Polish compatriots, combined with little charity for people suffering in conflicts abroad. Thus, both relatively weak social capital (in the form of horizontal civil society networks and trust), as well as recent political narratives, pose significant tensions to individual solidarity – and in particular, transnational solidarity in Poland nowadays.

Against this backdrop, current studies on the solidarity practices of Polish citizens show that its various indicators are close to the EU average (Domański 2009: 142-175, Bartkowski 2014). Thus, in this chapter we formulate questions about the level and sources of solidarity Poland. We would like to shed light on the factors which contribute to the involvement of Polish citizens in solidaristic actions in general, but in particular, we would like to discern what enhances the propensity of "solidaristic" Poles to engage in international solidarity actions. For this reason, we use a framework of social capital: we understand solidarity actions as a specific form of social capital.

According to a well-anchored tradition in the scholarly literature conceptualization of social capital we acknowledge it is a potential of social cooperation which consists of three related elements, that is: a structural, normative and the behavioral component (Coleman 1988, Grootaert and van Bastelaer 2002, Putnam 2002:9). Simultaneously, we focus on the individual level of social capital and solidarity, which means we regard persons as the "owners" of social capital. In theory, the structural component of social capital at the individual level entails relations and memberships in formal and informal social networks. The normative element of social capital includes: values, the beliefs and attitudes of a person, such as trusting to others, openness, assuming reciprocity is a moral duty if help has been received, etc. The third component of social capital at the individual level is usually understood in scholarly studies as certain civic practices of individuals, and in particular – practices involving social cooperation, such as: work in civil society organizations, practical engagement in local initiatives serving the public good, or helping the others. The aforementioned three components do not only describe the potential of cooperation (this refers also to a behavioral element, as the assumption is applied here that the more individual cooperates, the more he or she is likely to cooperate in the future, due to accumulated knowledge, efficacy and own experience) but they also mutually reinforce (Grootaert and van Bastelaer 2002, Narayan and Cassidy 2001). Accordingly, the more contacts one has and the more he or she is trusting, and the more strongly he or she practically cooperates with other people.

For the purpose of this chapter we understand solidarity as the behavior of individuals – certain actions which may involve cooperation with beneficiaries but more generally which supports goals, rights or standing of the others. Regarding solidarity as a practice is consistent with relevant subfields of studies on solidarity i.e. for studies on social movements (Lahusen 2016, Bartkowski 2014). IThist also allows us to interpret solidarity as a specific type of behavioral aspect of social capital. Essential in this understanding of solidarity is the issue of scope – with whom or for whose the benefits solidarity are practised.

The reasons for employing a social capital perspective in this chapter are twofold. Firstly, the social capital perspective seems specifically relevant to the Polish. As mentioned, both societal and academic debate about systematic transformation of Poland after communism fell tends to emphasize the "social capital problem" in Poland (Giza, Marody, Rychard 2000). Namely, it has been argued that civic participation and generalized trust in Poland is very low (Czapiński 2013). However, some Polish scholars claim that specific forms of social capital in Poland, although based on kinship, religion and attachment to locality are not as "unsocial" or "backwards" as West-European scholars suggest, and provide a good social environment for civil and more complex forms of cooperation in public sphere (Jacobsson, Korolczuk 2017, Żukowski, Theiss 2009).

Secondly, the theoretical connection between social capital and solidarity has already been acknowledged in the scientific literature[32] (Portes 1998, Putnam 200). As Lahusen (2016: 5) emphasizes, the analysis of solidarity can benefit from studies on social capital, which converge on the conviction that social capital is a necessary 'glue' of social cohesion and thus essential for understanding the conditions and structures of solidarity. More specifically, from social capital scholarship two stances emerge which are relevant for research on solidarity. We label the first one as a thesis on "quantitatively approached" sources of social action. According to this argument, the more dense and diverse the social networks of an individual are, as well as the more trusting a person is, the more prone he or she is to get involved in cooperative behavior or more generally – be engaged in civic activities in a broad sense (Coleman 1988). Various empirical studies support this relation, especially in regard to the effect of generalized trust level on civic action (Putnam and Nanetti 1994, Fukuyama 1995).

The second stance may be labelled as a thesis on "qualitatively approached" social capital. This assumes that the type of structural and normative elements of social capital affect an individual's propensity to cooperate with others, and in particular to be involved in civic activities. Two types of social capital are differentiated in this context. So-called "bonding" or "thick" social capital is based on relatively homogenous relations with family and friends. It entails strong norms of mutual support and thus might be exclusive. It is claimed that e.g. closed self-help groups may be based on this type of social capital and due to the effects of this form of social capital is named by some authors an "inward-looking" social capital. Extreme forms of this asset is close to traditional familialism (Portes 1998). On the other hand, so-called "bridging" social capital, based on horizontal, crosscutting social networks and values of openness and generalized trust positively contribute to social cooperation and public good at a systemic level (Putnam, Nanetti 1994, Granovetter 1973).

[32] It needs to be noticed that in significant part of relevant literature the realation between social capital and solidaity is conceptualized in a difeferent way than in this chapter. Solidarity is commonly understood only as specific attitude which leads to cooperation (social capital) (Portes 1988). This i also a result of ferquent conceptualization of solidarity as a moral value and not a practice.

Against this backdrop, our focus is to differentiate between the structures, values and actions which are labelled in the scholarly literature as “bonding” social capital and the structures, actions and values named “bridging” social capital. Our research questions in the second part of this chapter focus on the impact of these two phenomena on soliaristic behaviors both in general and specifically at transnational level. As noted, in particular, we aim at explanation of the relation between structures and values inherent in different types of social capital and the different scope of solidarity. Central to our investigation are the questions: which social networks and values contribute to solidarity actions in general but foremost – which contribute to transnational solidarity that is the solidarity with people abroad.

Basing on the presented literature, we hypothesize that: (1) bonding social capital (based on family and friendship ties) has a negative impact on solidaristic behaviors, in particular in regard to behaviors with beneficiaries of international scope; (2) bridging social capital (generalized trust and civic engagement) has positive impact on solidaristic behaviors, in particular in regard to behaviors with international scope of beneficiaries.

Sample characteristics

The sample used for our analysis consists of 2,119 respondents from Poland. The basic socio-demographic characteristics of this group are provided in Table 1. The sample is representative for all age groups. Each age group consists of over 200 respondents, which exceeds 10 percent of the total population. The largest group consists of respondents aged between 55- and 64-years-old, and the smallest group consists of the youngest group of adults below 25-years-old.

The distribution of the educational level of the respondents in the sample is presented with the account of a very detailed set of categories. These categories are similar to the ISCED (International Standard Classification of Education) seven categories of education levels (ISCED 1997). The educational structure of the Polish population of adults (people 18-years-old and older) is also closely reflected in our sample. It must be noted, however, that the results of our analysis are thus representative for the adult Polish population, in which lowest level of education is underrepresented as this group consists of younger people (under 18-years-old)

TABLE 1: Socio-demographic characteristics of Polish respondents

	Number of respondents	% in the weighted sample
Gender		
Female	1107	47.7
Male	1012	52.3
Age groups		
18-24	221	10.4
25-34	395	18.6
35-44	402	19.0
45-54	336	15.9
55-64	514	24.2
65 and older	252	11.9
Education		
Primary education or less	33	1.5
Lower secondary education	42	2.0
Vocational upper secondary education	432	20.4
Postsecondary education with access to tertiary	1048	49.5
Postsecondary-non-tertiary	172	8.1
Short cycle (3-4 years) tertiary education	40	1.9
Long-cycle (4+ years) tertiary education	111	5.2
Master's equivalent education	232	11.0
Doctoral or equivalent level	9	0.4

Notes: Frequencies and percentages are calculated with the use of variable: weight_country. This applies to all the tables in this chapter.

In the next section of this chapter, we present the distribution of the six different forms of solidarity behaviors with reference to the three groups of beneficiaries, identified on the basis of their geographical scope: country level, UE-level and outside-EU level. We explore the distribution of these different forms of actions with reference to these three groups in the entire sample of Polish people but also within the groups identified based on the distribution of basic socio-demographic characteristics of the population, i.e. gender, age and education.

Solidarity behaviors in Poland

In order to operationalize solidarity, we used the TransSOL survey question in which participants were simultaneously asked about the scope of solidarity action (three groups of beneficiaries were indicated) and its forms (six forms of behaviors). The respondents were asked if they have: attended a march, protested or demonstrated, donated money, donated time, bought or refused to buy products, engaged as an active or passive member of civic organization to support the rights/goals of the other people: in the country; in other countries in the UE; and in other countries outside UE. The answers provided by the respondents were binary, i.e. included only "yes" and "no" options.

In this part of the chapter, we provide the results for these forms of behaviors organized under two titles that reflect the dual character of these different forms of actions. The first group consists of forms that engaged respondent's time and/or physical activity, i.e. participation in the protests, marches or demonstrations; volunteering in civic society organization or generally "donating time" in order to support rights of other people. The second group involves engaging respondent's money in this purpose, i.e. simply donating

money, “pay checking” in a civic organization (passive membership) and buying or refusing to buy products in order to support the rights or goals of other people.

The frequency of solidaristic behaviors in Poland varies significantly between types of activity and between geographical scope of beneficiaries. As shown in the Table 2, 16.3 percent of Polish respondents report they have taken part in a march, protest or demonstration in order to support the rights of people in Poland. No significant gender differences may be observed in this regard, whereas the higher education level the more frequent experience of participation in protest activities, ranging from 12.2 percent among respondents who have completed vocational upper secondary education to 22.0 percent among those who have obtained a MA title. In regard to age groups, a U-shaped relationship is present: the youngest respondents (age 18-24 years), as well as the oldest (above 65 years) subpopulation reveal the highest rates of protest participation. This may be explained by co-occurrence of two features: typical for the EU higher propensity of younger generations to involve in protests, mainly due to higher tolerance level of youth and a higher level of membership in trade unions among the older generations, which act as a mobilization force for the members (Domański 2009, Żuk and Żuk 2015).

The share of Poles who participate in protest activities to support the rights of people in other countries in the EU is six percent (see Table 3) and is much smaller that the support for the compatriots. Gender, education and age composition of this group is similar to the group of those respondents who have stand for other Poles’ rights.

As presented in the Table 4, only 5.6 percent of the Polish population has the experience of protesting in order to support the rights of people in other countries in the EU. Although this share is only slightly lower than in case of protests which are aimed to support other EU countries’ citizens, it needs to be noticed that only a limited overlap of both groups of protestors has been observed. 36.2 percent of Polish citizens who have attended the protests supporting EU citizens have also protested for rights of non-EU citizens.

TABLE 2: Participation in march, protest or demonstration in order to support the rights of people in respondent's country

	Frequency	% of all respondents
Total	346	16.3
By gender		
Men	171	16.9
Women	175	15.8
By education		
Primary education or less	0	0
Lower secondary education	4	9.6
Vocational upper secondary education	53	12.2
Upper secondary with access to tertiary	180	17.2
Postsecondary education	25	14.4
Short cycle (3-4 years) tertiary education	6	14.7
Long-cycle (4+ years) tertiary education	25	22.6
Master's equivalent education	51	22.0
Doctoral or equivalent level	2	24.1
By age groups		
18-24	39	17.6
25-34	68	17.2
35-44	51	12.7
45-54	47	13.9
55-64	87	16.9
65 and older	54	21.5

Notes: Frequencies and percents are waged according to the country wage
Qs: Have you ever done one of the following [item: attended a march, protest or demonstration] in order to support the rights of people/groups in your own country?

TABLE 3: Participation in march, protest or demonstration in order to support the rights of people in other countries in the EU

	Frequency	% of all respondents
Total	127	6
By gender		
Men	69	6.8
Women	58	5.2
By education		
Primary education or less	0	0
Lower secondary education	1	1.8
Vocational upper secondary education	30	7
Upper secondary with access to tertiary	55	5.3
Postsecondary education	11	6.5
Short cycle (3-4 years) tertiary education	5	11.3
Long-cycle (4+ years) tertiary education	6	5.5
Master's equivalent education	19	18.1
Doctoral or equivalent level	0	0
By age groups		
18-24	6	2.8
25-34	27	7
35-44	25	6.3
45-54	14	4.2
55-64	35	6.9
65 and older	19	7.6

Notes: Frequencies and percents are waged according to the country wage
Qs: Have you ever done one of the following [item: attended a march, protest or demonstration] in order to support the rights of people/groups in other countries within the European Union?

TABLE 4: Participation in march, protest or demonstration in order to support the rights of people in other countries in the EU

		Frequency	% of all respondents
	Total	118	5.6
By gender			
	Men	61	6
	Women	58	5.2
By education			
	Primary education or less	2	6.9
	Lower secondary education	2	4.2
	Vocational upper secondary education	29	6.6
	Upper secondary with access to tertiary	47	4.5
	Postsecondary education	10	5.9
	Short cycle (3-4 years) tertiary education	2	5.7
	Long-cycle (4+ years) tertiary education	7	6.6
	Master's equivalent education	19	8.0
	Doctoral or equivalent level	1	8.0
By age groups			
	18-24	15	6.9
	25-34	32	8.2
	35-44	23	5.7
	45-54	17	5.8
	55-64	16	3.2
	65 and older	15	5.8

Notes: Frequencies and percents are waged according to the country wage
Qs: Have you ever done one of the following [item: attended a march, protest or demonstration] in order to support the rights of people/groups outside the European Union?

Solidarity activities in the form of an unpaid work for civil society organizations are visibly less frequent than protest activities. As presented in the Table 5, 7.8 percent of Polish respondents confirm they have been engaged as active members in and organization that supports the rights of people in Poland. Women tend to be more often engaged in this type of solidarity action, as well as younger people (the share ranges from 12.8 percent among people aged 18-24 to 4.7 percent in the group of Poles aged 55-64). It needs to be noticed that the level of this activity is consistent with findings of other studies on civic activism in Poland – 13.4 percent of Poles are reported to be active in any civil society organization and 9.0 percent in an active form, according to national survey "Societal Diagnosis" (Diagnoza Społeczna, 2015). However, in the mentioned research the pure effect of gender is 20 percent lower chances of active membership for women. On the contrary, in our TransSOL survey we found out that when asked "Have you ever engaged as active member of an organization in order to support the rights of people/groups in your own country?" relatively more women give positive answers. We hypothesize that when only "solidaristic organizations" are taken into account are women more likely to participate than men.

Similarly to protest activities, working for civil society at the EU level shows lower levels. These types of solidaristic behavior are reported by 3.7 percent of Poles (see Table 6). Active membership in organizations supporting the rights of people in countries outside the EU is at similar level and equals 3.9 percent (see Table 7).

TABLE 5: Active membership (volunteering) in organization supporting the rights of people in respondent's country

		Frequency	% of all respondents
	Total	165	7.8
By gender			
	Men	69	6.9
	Women	96	8.6
By education			
	Primary education or less	1	3.6
	Lower secondary education	4	9.8
	Vocational upper secondary education	29	6.8
	Upper secondary with access to tertiary	72	6.9
	Postsecondary education	13	7.6
	Short cycle (3-4 years) tertiary education	3	6.9
	Long-cycle (4+ years) tertiary education	15	13.6
	Master's equivalent education	26	11
	Doctoral or equivalent level	2	22.8
By age groups			
	18-24	28	12.8
	25-34	40	10.1
	35-44	31	7.7
	45-54	24	7.2
	55-64	24	4.7
	65 and older	17	6.9

Notes: Frequencies and percents are waged according to the country wage

Qs: Have you ever done one of the following [item: engaged as active member of an organization (volunteering in an organization)] in order to support the rights of people/groups in your own country?

TABLE 6: Active membership (volunteering) in organization supporting the rights of people in other countries in the EU

		Frequency	% of all respondents
	Total	79	3.7
By gender			
	Men	34	3.4
	Women	45	4.1
By education			
	Primary education or less	3	9.8
	Lower secondary education	0	0
	Vocational upper secondary education	15	3.6
	Upper secondary with access to tertiary	31	2.9
	Postsecondary education	10	5.6
	Short cycle (3-4 years) tertiary education	0	0
	Long-cycle (4+ years) tertiary education	5	4.4
	Master's equivalent education	15	6.3
	Doctoral or equivalent level	1	8.1
By age groups			
	18-24	12	5.3
	25-34	17	4.4
	35-44	18	4.4
	45-54	7	2.2
	55-64	18	3.5
	65 and older	8	3.0

Notes: Frequencies and percents are waged according to the country wage

Qs: Have you ever done one of the following [item: engaged as active member of an organization (volunteering in an organization)] in order to support the rights of people/groups in other countries within the European Union?

TABLE 7: Active membership (volunteering) in organization supporting the rights of people in other countries outside the EU

		Frequency	% of all respondents
	Total	82	3.9
By gender			
	Men	33	3.3
	Women	49	4.4
By education			
	Primary education or less	0	0
	Lower secondary education	0	0
	Vocational upper secondary education	10	2.3
	Upper secondary with access to tertiary	39	3.7
	Postsecondary education	13	7.6
	Short cycle (3-4 years) tertiary education	2	5.7
	Long-cycle (4+ years) tertiary education	3	2.7
	Master's equivalent education	13	5.4
	Doctoral or equivalent level	2	22.9
By age groups			
	18-24	10	4.7
	25-34	34	8.6
	35-44	15	3.8
	45-54	9	2.8
	55-64	7	1.3
	65 and older	6	2.4

Notes: Frequencies and percents are waged according to the country wage
Qs: Have you ever done one of the following [item: engaged as active member of an organization (volunteering in an organization)] in order to support the rights of people/groups outside the European Union?

Donating time in order to support others' rights is much more frequently indicated solidaristic behavior in Poland than protesting and active membership in civil society organizations. One reason for this is the fact that the question included the possibility of chosing more than one response and thus the category of "donating time" could have been understood as overlapping by some group of respondents.

As presented in Table 8, 24.1 percent of Polish society has devoted time to support some groups in the country. A similar pattern in regard to education and age may be observed among those who donated time for compatriots as among those who were engaged in protests. The propensity to donate time grows with educational level as well as being higher in the youngest cohorts and elderly people (a U-shaped relationship, as explained in previous paragraph). Similarly to the mentioned solidaristic behaviors, the share of Poles who donated their time to support others' rights fells with the geographical scope of beneficiaries. 12.5 percent of Polish respondents report to have been engaged in donating time to support the rights of people in other countries of the EU (see Table 9). The same activity aimed at supporting people outside the EU has been reported by 11.4 percent of Polish respondents. It may be hypothesized that the younger subgroups are slightly more likely to be engaged in this type of solidaristic behavior, although, as noted, the small numbers of cases do not allow us for far-reaching interpretations (see Table 10). According to other surveys conducted in Poland, 27 percent of Poles devotes some time in the year to services to people outside the family or for organizations and 15 percent claims to engage in voluntary work (Diagnoza Społeczna 2015: 345), we can see that only

a relatively small share of these activities is solidaristic in our understanding – that is supports rights of others.

TABLE 8: Donating time in order to support the rights of people in respondent's country

		Frequency	% of all respondents
	Total	511	24.1
By gender			
	Men	244	24.1
	Women	267	24.2
By education			
	Primary education or less	6	17.1
	Lower secondary education	12	27.3
	Vocational upper secondary education	83	19.1
	Upper secondary with access to tertiary	241	23.0
	Postsecondary education	47	27.4
	Short cycle (3-4 years) tertiary education	8	20
	Long-cycle (4+ years) tertiary education	34	30.9
	Master's equivalent education	76	32.7
	Doctoral or equivalent level	5	55
By age groups			
	18-24	65	29.7
	25-34	105	26.7
	35-44	70	17.5
	45-54	87	26
	55-64	119	23.1
	65 and older	64	25.5

Notes: Frequencies and percents are waged according to the country wage
Qs: Have you ever done one of the following [item: donate time] in order to support the rights of people/groups in your own country?

TABLE 9: Donating time in order to support the rights of people in other EU-countries

		Frequency	% of all respondents
	Total	266	12.5
By gender			
	Men	128	12.7
	Women	137	12.4
By education			
	Primary education or less	1	3.6
	Lower secondary education	3	7.8
	Vocational upper secondary education	67	15.5
	Upper secondary with access to tertiary	112	10.7
	Postsecondary education	21	12.3
	Short cycle (3-4 years) tertiary education	4	9.5
	Long-cycle (4+ years) tertiary education	16	14.2
	Master's equivalent education	40	17.3
	Doctoral or equivalent level	2	16.4
By age groups			
	18-24	34	15.3
	25-34	55	13.9
	35-44	42	10.5
	45-54	44	13.1
	55-64	63	12.2
	65 and older	28	11.1

Notes: Frequencies and percents are waged according to the country wage
Qs: Have you ever done one of the following [item: donate time] in order to support the rights of people/groups in other countries within the European Union?

TABLE 10: Donating time in order to support the rights of people outside the EU

		Frequency	% of all respondents
	Total	241	11.4
By gender			
	Men	109	10.8
	Women	131	11.9
By education			
	Primary education or less	1	3.6
	Lower secondary education	4	9.6
	Vocational upper secondary education	50	11.6
	Upper secondary with access to tertiary	110	10.5
	Postsecondary education	15	8.5
	Short cycle (3-4 years) tertiary education	6	14.7
	Long-cycle (4+ years) tertiary education	11	10
	Master's equivalent education	41	17.6
	Doctoral or equivalent level	3	31.2
By age groups			
	18-24	31	14.1
	25-34	45	11.3
	35-44	38	9.6
	45-54	38	11.4
	55-64	59	11.4
	65 and older	29	11.7

Notes: Frequencies and percents are waged according to the country wageQs: Have you ever done one of the following [item: donate time] in order to support the rights of people/groups outside the European Union?

Donating money turned out to be the most frequent solidaristic behavior in Poland. As presented in Table 11, 29.6 percent of Polish respondents reveal that they have donated money to support compatriots. Both higher education level and age improve the chances of being engaged in donating money. Financial support to the EU citizens living in other countries is over twice less frequent, as shown in Table 12; 13.2 percent of respondents have been active in this manner, whereas the educational and age composition of this group resembles similar to previous one which might be explained by a significant overlap of these two groups. 61.1 percent of Poles who donate money to support other EU countries' inhabitants also support financially Polish citizens.

It should be noticed that on the contrary to protest activities, being active in civil society organization and devoting one's own time to support others, donating money to support people outside the EU is more widespread in Polish society than financial help to EU inhabitants. As shown on Table 13, 18.0 percent of the respondents claim they have donated money to support beneficiaries not living in the EU. Only 39.9 percent of them also financially support EU inhabitants. As in the case of other mentioned types of financial help, also in case of extra-EU financial support, higher education and age (with exception of people aged more than 65 years) coincide with more frequent solidaristic behavior.

TABLE 11: Donating money in order to support the rights of people in respondent's country

		Frequency	% of all respondents
	Total	627	29.6
By gender			
	Men	283	28.0
	Women	345	31.1
By education			
	Primary education or less	3	10.1
	Lower secondary education	10	24.3
	Vocational upper secondary education	109	25.2
	Upper secondary with access to tertiary	329	31.4
	Postsecondary education	51	29.9
	Short cycle (3-4 years) tertiary education	13	32.7
	Long-cycle (4+ years) tertiary education	28	25.1
	Master's equivalent education	79	34.0
	Doctoral or equivalent level	5	55.9
By age groups			
	18-24	39	17.5
	25-34	103	26.0
	35-44	100	24.8
	45-54	111	33
	55-64	187	36.5
	65 and older	88	35.1

Notes: Frequencies and percents are waged according to the country wage
Qs: Have you ever done one of the following [item: donate money] in order to support the rights of people/groups in your own country?

TABLE 12: Donating money in order to support the rights of people in other countries in the EU

		Frequency	% of all respondents
	Total	280	13.2
By gender			
	Men	133	13.1
	Women	147	13.2
By education			
	Primary education or less	1	3.5
	Lower secondary education	4	9.7
	Vocational upper secondary education	53	12.2
	Upper secondary with access to tertiary	146	13.9
	Postsecondary education	23	13.2
	Short cycle (3-4 years) tertiary education	8	19.2
	Long-cycle (4+ years) tertiary education	12	11.1
	Master's equivalent education	31	13.5
	Doctoral or equivalent level	2	16.7
By age groups			
	18-24	15	6.8
	25-34	34	8.5
	35-44	44	10.8
	45-54	56	16.5
	55-64	95	18.4
	65 and older	37	14.8

Notes: Frequencies and percents are waged according to the country wage
Qs: Have you ever done one of the following [item: donate money] in order to support the rights of people/groups in other countries within the European Union?

TABLE 13: Donating money in order to support the rights of people in other countries outside EU

		Frequency	% of all respondents
	Total	381	18.0
By gender			
	Men	188	18.6
	Women	193	17.4
By education			
	Primary education or less	2	6.4
	Lower secondary education	7	16.9
	Vocational upper secondary education	75	17.3
	Upper secondary with access to tertiary	195	18.6
	Postsecondary education	27	15.9
	Short cycle (3-4 years) tertiary education	8	20.6
	Long-cycle (4+ years) tertiary education	20	18
	Master's equivalent education	43	18.5
	Doctoral or equivalent level	4	39.5
By age groups			
	18-24	30	13.7
	25-34	43	11
	35-44	56	13.9
	45-54	67	20.0
	55-64	120	23.4
	65 and older	65	25.6

Notes: Frequencies and percents are waged according to the country wage
Qs: Have you ever done one of the following [item: donate money] in order to support the rights of people/groups outside the European Union?

Tables 14, 15 and 16 provide information on passive membership of organizations supporting the rights of other people. Overall, this type of activity is least frequent among solidarity actions investigated by us. 5.7 percent of respondents claim to have aengaged passively in organization which suports the goals of some social group in Poland. This type of activity to suport EU inhabitants and those outsdie the EU is less fequent (7.7 and 3.4 percent respectively). This finding speaks for the activity-oriented nature of solidarity: people are involved in solidarity initiatives more frequanty as active agents than as pay checkers.

TABLE 14: Passive membership (pay check membership) in organization supporting the rights of people in respondent's country

		Frequency	% of all respondents
	Total	120	5.7
By gender			
	Men	70	6.9
	Women	51	4.6
By education			
	Primary education or less	0	0
	Lower secondary education	3	7.2
	Vocational upper secondary education	24	5.5
	Upper secondary with access to tertiary	49	4.7
	Postsecondary education	13	7.8
	Short cycle (3-4 years) tertiary education	9	7.9
	Long-cycle (4+ years) tertiary education	9	7.9
	Master's equivalent education	18	7.7
	Doctoral or equivalent level	2	23.4
By age groups			
	18-24	13	6.0
	25-34	23	5.8
	35-44	28	6.9
	45-54	12	3.6
	55-64	32	6.2
	65 and older	12	4.8

Notes: Frequencies and percents are waged according to the country wage

Qs: Have you ever done one of the following [item: engaged as passive member of an organization (paycheck membership)] in order to support the rights of people/groups in your own country?

TABLE 15: Passive membership (paycheck membership) in organization supporting the rights of people in other countries in the EU

		Frequency	% of all respondents
	Total	78	3.7
By gender			
	Men	49	4.9
	Women	28	2.6
By education			
	Primary education or less	2	6.8
	Lower secondary education	3	7.2
	Vocational upper secondary education	17	3.9
	Upper secondary with access to tertiary	27	2.5
	Postsecondary education	12	7.1
	Short cycle (3-4 years) tertiary education	3	7.4
	Long-cycle (4+ years) tertiary education	4	3.9
	Master's equivalent education	9	3.8
	Doctoral or equivalent level	1	8.6
By age groups			
	18-24	9	4.3
	25-34	22	5.6
	35-44	17	4.2
	45-54	8	2.4
	55-64	17	3.3
	65 and older	4	1.6

Notes: Frequencies and percents are waged according to the country wage

Qs: Have you ever done one of the following [item: engaged as passive member of an organization (paycheck membership)] in order to support the rights of people/groups in other countries within the European Union?

TABLE 16: Passive membership (paycheck membership) in organization supporting the rights of people in other countries outside the EU

		Frequency	% of all respondents
	Total	72	3.4
By gender			
	Men	34	3.4
	Women	38	3.4
By education			
	Primary education or less	0	0
	Lower secondary education	1	2.6
	Vocational upper secondary education	17	4.0
	Upper secondary with access to tertiary	29	2.8
	Postsecondary education	11	6.6
	Short cycle (3-4 years) tertiary education	0	0
	Long-cycle (4+ years) tertiary education	5	4.1
	Master's equivalent education	7	2.9
	Doctoral or equivalent level	2	16.5
By age groups			
	18-24	13	5.9
	25-34	15	3.8
	35-44	14	3.6
	45-54	10	3.1
	55-64	18	3.5
	65 and older	1	0.3

Notes: Frequencies and percents are waged according to the country wage
Qs: Have you ever done one of the following [item: engaged as passive member of an organization (paycheck membership)] in order to support the rights of people/groups outside the European Union?

Solidaristic actions which take form of buying or refusing to buy products in support of the goals of some groups are relatively widespread in Poland. As presented in Table 17, 18.5 percent of Polish respondents have conducted such solidarity acts to support some groups of Polish citizens. This type of behavior is less frequent in regard to beneficiaries in other countries of the EU: 9.8 percent of Poles have refused or decided to buy certain products to support some EU citizens (see Table 18). Economic solidarity behaviors are more frequently aimed to support people living outside the EU. 11.0 percent of Polish respondents report they buy or refuse to buy certain products to support people outside the EU (see Table 19).

As presented in Tables 17-19, engagement in economic solidarity (buying or refusing to buy certain products for moral reasons) clearly grows with h educationalt level of the respondent. In regard to age, people aged 25-35 years are a group in which this solidaristic behavior is most frequent.

TABLE 17: Buying or refusing to buy products in support to the goals of people in respondent's country

		Frequency	% of all respondents
	Total	392	18.5
By gender			
	Men	1892	18.0
	Women	210	18.9
By education			
	Primary education or less	0	0
	Lower secondary education	4	10.2
	Vocational upper secondary education	63	14.5
	Upper secondary with access to tertiary	197	18.8
	Postsecondary education	38	22.0
	Short cycle (3-4 years) tertiary education	8	20.4
	Long-cycle (4+ years) tertiary education	25	22.8
	Master's equivalent education	53	22.9
	Doctoral or equivalent level	4	39.0
By age groups			
	18-24	38	17.4
	25-34	86	21.8
	35-44	59	14.6
	45-54	70	20.7
	55-64	97	18.9
	65 and older	42	16.5

Notes: Frequencies and percents are waged according to the country wage

Qs: Have you ever done one of the following [item: bought or refused to buy products in support to the goals] of people/groups in your own country?

TABLE 18: Buying or refusing to buy products in support to the goals of people in other countries in the EU

		Frequency	% of all respondents
	Total	207	9.8
By gender			
	Men	90	8.9
	Women	117	10.6
By education			
	Primary education or less	2	6.6
	Lower secondary education	1	2.4
	Vocational upper secondary education	40	9.2
	Upper secondary with access to tertiary	102	9.7
	Postsecondary education	20	11.8
	Short cycle (3-4 years) tertiary education	4	9.2
	Long-cycle (4+ years) tertiary education	15	13.3
	Master's equivalent education	23	9.9
	Doctoral or equivalent level	1	8.1
By age groups			
	18-24	24	11
	25-34	42	10.7
	35-44	32	7.9
	45-54	43	12.8
	55-64	48	9.3
	65 and older	19	7.4

Notes: Frequencies and percents are waged according to the country wage

Qs: Have you ever done one of the following [item: bought or refused to buy products in support to the goals] people/groups in other countries within the European Union?

TABLE 19: Buying or refusing to buy products in support to the goals of people in other countries outside EU

		Frequency	% of all respondents
	Total	235	11.0
By gender			
	Men	115	11.3
	Women	120	10.8
By education			
	Primary education or less	4	13.1
	Lower secondary education	2	3.9
	Vocational upper secondary education	34	7.9
	Upper secondary with access to tertiary	121	11.5
	Postsecondary education	19	11.3
	Short cycle (3-4 years) tertiary education	4	8.9
	Long-cycle (4+ years) tertiary education	15	13.7
	Master's equivalent education	31	13.4
	Doctoral or equivalent level	4	47.9
By age groups			
	18-24	21	9.6
	25-34	54	13.6
	35-44	35	8.8
	45-54	42	12.5
	55-64	58	11.3
	65 and older	25	9.9

Notes: Frequencies and percents are waged according to the country wage
Qs: Have you ever done one of the following [item: bought or refused to buy products in support to the goals] of people/groups outside the European Union?

To sum up, we can see that solidarity as a practice in Poland comprizes different individual behaviors. Regardless, the most frequent solidarity action is donating money to support the rights of other people. Secondly, engaging one's own time is practiced. The third most frequent activity is buying or refusing to buy a product to support some groups. If our respondent is seen by us as being solidaristic with some geographical group, it most probably means she or he donates money and/or time for moral reasons. It is much less likely that he or she is a passive or active member of a solidarity organization or has participated in certain protests. Although overall the impact of age, gender and educational level is controlled for in models presented in subsequent part of this chapter, it needs to be specified that in the case of some researched activities, we have observed particular patterns of engagement across subpopulations. In regard to gender, we see men are engaged in protests, money donation and passive membership more frequently, whereas women are more visible in the cases of active membership, engaging their own time and economic solidarity practices. In regard to age groups, transnational solidarity in the form of protesting, membership in organizations and buying products is more frequent in the group of people aged 25-34, whereas the older generation (55-64 years) donates money more often. Educational attainment is in general positively correlated to engagement in solidarity practices.

The Table 20 shows the frequency of generalized solidaristic behaviors to support beneficiaries from different geographical scopes. As a generalized solidaristic behavior, we label *any* form of above described solidaristic practice which was reported by a

respondent. This provides us with an overall picture of the different choices of Polish respondents with reference to the three different geographical scopes of beneficiaries.

Slightly over one third (34.4 percent) of Polish respondents declared having no experience of participation in any solidaristic behavior, no matter the geographical scope of beneficiaries. The remaining 65.6 of respondents - which we call "solidaristic respondents" - can be divided into two groups: (1) a minority group (19.6 percent of all respondents, i.e. 29.9 percent of the "solidaristic respondents"), which includes respondents who were solidaristic in support of rights/goals of people *in Poland*; and (2) a majority group (46 percent of all respondents, i.e. 70.1 percent of the "solidaristic respondents") who participated (also) in solidarity action in order to support the rights/goals of people in other countries.

TABLE 20: Solidarity practices in Poland with different scope of beneficiaries

	Frequency	% of all respondents
No solidarity action at any level	729	34.4
Solidaristic behaviours:		
Solidarity action(s) only at the country level	416	19.6
Solidarity actions at the country and EU level	146	6.9
Solidarity actions at the country and outside EU level	180	8.5
Solidarity actions at all levels	513	24.2
Solidarity action(s) only at the supranational level (EU or outside EU)	136	6.4

Notes: Frequencies and percents are waged according to the country wage

Social capital and solidarity – in search for causal relations

Dependent variables

In the first of our models, we identify those respondents that did not participate in any form of solidarity actions (34.4%) and those, who have indicated their participation in any form of solidarity actions that has a reference to any level: country, EU or outside EU (65.4%). We call this model a "general solidarity model".

In the second model, from those who participate in solidarity actions, we identify those respondents who do participate in solidarity actions with a supranational goal/interest (70.1%). We use the same exploratory variables to explore the role of social capital on the solidarity activity that refer to problems/issues of people in other than respondents' country.

Independent variable

We divide our explanatory variables into three blocks: the first block of basic control variables, such as age, education, gender and income; the second block includes the first

dimension of social capital; and the third block includes the second dimension of social capital described above.

The second block, describing bonding social capital, included four variables. Firstly, *contacts with friends* – a quasi-continuous variable, based on the survey question: "During the past month, how often have you met socially with friends not living in your household?" The answers included four frequencies to choose from: less than once this month (1); once or twice this month (2); every week (3); almost every day(4). Secondly, *contacts with family* – a binary variable based on the survey question: "Please say if each of the following do or do not apply to you: I have seen a family member over the last six months (other than my parents or children)?" The answers included yes(1)/no(0) option only. Thirdly, *formalized family ties* – which was created on the base of marital status variable in the survey, from which we identified respondents who were married or in civil/legally registered union as being in a formalized relationship d(1). An finally, *receiving help in community* – a quasi-continuous variable, based on the question: "In the past 12 months, how often did you get help such as getting a lift with someone, help in looking after children, having shopping done, having something repaired at your house etc.?" And the answers included 4 frequencies to choose from: less than once this month (1); once or twice this month (2); every week (3); almost every day (4).

The third block, describing bridging social capital, included five variables. Firstly, *generalized trust level* – a quasi-continuous variable which was based on the survey question: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" And the answers included 11-point scale were 0 indicated an attitude: "You can't be too careful" and 10: "Most people can be trusted". Secondly, *interest in politics* – a binary variable which was created based on the survey question: How interested, if at all, would you say you are in politics? The answers included five options, from which we identified "very" and "quite" interested responses and coded them as "1", and other answers, including don't know option, we coded as "0". Thirdly, *keeping informed about public issues* – a binary variable, which was identified on the base of the answers "I don't inform myself" (1) to the question: "How do you keep yourself informed about current events?", Fourthly, *voting* – a binary variable which was based on the question: "Did you vote in the national election October 25, 2015?" The answers included yes(1)/no(0) option only. And finally - *local attachment* - a binary variable which was constructed on the base of the answers "very attached" to the question: "Please tell me how attached you fell to your city/town/village?"

Table 21 presents basic parameters of the distributions of explanatory variables in the sample of Polish respondents.

TABLE 21: Explanatory variables –frequencies, means and standard deviations

Ordinary (binary) variables	Percent of values =1	
Formalized family ties	59	
Contacts with family	77.7	
Interest in politics	72.8	
Not keeping informed about public issues	1.9	
Voting	75.2	
Local attachment	62.3	
Continuous variables:	Mean	Standard deviation
Contacts with friends	2.33	(0.87)
Receiving help in community	1.51	(0.83)
Generalized trust level	3.76	(2.72)

Notes: Means for binary variables indicate the percentage of respondents with variable value equal to 1

Results

Tables 22 and 23 present the results of the logistic regression. As shown, the impact of bonding social capital – based on close connection within family and friends – has a diverse impact on solidarity. The frequency of contacts with friends positively impacts the chances to be involved in solidarity action in general (at any level, see Table 22) but it has no significant influence on transnational solidarity. On the contrary, the experience of receiving help in the community does not significantly impact "general solidarity" but positively impacts the likelihood of transnational solidaistic action. In both models, formalized family ties (being married or in formal partnership) do not have a significant impact on solidarity. However, actual contact with (extended) family members do have a significant negative effect but only for the first model, i.e. contacts with (extended) family negatively impact the propensity to undertake solidaristic behaviors in general (see Table 22).

Regarding the indicators of bridging social capital, we see that the generalized trust levels proved to have a positive, and statistically significant impact on both general solidarity and the propensity to undertake solidaristic behaviors with a supranational scope. Interest in politics as well as voting activity (standard political participation behavior) negatively impacts the propensity to undertake solidaristic behavior. People who declare they are quite or very interested in politics have, on average, nearly 40 percent lower propensity to declare being involved in any form of solidaristic behavior (see Table 22). People who declared that they participated in the last parliamentary elections in Poland (in 2015), were 37.4 percent less likely to be involved in such activity. Local attachment proved to positively impact the propensity of "solidaristic people" to participate in transnational solidarity actions (see Table 23). People who declared they were very attached to their city/municipality were over 30 percent more likely to participate in such actions than other "solidaristic people".

Both models also point at the insigntificant role of gender in solidarity behaviors. Men are as likely as women to undertake solidarity actions, and among these participate in actions with a supranational scope. The impact of age is week, and education matters only for general solidarity. The higher the educational level, the higher the propensity to undertake solidaristic actions. Surprisingly, income showed significant and negative impact on propensity for a solidaristic behavior of a supranational scope.

TABLE 22: Logistic regression results for the model of general solidarity

	General solidarity		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Continuous variables:		Coef.:	
Age	0.01*	0.01***	0.00
Education	0.12***	0.11***	0.09***
Income	0.02	0.02	-0.12
Contacts with friends (bonding)		1.24***	1.23***
Receiving help in community (bonding)		0.02	0.02
Generalized trust level (bridging)			0.05**
		dds ratios:	
Ordinary variables:			
Gender (ref. male)	0.94	0.94	0.89
Formalized family ties (bonding)		1.08	1.08
Contacts with family (bonding)		0.74**	0.78**
Interest in politics (bridging)			0.60***
Keeping informed about public issues (bridging)			1.66
Voting (bridging)			0.63***
Local attachment (bridging)			1.04
Constant	-0.20	-0.77**	-0.69
N	1818	1818	1818

*Notes: The level of significance are described by number stars: *** p≤0.01 ** p≤0.05 * p≤0.1*

TABLE 23: Logistic regression results for the model of supranational solidarity

	Supranational solidarity		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Continuous variables:		oef.:	
Age	0.007	0.007*	0.008*
Education	0.012	0.016	0.012
Income	-0.068***	-0.074***	-0.074***
Contacts with friends (bonding)		-0.018	-0.030
Receiving help in community (bonding)		0.233***	0.198**
Generalized trust level (bridging)			0.063***
Ordinary variables:		dds ratios:	
Gender (ref. male)	1.128	0.938	0.885
Formalized family ties (bonding)		1.081	0.852
Contacts with family (bonding)		1.033	0.997
Interest in politics (bridging)			1.008
Keeping informed about public issues (bridging)			0.825
Voting (bridging)			1.073
Local attachment (bridging)			1.316**
Constant	0.893***	0.620	0.537
N	1238	1238	1238

*Notes: The level of significance are described by number stars: *** p≤0.01 ** p≤0.05 * p≤0.1*

Conclusion

Our findings show that generalized solidarity and transnational solidarity in Poland results from different types of social capital. Our first model has provided evidence to show that the sage and education level of the respondent positively influences the tendency to show solidarity with any group of people. Insight into the influence of bonding social capital gave mixed results. We have confirmed the hypothesis that relatively strong family ties hinder generate solidaristic actions undertaken by Poles (Putnam 2000, Portes 1988, Banfield 1967). However, contrary to our assumptions, frequent meeting with friends has a significant positive influence on the propensity to solidaristic behavior. We interpret this result as the diverse role of various types of social network. Namely, family networks seem to be closer to the concept of "bonding" social capital, whereas ties to friends and acquaintances may be relatively more diversified. It seems that frequent contacts with friends provide beneficiaries with information on needs and possibilities, as well as create opportunities to become engaged in solidaristic actions. Simultenously, this finding is consistent with the aforementioned argumentation that close ties in Poland do contribute to civic action, and in particular solidaristic activities (Jacobsson and Korolczuk 2017). Two indicators of bridging social capital seem beneficial for generalized solidaristic action, that

is, above all, t rusting the unknown other and the respondent's interest in politics. We perceive the meaning of these features to be in accordance with the scholarship of Putnam and his followers (Putnam 2994). Civic virtues do contribute to engagement in helping the others. A somewhat surprising result is shown when considering the negative impact of voting on being solidaristic which sidelines social capital explanations. We suppose that a trade-off occurs between political efficacy and the relatively high legitimization of the political system in Poland which leads to voting behavior on the one hand, and low legitimization as well as searching for alternative forms of political participation on the other hand which might take a form of solidaristic action (Mider 2014).

Our models show that transnational solidarity behaviors in Poland are embedded in a different combination of social capital features compared to general solidaristic behavious. All but one indicator of bonding social capital turned out to be insignificant in influencing solidarity behaviors for people abroad. Moreover, contrary to our hypothesis, receiving help in the local community enhances the propensity of being solidarsitic with non-compatriots. Two bridging social capital indicators – generalized trust and attachment to locality – as assumed, positively contribute to solidarity actions for beneficiaries in the countries.

Although receiving help, trusting others and having a strong attachment to local community cross cut the distinction between bonding and bridging social capital; we izee these as a relatively coherent-specific form of social capital, which can be labelled as "engagement in local non-political networks". It should be noticed that being relatively not wealthy contributes to transnational solidaristic behaviors in Poland in a similar manner.

We have observed the relevance of the aforementioned form of social capital in our study on social activism in Poland (Theiss, 2016). The investigation of alternative action organizations in Poland has shown a strong potential of apolitical social activism, based on very diverse local networks, high levels of trust and anticapitalistic attitudes. We interpret the outcomes in our model on supranational solidarity behaviors as an argument for the relevance of such alternative and apolitical social networks and attitudes.

Our study contributes primarily to understanding the specific conditions for the emergence of transnational solidaristic action in Poland. Whereas the generalized solidarity action in Poland (in which acts for compatriots make only a 20 percent share) follow more or less a Putnamian pattern, which means they result i.e. from high level of trust (Putnam 1994), it is clearly not the case with transnational solidarity. It seems transnational solidarity action in Poland emerges from open and non-exclusive local networks of mutual help and is more a "social" than "political" phenomenon. It is, unlike in Putnam's model (Putnam 1994), oriented towards the public sphere, cooperation with local government and the creation of a cohesive polity. However, it aims to acknowledge the needs of various people and act for them, as well as with them, with no political goals involved. Secondly, our findings show that the classical (although criticized as somewhat

superficial) distinction between bridging and bonding social capital may be losing its relevance, at least in regard to such phenomena as solidarity. Thirdly, we perceive our findings as optimistic in the Polish context. The widespread criticism of low civicness in Poland (Diagnoza Społeczna 2015, Giza et al 2000) and suggestions of over abundant bonding social capital may be seen as underestimating the role of certain social resources. These social assets – strong local networks and social norms of informal help – are beneficial for the development of transnational solidarity in Poland.

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TABLE 24: Recoding of the variables from the survey in the models

Variables in the models:	Recoding from original variables:
Continuous variables:	
Age	*age* - no recoding needed
Education	*education*- no recoding needed
Income	*income* - no recoding needed (999=missing values)
Contacts with friends	*metfriends* - no recoding needed
Receiving help in community	*help* - no recoding needed
Generalized trust level	*socialtrust* - 999=5; else was coppied
Ordinary variables:	
Gender (ref. male)	*gender* - no recoding needed
Formalized family ties	*mamarsts* – 3 and 6 recoded as 1; else = 0
Contacts with family	deprivepices_8 - no recoding needed
Interest in politics	*polint*- 3 and 4 recoded to 1; else=0
Keeping informed about public issues	*news_12*- no recoding needed
Voting	*votenat*_PL – 3 recorded as 1; else=0
Local attachment	*attachcountry_city* - 4 recoded as 1; else 0

*Notes: The level of significance are described by number stars: *** p≤0.01 ** p≤0.05 * p≤0.1*

Civic and Political Solidarity Practices in Switzerland

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Introduction

The study of civic and political engagement has often been addressed in the social sciences within altruistic perspectives encompassing prosocial behaviour beyond the narrowed approach of self-interest individualism (Passy and Giugni 2001). Altruism refers to actions and attitudes on social issues revolving around others person well-being aligned to solidarity beyond group membership. It is a freely chosen behaviour that is of benefit to others, a group or a cause. It is typically proactive, requiring resources - time, effort or money - from individuals (Brady et al. 1995; Butcher 2010). Nowadays, this kind of behaviour accounts for a fair share of goods and services provided in modern societies. Solidarity practices, as productive activity, stress the willingness of individuals to help others in need, to contribute to a common good and to be fair and considerate (Fetchenhauer et al. 2006: 3). Societies rely heavily on this kind of solidarity, but how can we account for differences in solidary practices? Which are the factors (e.g. socio-economic characteristics, attitudes, networks and resources) that promote and trigger solidary practices? The analysis of the relations between the factors and the forms of civic and political solidarity allow us to examine the impact of solidarity as a more inclusive form of doing politics by standing by and/or with the most vulnerable.

For instance, when referring to individual acts of solidarity in Switzerland, various researchers have focused on volunteering as a solidarity based behaviour. Individuals enact in solidarity toward each other, as a form of prosocial behaviour based on norms of reciprocity and altruism. Building upon the analysis of the individual factors counting for this kind of behaviour, researchers have examined education level, gender, age, race, income, free time and citizenship as 'human capital' determinants to volunteering (Wilson 2012; Wilson and Musick 1997). In addition, social and cultural capital have been also considered as explanatory resources for voluntarism: embeddedness in social networks, trust and social identification (Stadelmann-Steffen et al. 2015; Van Deth 2007; Wilson 2001; Putnam, 2000). Recent researches about the interaction between micro and macro factors have referred to cross-country variations, or in the case of Switzerland to the expected variance between volunteering cultures and interactions between cantons' welfare regimes effects - crowding-in and crowding-out (Manatschal et al. 2014; Stadelmann-Steffen et al. 2015).

Particularly interesting for our present purpose are the sociological and psychological perspectives on prosocial behaviour. These studies have centred the attention on the individual interpersonal orientation, traits and emotions explaining why and when individuals act pro-socially. As well as, which social mechanisms, as norms, induce toward reciprocal and altruistic behaviour (Fetchenhauer et al. 2006; Simpson and Willer 2015).

As part of our analysis of solidary practices, human and social capital factors are coupled with motivations. Motivations stress the distinction between altruistic and egoistic behaviour. The study of the orientation (self-regarding or other-regarding) of the civic and political engagement might shed some light on the process enhancing solidary practices.

This chapter analyses civic and political engagement as forms of solidarity motivated primarily by other-regarding orientations. It conceptually links solidary practices to civic and political forms of participation, within formal or informal organisational structures. It aims at analysing civic and political engagement in Switzerland by exploring the factors that enhance solidary practices. More precisely, we first identify the forms of solidarity and examine the socio-demographic characteristics, social capital and motives of the people engaged. Secondly, we examine the impact of target-oriented civic and political engagement when addressing migrants, unemployed, and disabled people. We seek to unveil how generalised are these forms of solidaristic behaviour within these three vulnerable groups comparison. That is, which factors tend to promote or inhibit cross-groups solidarity at the individual level? Finally, we investigate regional variations in solidary practices by comparing the major linguistic regions of the country, namely the German-speaking, French-speaking and Italian-speaking regions. We therefore also look at the cultural impact of belonging to a language community on solidary practices.

Hypotheses

The conceptual link between solidarity and civic and political engagement have been mainly deployed through the lenses of political activism or acts of compassion. Still these analyses depict solidaristic behaviour as a connection with others, enhanced by membership to a group that presupposes some specific duties (Rochon 1998; Wilson 2012). The presupposition of belonging is expected to impact the relationship between the actor and the recipient. The degree of social proximity and attachment affect as well individual motivations and consequently the form of the engagement. In addition, to these factors of solidaristic in-bond behaviour, social tolerance plays as well fundamental role. Tolerance (social and political) is not limited to the acceptance of diversity but also to the acceptance on equal terms of certain unpopular and target-groups (Leite Viegas 2007). Thus social tolerance as covariate to explain civic and political engagement gears-up individuals distance to social groups, which is then to be peered to social identification as attachment.

A step further from the perspective of solidarity as sole membership/connection (social identification), suggest that acts of compassion encompass an altruistic component as well, a general concern toward the other. The experimental design of the dictator game implemented by Fowler et al. (2007), showed that social identification and altruism both trigger political participation, however social identification enhances particularised solidarity behaviour. That being said the norms of reciprocity are stronger within groups solidarity. However, generosity and unilateral giving behaviours have been proved as well

in experimental research to cascade individual contributions to public goods (Simpson et al. 2015). With regard to civic and political engagement, these two perspectives dive into social distance to better understand in-bond and out-bond group solidarity. In line with theses we assume that solidarity is related to both particularised within group and altruistic behaviour. Thus:

Hypothesis 1a: Individuals reporting high levels of social group identification are likely to engage in activities targeting the within group well-being (within group boundaries).

Hypothesis 1b: Individuals reporting high levels of social tolerance are likely to engage on unilateral giving activities (between group boundaries).

Digging into the question of civic and political practices, we argue that solidarity as "acts carried out in order to support others, or at the very least to describe a disposition to help and assist" (Bayertz 1996: 308), is mainly related to civic engagement. And it stands beyond the old communitarian approach of civic loyalties, linking solidarity to altruism. While solidarity as political practices refers to "a moral relation formed when individuals or groups unite around some mutually recognized political need or goal in order to bring about social change" (Scholz 2015: 732). Consequently the grounded commitment to enhance social change is key to differentiate solidarity forms, which primarily tend to provide help, services and relief to others, and critical political voicing - advocacy, products boycotting and activism. Aside from the pure behaviourist approach of defining solidary practices as merely helping acts without dispositional component. We argue that social dispositions are key to understand pro-social behaviour. Prior research shows that cosmopolitan and altruism are associated to re-distributional attitudes and political participation (Bechtel et al. 2014). Cosmopolitanism and altruism, as covariates to civic and political engagement, are means to other forms of belongings, at the margins of the groups, communities, nation-states boundaries. Relevant to our analysis is to understand how solidarity is conditional to the immediate community (social and spatial proximity) and to target-oriented groups (Klaus 1998). Thus:

Hypothesis 2a: Individuals reporting high levels of cosmopolitanism and universalism (attachment to humanity) are likely to engage in activities foreseeing the well-being of undistinguished vulnerable groups.

Hypothesis 2b: In contrast, strong communitarian attachment as well as individuals reporting strong importance to cultural proximity will sole decreases target-oriented solidarity toward migrants and refugees.

To complement the analysis of social dispositions, we build upon the behavioural psychological perspective on prosocial behaviour, arguing that the motivational and functional assessment of the action are key to understand how diverse motives converge in the same type of behaviours. In this sense, the Volunteer Functions Inventory (VFI) developed by Clary and Snyder (1999) showed that individual behaviour embodies various types of motivations and that the distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding

orientations, is associated to the physiological function of the action. As a result when assessing the motivational orientation of the civic and political engagement of aids activists and civic volunteering, Omoto et al. (2010) showed that other regarding orientations are a strong covariate to civic and political engagement. However, self-regarding orientations are still important to understand prosocial behaviour. While the covariations between community and universalistic orientations are first associated to civic forms of engagement and second to political form of engagement. We therefore analyse the motivational function of solidaristic practices based on the orientations as other-regarding, self-regarding and community-regarding. We aim to explain the variance between political and civic engagement as dependent mainly to other-regarding orientations. Thus:

Hypothesis 3a: Individual civic and political engagement is partly associated to self-regarding orientations and strongly related associated to other-regarding concerns.

Hypothesis 3b: Difference on target-oriented solidarity actions are likely to be associated to community-regard orientations.

Also as part of our analysis of solidary practices, human and social capital factors are analysed with motivational orientations. Scholars have tended to confirm the importance of socio-demographic factors and social traits (e.g., age, gender, education, religion, social class) as covariates to assess the conditions for civic and political engagement. Previous research on political participation has identified factors as gender and education as important socio-economic predictors of political attitudes and action (Dalton 2008). In addition to these, through the lenses of altruism, we will control for the cultural allocation of women's role as more emphatic and mainly deploying civic solidaristic type of engagement (Gallagher 1994; Wilson 1997).

Since Almond and Verba (1963), survey evidence has generally confirmed that education is linked to civic and political engagement. Likewise, we control for the covariations related to the impact of people's social embeddedness and religiosity on solidaristic practices. In this sense, social capital approaches are also of crucial importance, as it has been understood to enhance social trust (Putman 2000; Van Deth et al. 2007). A large part of the literature has measured social capital through the proxy of trust closely related to social cohesion and solidarity, to the establishment of bonds and norms for cooperative endeavours, as shown in studies of the impact of the social capital of migrants on their political participation (Eggert and Giugni 2010; Morales and Giugni 2011; Smith 1999). In this perspective, solidary practices are mainly seen as norms of reciprocity which link citizens together (Stolle 1998).

Data and Methods

Our analysis draws upon a comprehensive 8-country dataset, collected within the EU project "European paths to transnational solidarity at times of crisis: Conditions, forms, role models and policy responses" (TransSOL) which aims to provide exhaustive analysis upon the individual forms and conditioning factors enhancing transnational solidarity in Europe. The dataset sample contains 2221 observations for Switzerland, with its corresponding weights. It matches as well national quotas on age, gender, region and education. Our current analysis mainly uses categorical and discrete interval variables. The appendix to this report contains all the variables recordings, used in our models. The statistical procedure applied, first gives a descriptive overview of the dependant variables - civic and political solidary practices. Secondly, we propose an exploratory logistic model to assess the effects of the covariates on solidary practices by target group.

Descriptive analysis

Within a first step, we analyse solidary behaviour revolving around the given support to vulnerable groups in general, referring only to the national territory. We then analyse these civic and political solidary practices, when referring to other spatial realities, mainly referring to the European countries and non-EU countries. As shown in table 1, the proportion of individuals engaging in civic practices of solidarity is larger than the proportions of individuals engaging in political practices of solidarity (~1/2 against ~1/3). In general, the socio-demographic and geographic factors of the individuals supporting the rights of vulnerable people and groups in Switzerland, describe the Swiss-French region and women as more prone to engage in solidary behaviour. Table 1, also shows how the proportions of individuals engaging decreases when referring to groups and people in EU and non-EU countries. More precisely, the share of civic engagement toward vulnerable groups in non-EU countries is 36 percent while the share of civic engagement to support vulnerable groups in EU countries is 25.7 percent. Similarly, the share of political engagement to support vulnerable groups in EU countries is 19.5 percent while the share of political engagement to support vulnerable groups in non-EU countries is 24.9 percent, almost equal to the share of civic engagement toward vulnerable groups in EU countries. Likewise other interesting facts described in table 1 are the regional differences. The Swiss-Italian region shows the lowest percentage share of support toward vulnerable groups within EU-countries, civic and political practices decrease to 14.9 and 13.2 percent in this region.

TABLE 1: Solidary practices by geographical regions and gender in Switzerland (in %)

Political engagement	Support others groups		Support other groups in EU		Support other groups outside EU		
	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Total
Swiss regions							
Swiss-German	70.1	29.9	80.2	19.8	74.1	25.9	62.9
Swiss-French	65.5	34.5	80.0	20.0	76.9	23.1	32.0
Swiss-Italian	69.3	30.7	86.8	13.2	76.3	23.7	5.1
Total	68.6	31.4	80.5	19.5	75.1	24.9	100
Gender							
Man	70.1	29.9	82.3	17.7	77.6	22.4	53.1
Woman	67.0	33.0	78.5	21.5	72.4	27.6	46.9
Total	68.6	31.4	80.5	19.5	75.1	24.9	100
N		*697*		*433*		*552*	*2221*

Civic engagement	Support others groups		Support other groups in EU		Support other groups outside EU		
	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Total
Swiss regions							
Swiss-German	52.1	47.9	74.6	25.4	63.0	37.0	62.9
Swiss-French	45.6	54.4	72.2	27.8	65.3	34.7	32
Swiss-Italian	59.6	40.4	85.1	14.9	68.4	31.6	5.1
Total	50.4	49.6	74.3	25.7	64.0	36.0	100
Gender							
Man	49.4	50.6	74.5	25.5	64.9	35.1	53.1
Woman	51.5	48.5	74.2	25.8	63.1	36.9	46.9
Total	50.4	49.6	74.3	25.7	64.0	36.0	100
N		*1102*		*570*		*799*	*2221*

The overview of the general solidaristic behaviour showed important differences when referring to spatial realities, however we are interested in testing target driven solidarities. What Klaus (1999) defined as project-related solidarities, which go beyond the communitarian duties. In this sense we seek to unveil, solidarity practices related to specific groups that can embodied as well spatial referencing, as when targeting migrants. Table 2 (see below), shows that two thirds of the individuals have engaged to support disable people's rights while only a third of the individuals have engaged to support migrant or unemployed people's rights. The disability field is the most 'crowded' field in terms of solidarity engagement. It has the largest share of social capital (as membership to organisation) doubling the other fields. Also within the disability field we observe that the most frequent form of engagement is associated to donate money (41%). Conversely, this field seem to be the less contentious; protest oriented practices are the lowest for

disability. Still the proportion of political forms of solidarity (1/4) is the highest of all the three fields and it is mainly driven by political consumerism actions. With regards to solidary behaviours donating money and political consumerism seem to be the most relevant practices. Although, the corresponding share of money donating practices is highest in two of the three fields (migration and disability). These results are in line with previous analysis on volunteering and associational involvement. Pay-check involvement seems to be very strong in Switzerland where people tend to donate money to more than two associations in average (Morales et al. 2007).

TABLE 2: Proportions of solidary practices toward vulnerable groups in Switzerland (in %)

Activities: Support migrants and refugees' rights		Activities: Support disability rights		Activities: Support unemployed people rights	
Attended a march, protest or demonstration	4.1	Attended a march, protest or demonstration	3.5	Attended a march, protest or demonstration	3.7
Donate money	17.5	Donate money	41.6	Donate money	11.4
Donate time	11.3	Donate time	24.9	Donate time	11.6
Bought or refused to buy products in support to the goals	11.2	Bought or refused to buy products in support to the goals	23.2	Bought or refused to buy products in support to the goals	13.7
Engaged as passive member of an organisation	3.7	Engaged as passive member of an organisation	11.5	Engaged as passive member of an organisation	4.5
Engaged as active member of an organisation	4.9	Engaged as active member of an organisation	7,0	Engaged as active member of an organisation	4.5
None of the above	66.9	None of the above	33.2	None of the above	67.5
Civic practices	27.3	Civic practices	59.3	Civic practices	24.2
Political practices	13.6	Political practices	25.3	Political practices	16.0
N	*2221*	*N*	*2221*	*N*	*2221*

With regards to distribution of these practices as civic and political, we notice that for the three fields, civic engagement tends to double the percentage share of individuals engaging in political forms. More precisely, when ranking civic practices: support toward disable people counts with 59.3 percent, support to migrant and refugees counts with 27.3 percent and support to unemployed people count with 24.2 percent. Correspondingly, the ranking of the political practices by field, also situates disability ahead of the other two fields (25.3%), but the positioning of the other two field has been reverse. Political support to unemployed people counts with 16.0 percentage while political support to migrants counts with 13.6 percentage.

As shown in previous tables, solidarity behaviour embodies important regional and gender differences, we will now describe the target-oriented solidarity through the lenses of the geographical and socio-demographic factors. Table 3 (see below) shows that women tend to engage more in civic and political forms of solidaristic behaviour toward migrants (28.3% and 15.3%), while they participate less in civic and political forms of engagement to support unemployed people rights (19.6 % and 14.7%). For the field of

disability differences in participation between women and men seem to be less relevant. With respect to regional variations, Swiss-Italian are the less prone to engage in solidarity practices to support migrants and refugees rights. The regional civic behaviours variations in this field result in more than 10-percentage point difference (Swiss-German 29.4%; Swiss-French 24.6%; Swiss-Italian 18.4%). Vice versa, the Swiss-Italian region has the largest share of individuals supporting unemployed people –civic and politically. The Swiss-French region has the highest share of individuals engaged in political practices to support migrants (15.6%), while the Swiss- German region has the highest share of individuals engaged to support migrant through civic practices (29.4%). Finally, with respect to the regional variations in the field of disability, as for the gender factor, solidaristic behaviours in this field are not conditioned to the geographical factors.

TABLE 3: Solidary practices toward vulnerable groups by geographical regions by gender in Switzerland (in %)

Political engagement	Support refugees and migrants		Support people with disability		Support unemployed people		
	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Total
Swiss regions							
Swiss-German	87.4	12.6	75.0	25.0	84.3	15.7	62.9
Swiss-French	84.5	15.5	74.1	25.9	83.7	16.3	32.0
Swiss-Italian	86.8	13.2	75.4	24.6	81.6	18.4	5.1
Total	86.4	13.6	74.7	25.3	84.0	16.0	100
Gender							
Man	88.0	12.0	75.2	24.8	82.8	17.2	53.1
Woman	84.7	15.3	74.2	25.8	85.3	14.7	46.9
Total	86.4	13.6	74.7	25.3	84.0	16.0	100
N		*301*		*561*		*356*	*2221*

Civic engagement	Support refugees and migrants		Support people with disability		Support unemployed people		
	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Total
Swiss regions							
Swiss-German	70.6	29.4	41.8	58.2	76.5	23.5	62.9
Swiss-French	75.4	24.6	37.7	62.3	74.8	25.2	32.0
Swiss-Italian	81.6	18.4	47.4	52.6	72.8	27.2	5.1
Total	72.7	27.3	40.7	59.3	75.8	24.2	100
Gender							
Man	73.5	26.5	39.9	60.1	71.7	28.3	53.1
Woman	71.7	28.3	41.7	58.3	80.4	19.6	46.9
Total	72.7	27.3	40.7	59.3	75.8	24.2	100
N		*607*		*1316*		*538*	*2221*

Exploratory logistic analysis

In a second step, we propose an exploratory logistic model to assess the effects of human, social, motivational and contextual covariates on civic and political forms of solidarity by target group. We regress six binary dependant variables, one for each kind of solidaristic form per target group. Custom to all models are: a block of socio-demographic covariates which include (age, education, gender, income and living with children), a block of social and political covariates (discuss politics and meet with friends), a block of motivational orientations covariates (self-regard, other-regard and community regard motivations), a block of attitudinal and social dispositions covariates (social distance, social trust, fairness, attachment to country and to humanity, religiosity, multicultural appraisal, xenophobic attitudes and intolerance to migrants and refugees' groups) and lastly we also included a block of contextual covariates for the three main linguistic regions of the country. In general terms, the three civic dependant variables refer to 1 when in engaging in at least one form of civic action within each target group. Equally the three political dependant variables refer to 1 when engaging in at least one form of political action within each target group. For interpretative purposes, the six logistic models are presented as odd ratios instead of log odds, which express the odds variation of the dependant variable for each unit of change in the covariates. With respect to the overall explain variance of our models all have limited explanatory power. The civic models of solidarity have the highest explanatory power, more specifically the model explaining the civic support to migrants and refugees counts for 15% of the overall variance, while the other two are limited to 9% (see pseudo-R2 in tables 4-5 below). Similarly, the political model concerning migrants and refugees support counts for 11% of the overall variance, when the political unemployment support model counts for almost the 9% and the political support model toward disable people explains less than 5% of the overall variance.

The models concerning the civic practices of solidarity per target group show that the socio-demographic covariates have mainly a positive effect on the dependant variables but the odds are scarcely relevant (see table 4). However, gender (reference category: woman) has a significant and negative effect on civic support practices toward unemployed people. As well individuals with high income tend to engage 1.5 times more than low income individuals when supporting migrant and refugees groups. The social and political covariates are positive and statistically significant when explaining civic support toward unemployed and disable people, still their odds coefficients are less revealing. With respect to the motivational covariates as presupposed in our hypothesis 3a; self-regarding and other-regarding motivations are relevant to explain civic forms of engagement through all the groups, nevertheless the other regarding motivations have a stronger explanatory power and positive statistical significance. Also as assumed in hypothesis 3b, community regarding motivation are positive and statistical significant when explaining civic support toward unemployed and disable people but against our expectations these are still somehow relevant to explain civic support toward migrants. Within the block of attitudinal and social dispositions covariates we have two types of significant effects, negative effects concerning strong communitarian attachment and

xenophobic attitudes toward other cultures; and positive effects related to cosmopolitanism and religiosity. More in detail, in line with our hypothesis 2b communitarian attachment and xenophobic attitudes, negative impact solidaristic behaviour to support migrant and refugees. Nevertheless, country attachment is also negative associated to civic support for unemployed people. Likewise as partly presupposed in hypothesis 2a cosmopolitanism (as multicultural appraisal and attachment to humanity) are positive associated to civic forms of solidarity. Still these are only relevant to explain solidaristic behaviour toward migrants and disable people which excludes foreseeing the well-being of vulnerable groups as undistinguishable. Also religiosity, as expected and tested in other researches, is positively related to civic practices. However, we cannot confirm hypothesis 1a and 1b, as social distance has not a significant impact when explaining civic forms of solidarity. Finally, with regards to the contextual covariates, these are significant and negative associated to civic support toward migrant. In average people in Swiss-French regions tend to engage 0.6 times less than in Swiss-German region when supporting migrants, within the same field people in the Swiss-Italian region tend to engage 0.45 times less than in the Swiss-German region.

TABLE 4: Logistic regression models on civic engagement strength (odds ratios)

	Support to refugees and migrant		Support to people with disability		Support to unemployed people	
		SE		SE		SE
Age	0.95*	(0.02)	1.04*	(0.02)	1.03	(0.02)
Age2	1.00*	(0.00)	1.00	(0.00)	1.00	(0.00)
Gender	1.00	(0.11)	1.01	(0.10)	0.61***	(0.07)
Income (ref. low income groups)						
Middle income	1.13	(0.15)	1.14	(0.13)	1.14	(0.15)
High Income	1.51*	(0.26)	1.20	(0.19)	1.05	(0.19)
Education (ref. secondary school or lower)						
BA or equivalent.	0.96	(0.13)	1.04	(0.12)	0.95	(0.13)
MA or higher degree	1.05	(0.15)	1.10	(0.14)	1.22	(0.18)
Live with child	1.16	(0.16)	1.03	(0.13)	0.92	(0.13)
Discuss politics	1.04	(0.02)	1.04*	(0.02)	1.05*	(0.02)
Meet with friends	0.88	(0.10)	1.12	(0.11)	0.86	(0.10)
Self-regard motivation	1.37**	(0.16)	1.29*	(0.14)	1.64***	(0.19)
Other-regard motivation	2.16***	(0.27)	2.07***	(0.22)	2.20***	(0.28)
Community regard motivation	1.32*	(0.15)	1.46***	(0.16)	1.53***	(0.18)
Social distance	1.00	(0.02)	0.96*	(0.02)	0.96	(0.02)
Social trust	1.16	(0.13)	0.99	(0.10)	0.98	(0.11)
Fairness	0.88	(0.10)	1.01	(0.10)	1.24	(0.14)
Attachment to country	0.54***	(0.10)	1.12	(0.18)	0.62**	(0.11)
Attachment to humanity	1.96***	(0.30)	1.34*	(0.16)	1.21	(0.17)
Religiosity	1.10***	(0.02)	1.04**	(0.02)	1.03	(0.02)
Multicultural appraisal	1.34***	(0.09)	0.99	(0.05)	0.96	(0.06)
Xenophobic attitudes toward other cultures	1.00	(0.00)	1.00	(0.00)	1.00	(0.00)
Intolerance to migrants and refugees' groups	0.51***	(0.08)	1.10	(0.15)	1.06	(0.16)
Swiss Regions (ref. Swiss German)						
Swiss French	0.60***	(0.07)	1.06	(0.11)	0.99	(0.12)
Swiss Italian	0.45**	(0.12)	0.87	(0.18)	1.37	(0.32)
Constant	0.13***	(0.07)	0.10***	(0.05)	0.07***	(0.04)
Pseudo R2	0.153		0.089		0.090	
N	2221		2221		2221	

The models concerning the political practices of solidarity by target group show that as for the civic models the socio-demographic covariates have scarcely relevant effects (see table 5). However in these kinds of practices, gender (reference category: woman) has a significant and positive effect when supporting migrants and refugees, women engage 1.3 times more than men. In comparison to civic models, the high income covariate has a reverse effect, individuals with high income tend to engage less when politically supporting migrant and refugees groups. The political covariates are positive and statistically significant when explaining political support toward migrant, and social covariates are only relevant to explain political support toward disable people. With respect to the motivational covariates, hypothesis 3a is confirmed; self-regarding and other-regarding motivations are relevant to explain political forms of engagement through almost all the groups. Nevertheless, in this occasion the other-regarding motivations have a stronger explanatory power and statistical significance. Also as presupposed in hypothesis 3b, community regarding motivation are positive and

statistical significance when explaining political support toward unemployed and disable people but these are not relevant to explain political support toward migrants. Within the block of attitudinal and social dispositions covariates we continue to have two types of significant effects, negative effects concerning strong communitarian attachment; and positive effects related to social trust and religiosity. More in detail and also as presupposed in the hypothesis 2b communitarian attachment negative impacts solidaristic behaviour to support migrant and refugees. Nevertheless, country attachment is still negatively associated to political support for unemployed people. Conversely, as presupposed in hypothesis 2a cosmopolitanism (as multicultural appraisal and attachment to humanity) is not a relevant covariate to our target oriented political forms of solidarity. In the other hand, religiosity continues to have a shy and positive effect, while social trust has a positive and increasing effect when supporting politically unemployed people. Lastly, hypothesis 1a and 1b are still not confirmed, as social distance has not a significant impact when explaining political forms of solidarity. Finally, with regards to the contextual covariates, in contrast to the civic engagement models contextual covariates have no significant impact on the target oriented practices.

TABLE 5: Logistic regression models on political engagement strength (odds ratios)

	Support to refugees and migrant		Support to people with disability		Support to unemployed people	
		SE		SE		SE
Age	0.95*	(0.02)	1.01	(0.02)	1.09**	(0.03)
Age2	1.00*	(0.00)	1.00	(0.00)	1.00*	(0.00)
Gender	1.30*	(0.18)	1.14	(0.12)	0.87	(0.11)
Income (ref. low income groups)						
Middle income	0.79	(0.12)	0.98	(0.12)	0.88	(0.13)
High Income	0.56**	(0.12)	1.02	(0.17)	0.83	(0.17)
Education (ref. secondary school or lower)						
BA or equivalent.	0.88	(0.15)	1.20	(0.16)	1.25	(0.21)
MA or higher degree	0.98	(0.18)	1.16	(0.17)	1.26	(0.22)
Live with child	1.11	(0.20)	0.98	(0.13)	0.81	(0.13)
Discuss politics	1.12***	(0.03)	1.02	(0.02)	1.05	(0.03)
Meet with friends	1.01	(0.14)	1.29*	(0.14)	1.12	(0.14)
Self-regard motivation	1.56**	(0.22)	1.12	(0.13)	1.38*	(0.18)
Other-regard motivation	1.89***	(0.32)	1.70***	(0.21)	1.88***	(0.29)
Community regard motivation	1.22	(0.17)	1.36**	(0.15)	1.65***	(0.22)
Social distance	0.97	(0.03)	0.99	(0.02)	0.98	(0.02)
Social trust	1.22	(0.17)	1.21	(0.13)	1.32*	(0.17)
Fairness	1.04	(0.15)	1.17	(0.13)	1.05	(0.14)
Attachment to country	0.47***	(0.09)	1.16	(0.22)	0.66*	(0.13)
Attachment to humanity	0.94	(0.17)	1.02	(0.13)	0.98	(0.16)
Religiosity	1.04	(0.02)	1.01	(0.02)	1.04*	(0.02)
Multicultural appraisal	1.15	(0.09)	0.94	(0.05)	1.01	(0.07)
Xenophobic attitudes toward other cultures	1.00	(0.00)	1.00	(0.00)	1.00	(0.00)
Intolerance to migrants and refugees' groups	0.66*	(0.13)	1.15	(0.17)	0.95	(0.17)
Swiss Regions (ref. Swiss German)						
Swiss French	1.23	(0.18)	0.98	(0.11)	0.93	(0.13)
Swiss Italian	1.13	(0.35)	1.12	(0.26)	1.49	(0.40)
Constant	0.15**	(0.10)	0.07***	(0.04)	0.01***	(0.01)
Pseudo R2	0.111		0.468		0.087	
N	2221		2221		2221	

Concluding remarks

The study of civic and political solidary practices in Switzerland has allowed us to analysis solidaristic behaviour in a twofold process within and at the margins of group membership perspectives. Our analysis refers to the impact of social dispositions and motivations when understanding prosocial behaviour, beyond the narrow scope of self-interest. We have confirmed that socio-demographic as well as socio-political attitudes are relevant to explain the various form of prosocial behaviour but that social dispositions and motivations seem to be the key triggers of the solidarity practices. That being said, this chapter is just exploring these mechanisms further statically analysis and power tests would be needed to accurately confirm our hypothesis. More precisely, the marginal effects of the civic and political forms of solidarity (see below figure 1 and figure 2), highlight that the effects of the social dispositions and contextual covariates are relevant

to study target civic support toward migrants and refugees. Likewise, we corroborate that the motivational effects are relevant to these kind of practices independently of the reference group. With respect to these type of covariates the other-regarding orientations have the strongest marginal effect, even if the solidary practices embody various types of motivations.

FIGURE 1: Marginal effects on civic solidary practices by target group



Note: Marginal effects for each model in Table 2. The horizontal lines indicate .95 confidence intervals.

FIGURE 2: Marginal effects on political solidary practices by target group



Note: Marginal effects for each model in Table 3. The horizontal lines indicate .95 confidence intervals.

In addition and pertinent to our analysis was the differentiation between civic and political forms of solidaristic behaviour. In contrast to the civic models the marginal effects size of the political models are less revelling. However, they shed some light on the covariation between other-regarding and community-regarding orientations, when explaining target oriented support to groups which embodied spatial referencing (migrants). Within this perspective in further analyses we will seek to unveil how social identification and proximity might impact and trigger less political forms of solidarity.

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Appendix

Variable	Item(s)	recoding	distribution
Gender	1=woman; 0=man		53.08; 46.92
Age	How old are you?		M:44.8 years
Education	What is the highest level of education that you have completed? (ISCED-list)	Education, Highest completed level of education, 3-category: 1 "Education Group 1 (low educational achievement)" 2 "Education Group 2 (intermediate educational achievement)" 3 "Education Group 3 (high educational achievement)"	26.6%; 42.77; 30.44
Income	What is your household's MONTHLY net income, after tax and compulsory deductions, from all sources? (ten decils)	1 (low income), 2 (middle income), 3 (high income)	25.39; 58.98; 15.62
live_child	I currently live with… (Please choose all that apply.)? My or my partner's child/ren	1 = "child/children in the household" and 0= "no children in the household"	78.48; 21.52
Discuss politics	Discuss political matters with friends and/or family? (1-10)		M: 5.1
Meet with friends	[metfriends] During the past month, how often have you met socially with friends not living in your household? (1-4)		M: 2.61
Self-regard motivation	People do unpaid work or give help to all kinds of groups for all kinds of reasons. Thinking about all the groups, clubs or organisations you have helped over the last 12 months, did you start helping them for any of the reasons on this list? Chose up to 5 reasons that were most important to you.	0 "None"; 1 "for all the battery of career and individual enhancement motivations (It helps me get on in my career and/or I thought it would give me a chance to learn new skills)"	70.46; 29.64
Other-regard motivation	People do unpaid work or give help to all kinds of groups for all kinds of reasons. Thinking about all the groups, clubs or organisations you have helped over the last 12 months, did you start helping them for any of the reasons on this list? Chose up to 5 reasons that were most important to you.	0 "None"; 1 "for all the battery of values and other understanding motivations (I felt that it was a moral duty to help others in need and/or I wanted to improve things/help people)"	42.1; 57.9
Community regard motivation	People do unpaid work or give help to all kinds of groups for all kinds of reasons. Thinking about all the groups, clubs or organisations you have helped over the last 12 months, did you start helping them for any of the reasons on this list? Chose up to 5 reasons that were most important to you.	0 "None"; 1 "for all the battery of social and community motivations (It was connected with the needs of my family/friends and/or I felt there was a need in my community)"	59.66; 40.34
Social distance (tolerance toward)	Please say whether you would mind or not having each of the following as neighbours?(18-item additive scale)		M: 5.76
Social trust	Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? (0-10)		M: 4.65
Fairness	In order to be considered fair, what should a society provide? Please tell me for each statement how important or unimportant it is to you: (Income)Eliminating big inequalities in income between citizens (1-5)		M: 3.78

Attachment to country	Please tell me how attached you feel to your country? (1-4)	1-2:0; 3-4:1	9.41; 90.5
Attachment to humanity	Please tell me how attached you feel to the world/humanity? (1-4)	1-2:0; 3-4:2	22.65; 77.35
Religiosity	How religious would you say you are?(1-10)		M: 3.84
Multicultural appraisal	To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: It is a good thing to live in a multicultural society. (1-5)		M: 3.55
Xenophobic attitudes toward other cultures	Would you say that cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries? (0-10) .	0 : 'Undermined' ; 10 :'Enriched'	M: 6.78
Intolerance to migrants and refugees' groups	Please say whether you would mind or not having each of the following as neighbours? Refugees and asylum seekers and/or Immigrants/foreign workers	0 No; 1 Yes (if at least one of the two groups is chosen)	52.86; 47.14
Swiss Regions	Swiss German(all the rest); Swiss French(Vaud, Valais, Neuchatel, Geneva, Jura, Fribourg); Swiss Italian (Ticino)	1: Swiss-German; 2: Swiss French; 3:Swiss Italian	62.85; 32.01; 5.13
Political forms of solidarity toward migrants and refugees	Have you ever done any of the following in order to support migrant or refugees rights? (two options)	0 "None"; 1 "Attended a march, protest or demonstration" and/or "Bought or refused to buy products in support to the goals"	Table 2
Political forms of solidarity toward people with disability	Have you ever done any of the following in order to support disable people rights? (two options)	0 "None"; 1 "Attended a march, protest or demonstration and/or Bought or refused to buy products in support to the goals"	Table 2
Political forms of solidarity toward unemployed people	Have you ever done any of the following in order to support unemployed people rights? (two options)	0 "None"; 1 "Attended a march, protest or demonstration and/or Bought or refused to buy products in support to the goals"	Table 2
Political forms of solidarity toward vulnerable groups	Have you ever done one of the following in order to support the rights of people/groups in your own country? (two options)	0 "None"; 1 "Attended a march, protest or demonstration and/or Bought or refused to buy products in support to the goals"	Table 1
Political forms of solidarity toward vulnerable groups in EU countries	Have you ever done one of the following in order to support the rights of people/groups in other countries within the European Union? (two options)	0 "None"; 1 "Attended a march, protest or demonstration and/or Bought or refused to buy products in support to the goals"	Table 1
Political forms of solidarity toward vulnerable groups in non EU countries	Have you ever done one of the following in order to support the rights of people/groups in countries outside the European Union? (two options)	0 "None"; 1 "Attended a march, protest or demonstration and/or Bought or refused to buy products in support to the goals"	Table 1
Civic forms of solidarity toward migrant and refugees	Have you ever done any of the following in order to support migrant or refugees rights? (four options)	0 "None"; 1 "Donate money" and/or "Donate time" and/or "Engaged as passive member of an organisation" and/or "Engaged as active member of an organisation"	Table 2

Civic forms of solidarity toward people with disability	Have you ever done any of the following in order to support disable people rights? (four options)	0 "None"; 1 "Donate money" and/or "Donate time" and/or "Engaged as passive member of an organisation" and/or "Engaged as active member of an organisation"	Table 2
Civic forms of solidarity toward unemployed people	Have you ever done any of the following in order to support unemployed people rights? (four options)	0 "None"; 1 "Donate money" and/or "Donate time" and/or "Engaged as passive member of an organisation" and/or "Engaged as active member of an organisation"	Table 2
Civic forms of solidarity toward vulnerable groups	Have you ever done one of the following in order to support the rights of people/groups in your own country? (four options)	0 "None"; 1 "Donate money" and/or "Donate time" and/or "Engaged as passive member of an organisation" and/or "Engaged as active member of an organisation"	Table 1
Civic forms of solidarity toward vulnerable groups in EU countries	Have you ever done one of the following in order to support the rights of people/groups in other countries within the European Union? (four options)	0 "None"; 1 "Donate money" and/or "Donate time" and/or "Engaged as passive member of an organisation" and/or "Engaged as active member of an organisation"	Table 1
Civic forms of solidarity toward vulnerable groups in non EU countries	Have you ever done one of the following in order to support the rights of people/groups in countries outside the European Union? (four options)	0 "None"; 1 "Donate money" and/or "Donate time" and/or "Engaged as passive member of an organisation" and/or "Engaged as active member of an organisation"	Table 1

Pulling together or pulling apart? Solidarity in the post-crisis United Kingdom

Simone Baglioni, Olga Biosca, Tom Montgomery (Glasgow Caledonian University) Maria Grasso (University of Sheffield)

Introduction

The importance of solidarity can hardly be underestimated in a contemporary Britain which has weathered the financial crisis, witnessed the impact of austerity in public services and local economies and lived through a highly divisive European referendum which has not only polarized UK society and transformed the political landscape, it has reconfigured relations with European neighbours and reopened internal divisions regarding the constitutional future of the UK. In this context, we seek in this chapter to uncover the reality of solidarity in UK society using a novel dataset. Our aim will be to reveal the various dimensions of solidarity and how it is practiced. We will uncover which groups in society are the most solidaristic and which groups have solidarity most directed towards them.

It is beyond the scope of this chapter to comprehensively unpack the concept of solidarity in all of its complexity and a more comprehensive discussion of this concept is outlined at the outset of this volume. What we can say is that the concept of solidarity has been long established in social science and has been the subject of key works (Durkheim, 2014) including those focused on the UK context (Thompson, 2016). Rather than engage in a conceptual discussion, this chapter adopts a pragmatic approach involving the operationalization of solidarity through specific practices with vulnerable groups such as the unemployed, refugees and the disabled and across different geographic areas such as within the UK, outside of the UK but within the European Union and outside of the European Union. The types of activity which we observe as solidarity are discussed later in this chapter but they range from donating money or time, attending protests, buying or boycotting goods for a particular goal, as well as being a passive, or an active member of an organization in favour of specific groups or causes. This approach is not designed to reduce solidarity to purely these activities but instead is aimed at enabling an empirical analysis of solidarity in contemporary UK society. Moreover, one might argue that while professing solidarity is relatively simple, engaging in activities supporting solidarity suggests a real commitment to these ideals.

Our analysis of solidarity is guided by two research questions, followed by a hypothesis: (a) whether or not there is an uneven distribution of solidarity across the constituent nations of the United Kingdom, a context where devolution has empowered national assemblies and parliaments that have led, sometimes, to policy divergence on issues related to solidarity; (b) whether solidarity follows a path of differentiation according to perceptions of ‘deservingness’; (c) finally, we hypothesise that the distribution of

solidaristic practices and attitudes towards specific categories of people such as the disabled, migrants/asylum seekers, and the unemployed depends on the exposure of an individual to vulnerabilities similar to those experienced by those categories, to their degree of exposure to opportunities of socialization and information sharing (social networks), as well as to their interest in societal and political issues. Our conclusions will outline not only how our hypotheses hold up against our data but also discuss the implications of divergences of solidarity for the UK.

Geographical divergences of solidarity in the UK

Our analysis begins by looking at the distribution of solidarity practices across the UK by geographical location of the groups which are supported. In Table 1, we measure solidarity as any action undertaken in support of the rights of groups in respectively three different spatial dimensions: inside the UK; outside the UK, but inside the European Union; and outside the European Union.

TABLE 1: Solidarity practices in different geographical areas by constituent country in UK

Country	N	supported rights in own country (%)	supported rights in Europe (%)	supported rights outside Europe (%)
England	1761	38.0	18.7	25.1
Scotland	177	44.7	20.9	29.6
Wales	97	38.2	14.5	20.8
Northern Ireland	48	31.2	25.1	27.0
Total UK	2083	38.4	18.9	25.4

To understand why we hypothesise that solidarity can diverge across the constituent nations of the UK requires an appreciation of the historical context and the political cultures which have developed in devolved nations. Firstly, in terms of Scotland, we can see that there is a longstanding argument in the literature on the development of 'policy autonomy' (Midwinter et al, 1991) or indeed a distinctive political culture (Kellas, 1989). The debate regarding a distinctively Scottish political culture and its extent is ongoing and to some extent has been integrated into the seemingly unresolved question of the future of Scotland in the UK following the 'No' vote which took place in the 2014 Scottish independence referendum (Torrance, 2013; MacWhirter, 2014) and the rise of the SNP as the dominant force in Scottish politics (Johns and Mitchell, 2016). Another dimension to that debate is whether or not the Scottish socio-political context can be considered more egalitarian than its counterparts in England (Mooney and Poole, 2004).

Northern Ireland can also be seen to have a distinctive political context where the divisions between the nationalist and unionist communities continue to be a fault line through society. Nevertheless, following the common experience of 'the Troubles' which saw a great loss of life over a period of thirty years, the peace process (Mallie and

McKittrick, 1996) cemented by the Good Friday Agreement (Tonge, 2000; Bew, 2007) has developed alongside an emphasis on equality (McCrudden, 1998) between the previously conflicting communities and the centrality of consociationalism (McGarry and O'Leary, 2004) in overcoming divisions (Lijphart, 2012). Therefore, to some extent we can hypothesise that the proliferation of discourses, legislation and indeed the very governance of Northern Ireland (Tonge, 2002) may contribute towards the construction of a more fertile environment for solidarity to be practiced.

Our findings in Table 1 reveals supportive evidence for our hypothesis about a divergence pattern of solidarity among the UK constituent nations: our respondents from Scotland and Northern Ireland report stronger solidarity than people living in England or Wales. This is true not only for solidarity activities undertaken for UK-based beneficiaries, but also with respect to beneficiaries based elsewhere. Our findings therefore provide a unique contribution to the debate on divergence between the constituent nations of the UK by focusing on practices of solidarity and our results do suggest that there is a divergence between these contexts within the UK.

What our findings also reveal is the uneven distribution of solidarity practices in terms of where support is directed. As we hypothesised, solidarity practices and attitudes may be influenced by broader socio-political dynamics and discourses which make some groups appear more 'deserving' of help than others. Our results indicate that for the most part the practice of solidarity is aimed at protecting the rights of those within the UK and this holds across all four of the constituent nations. Further, more longitudinal research will reveal if this tendency towards looking inwards when practicing solidarity is a constant within British society or whether solidaristic efforts have been intensified towards UK beneficiaries following the financial crisis and the austerity measures which followed. What we can say at this point is that if there is a focus primarily on practicing solidarity within the UK then this may reflect a narrowing of the scope of solidarity during periods when there is a financial downturn and the retrenchment of public services. Indeed, we can see that in terms of transnational solidarity, practices are more geared towards supporting those who are outside of Europe rather than our European neighbours. We can hypothesise that the issue of prioritising deservingness may have a role to play here. In other words, those engaged in solidarity practices may consider that those outside of Europe are requiring the most assistance. We can further hypothesise that this may be driven by responses to emergencies such as the Syrian refugee crisis.

Divergences of solidarity towards different groups

Our findings revealing the variegated distribution of solidarity across the constituent nations of the UK are to some extent mirrored by similar variations in terms of who is targeted by solidarity practices. As can be seen by our results in Table 2, which sets out solidarity practices with vulnerable groups by constituent country, there is an uneven distribution of solidarity across the three vulnerable groups: the disabled, refugees and the unemployed. Extant research has sought to understand the extent to which

deservingness is conditional and how popular perceptions of deservingness can shape the rationing of welfare (van Oorschot, 2000). Moreover, research using survey data has also been conducted to uncover the variegated degrees of deservingness across different vulnerable groups (van Oorschot, 2006). Adopting a similar approach but focusing instead on the practice of solidarity in a context of austerity and crisis, our findings also reveal the uneven distribution of deservingness among our three vulnerable groups.

TABLE 2: Solidarity practices with vulnerable groups (refugees, unemployed, disabled) by constituent country in UK

Country	N	support refugees (%)	support unemployed (%)	support disabled (%)
England	1761	20.8	18.0	33.2
Scotland	177	28.6	27.5	44.9
Wales	97	18.5	16.5	33.9
Northern Ireland	48	30.9	18.7	48.0
Total UK	2083	22.7	18.8	34.6

Disabled

The group which attracts the greatest degree of solidarity, as revealed by Table 2, is the disabled. The disabled are the group with the greatest degree of solidaristic support across all four constituent nations of the UK, although again there is an uneven distribution with the highest levels of solidarity to be found in Northern Ireland and Scotland. There is little doubt that the disabled in the UK has been a group at the front line of welfare reform and given that welfare remains largely the domain of Westminster control, there has been few opportunities for devolved legislatures to strike a different path. Perhaps the most visible of the welfare reforms is the expansion of the Work Capability Assessment, where those disabled people in receipt of welfare state support were reassessed in significant numbers with the principal aim of Government to reduce welfare spending by moving as many disabled people back into work. Existing research has on the one hand revealed the extent of the reassessments with 750, 000 of these conducted in 2013 alone (Baumberg et al, 2015). On the other hand, it has critically addressed the underpinning theme of deservingness of these reforms which separated the disabled into groups of those needing the most support and not required to undertake any work or related activities (the 'support group') and groups where the disabled would be required to undertake work related activities (the 'work related activity group') to keep their benefits, albeit for a limited period of time (Garthwaite, 2014). Therefore, solidarity practices with the disabled are on, the one hand, perhaps unsurprising given the impact of austerity and welfare reform on this group, but on the other hand they could be somewhat unexpected given the strength of discourses of deservingness in the field of disability (Garthwaite, 2011). However, this does not fully explain why the disabled are targeted more than our two other vulnerable groups, refugees and the unemployed.

Our findings that solidarity is more targeted towards the disabled may indicate that in the UK disabled people are deemed the most deserving of our three vulnerable groups. Although undoubtedly welcome, the heavier distribution of solidarity towards the disabled deserves a more nuanced analysis. For example, we can hypothesise that this could be driven by a more paternalistic attitude towards the disabled. The perception of disabled people as being somehow helpless or indeed tragic figures who require support from others has been strongly opposed by disability campaigners who since the 1970s in the UK have sought to contrast those narratives of disabled people as victims. This is illustrated for example through those social movements and activists who adopt the 'social model of disability' which understands the challenges faced by disabled people as being constructed by a 'disabling society' and rejects deservingness but instead demands equal treatment as citizens (Oliver et al, 2012). Therefore, although our findings make for positive reading in terms of the solidarity targeted towards the disabled, our analysis requires a much more cautious approach and fine grained understanding of the perceptions of disabled people which may be driving this solidarity.

Refugees

Our findings outlined in Table 2 reveal that the group with the next highest share of solidarity practices are refugees and that these practices are again unevenly distributed across the constituent nations of the UK. What we see is that support for refugees is highest in Northern Ireland and Scotland with a visible gap between them and England and Wales. In broad terms, we can grasp from existing research that there has been, for a considerable time, a proliferation of negative policy discourses aimed at those seeking refuge and asylum in the UK and indeed migrants more generally (Sales, 2002; Statham and Geddes, 2006, Squire, 2008). What our findings confirm is that there is certainly a section of the population which stands in stark contrast to the 'racist public' thesis and the practice of solidarity has been captured by extant research (Squire, 2011). Nevertheless, there has been, across Governments of different political orientation, a drive towards policies which are far more focused on border control than solidarity when it comes to refugees arriving in the UK (Squire, 2016). Given that immigration and asylum policy is reserved to Westminster control and there are few avenues for devolved administrations to pursue alternative approaches it perhaps leaves only space for rhetorical divergence.

We can see this at work in Scotland where the Scottish Government has adopted a different approach towards refugees than that of Westminster, calling an emergency summit at the time of the Syrian refugee crisis, setting up a 'Refugee Taskforce'[33] and a website entitled 'Scotland Welcomes Refugees'[34] along with frequently more solidaristic discourses with refugees emanating from debates and committee meetings in the

[33] https://news.gov.scot/news/refugee-task-force-first-meeting
[34] https://news.gov.scot/news/scotland-welcomes-refugees

Scottish Parliament[35]. In Northern Ireland, where refugees are settling in a divided community, there have also been signs that policymakers there have been willing to adopt a more welcoming approach towards refugees and asylum seekers, perhaps best exemplified by the establishment by the Office for the First Minister and Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM) of a crisis fund for refugees in Northern Ireland[36]. In Wales too there have been efforts by the Assembly Government to work towards the integration of refugees and, similarly to Scotland, a Syrian Refugee Taskforce was created to be best prepared to respond to the needs of those arriving[37]. Moreover, in the Spring of 2017, the Equality, Local Government and Communities Committee of the Assembly made 19 recommendations to the Welsh Government with a view to making Wales the world's first 'nation of sanctuary'[38]. The question we are left to ask at this point is whether or not these rhetorically diverse approaches to the Westminster Government discourses on asylum explain the difference in support for refugees?

Unemployed

Our findings reveal that among our three groups, it is the unemployed in the UK who have the least amount of solidarity practices targeted towards them. Any analysis of why the unemployed are the least supported should be caveated by the fact that most support for the unemployed in the UK has traditionally been delivered by the welfare state through support with basic subsistence such as Jobseeker's Allowance (JSA) and with the cost of rent through Housing Benefit (HB). It is, however, worth noting that both of these benefits have been at the centre of a welfare reform agenda pursued in the aftermath of the financial crisis by the Conservative and Liberal Democrat Coalition Government elected in 2010 and articulated through their policy document *Welfare in the 21st Century* which highlighted concerns of a 'culture of worklessness' in the UK. Such policies reflect a process of transforming the poverty and unemployment caused by market failure into a story of personal failure (Wiggan, 2012), a consistently strong trope in austerity Britain which seems impervious to evidence (MacDonald et al, 2014) and offers some context as to why the unemployed are the group viewed as least deserving among the three vulnerable groups we have focused upon.

The power of policy discourses to shape attitudes towards the unemployed should not be underestimated and extant research has revealed the impact of negative discourses in legitimising the stigmatization of the unemployed in the UK as well as feeding a media narrative that has witnessed the emergence of 'poverty porn' (Jensen, 2014; Jensen and Tyler, 2015; MacDonald et al, 2014). Nevertheless, despite these discourses we should

[35]http://www.parliament.scot/S4_EuropeanandExternalRelationsCommittee/General%20Documents/2015_10_16_UKMinister_Refugee_crisis.pdf
[36] http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/assembly-business/official-report/reports-13-14/16-june-2014/#10
[37] http://gov.wales/docs/dsjlg/publications/150917-communique-syrian-refugee-summit-en.pdf
[38] http://www.assembly.wales/laid%20documents/cr-ld11012/cr-ld11012-e.pdf

not underestimate the solidarity practices that do exist to support the unemployed, in particular when looking at the scale of 'sanctions' (where benefit is stopped as a punishment for non-compliance with conditions set out by the Department of Work and Pensions) applied to benefit recipients in the UK (e.g. those in receipt of JSA), we can note that the crisis which unemployed people find themselves has been somewhat mitigated by the support offered by 'food banks'. The growth in the number of food banks in the UK is concurrent with the aftermath of the financial crisis and in particular the austerity measures pursued by the UK Government, particularly that of welfare reform (Trussel Trust, 2015). Although the explosion in the growth of foodbanks serve as a damning indictment of the degree of poverty in communities across the UK, they do act as a counter narrative of solidarity towards groups such as the unemployed, in contrast to the negative, stigmatising and stereotyping discourses which seek to demonise the unemployed. What our findings in Table 2 also reveal is that there is variation in solidarity practices towards the unemployed across the UK, with a much greater distribution of solidarity evident in Scotland than anywhere else in the UK. These findings in Scotland support our hypothesis of policy convergence across the constituent nations across the UK, and add weight to the argument that Scotland has a more social democratic outlook which in turn may lead to a greater degree of solidarity with those out of work, particularly given the common experience of de-industrialization in high centres of population such as the central belt. Nevertheless we should be cautious in our approach to understanding this greater tendency towards solidarity practices in Scotland as extant research suggests that there is a similar alignment between Scotland and England in social attitudes in terms of what are the causes of unemployment (Sinclair et al, 2009).

Type of solidarity

To understand the types of solidarity concerning our three vulnerable groups, we look to Table 3 which displays the form of solidarity activity and how it is distributed across each of our vulnerable groups. What our findings reveal, above everything else, is the low levels of solidarity practiced in the UK: only a few of our respondents declared having actively expressed solidarity towards one of our three categories of vulnerable people, and that once they have done so, their support has been limited to donating money or time or to the conscientious purchasing or boycotting of products. Indeed, when we focus on those practices that involve a more active form of participation or engagement, such as the membership of an organization or attending a march or protest, the figures are very low. We wonder whether or not the discourses of deservingness which have accompanied the austerity policies pursued in post-crisis Britain have acted to suppress solidarity towards vulnerable groups.

TABLE 3: Type of reported solidarity activities by vulnerable groups (in %)

	Refugees	Unemployed	Disabled
Attended a march, protest or demonstration	3.0	3.8	3.2
Donated money	12.4	8.5	21.5
Donated time	4.8	4.8	10.3
Bought or refused to buy products in support of goals	5.1	5.1	7.3
Engaged as passive member of an organisation	3.0	2.4	3.5
Engaged as active member of an organisation	2.5	2.6	5.1

Notes: Categories were not mutually exclusive; the same individual could perform more than one activity.

Therefore, what we can say at this point is that against the backdrop of low levels of solidarity activities in the UK, even when solidarity is practiced it tends to be manifested through more passive, less politicised, forms of support. In terms of the distribution of solidarity across our three vulnerable groups, our findings from Table 2 which revealed disabled people being regarded as the most deserving of solidarity practices are confirmed by the distributions outlined in Table 3 where the disabled are consistently more frequently targeted by these practices in comparison to refugees and the unemployed. As a consequence, what we can see is an emergent pattern which points towards a hierarchy of solidarity in the UK.

A hierarchy of solidarity?

What our findings reveal, as outlined in Table 2, is the existence of a hierarchy of solidarity in the UK towards vulnerable groups. Although there are variations across the constituent nations, solidarity towards the unemployed is the least strong of our three groups and may suggest that policy discourses and media narratives which have stigmatised the unemployed may be cutting through to British society. These findings are therefore perhaps unsurprising to some extent, however the changing nature of the UK labor market and the rise of zero hour contracts (Pennycook et al, 2013), as well as jobs tied to online platforms such as Uber and Deliveroo, could be reasonably expected to have had a greater impact on the awareness of the increasing precarity of employment in the UK. In the middle of this hierarchy are refugees, who we may have expected to be the primary target for solidarity activities among our three groups, not only because of the sense of urgency regarding the Syrian Refugee Crisis, but also because our earlier findings suggested that transnational forms of solidarity are more geared towards those outside of Europe.

The group at the apex of our hierarchy, namely the disabled, can be understood to occupy that position through two disparate lenses: on the one hand, it may be that they have been a group more visible in terms of the impact of austerity upon them, not only through the changes to ESA but also policies such as the 'bedroom tax'; whilst on the other hand, we could perceive the high degree of solidarity directed towards the disabled as being reflective of longstanding stereotypes of disabled people as victims of their illness rather

than equal citizens who have been at the sharp end of austerity measures. Therefore, although our hierarchy, illustrated in Figure 1 below, serves to remind us of the uneven distribution of solidarity towards vulnerable groups it requires a more careful understanding of the factors which may be driving solidarity such as the continued attempt by the UK Government since the onset of the crisis and the austerity measures which followed to distinguish between the deserving and the undeserving.

FIGURE 1. The hierarchy of solidarity in the UK



The fluid hierarchies of solidarity in the UK

Our findings thus far provide us with a broad picture of solidarity in the UK in respect to our three vulnerable groups. However, to understand those factors which shape the potential for an individual to practice solidarity, we need a more nuanced approach which provides a robust test for our hypotheses, namely (a) whether or not there is an uneven distribution of solidarity across the constituent nations of the United Kingdom, a context where devolution has empowered national assemblies and parliaments that have led, sometimes, to policy divergence on issues related to solidarity; (b) whether solidarity follows a path of differentiation according to perceptions of 'deservingness'; and (c) finally, we hypothesise that the distribution of solidaristic practices and attitudes towards specific categories of people such as the disabled, migrants / asylum seekers, and the unemployed depends on the exposure of an individual to vulnerabilities similar to those experienced by those categories, to their degree of exposure to opportunities of socialization and information sharing (social networks), as well as to their interest in societal and political issues.

TABLE 4: Solidarity practices to support the rights in different areas and groups

	Inside the UK	In the EU, outside UK	Outside the EU	Refugees and/or asylum seekers	Unemployed	Disabled
Age	-0.03	-0.08***	-0.06***	-0.11***	-0.08***	-0.04*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age Squared	0.00	0.00*	0.00**	0.00***	0.00**	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Female	-0.18*	-0.14	-0.24**	0.04	-0.44***	-0.13
	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.10)
Higher education	0.32**	0.33*	0.69***	0.74***	0.35**	0.23*
	(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.13)
Intermediate education	0.09	0.05	0.12	0.25	0.09	0.07
	(0.12)	(0.17)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.12)
Unemployed	0.10	0.45	0.23	0.38	0.21	0.32
	(0.25)	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.25)
Disabled	0.55***	0.31*	0.47***	0.34**	0.54***	0.84***
	(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.13)
Born in UK	-0.10	-0.43**	-0.62***	-0.14	-0.20	-0.35**
	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.17)
Daily Mail	0.18	0.14	0.13	0.01	0.27*	0.29**
	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.12)
Sun	0.23	0.56***	0.43***	0.44**	0.69***	0.53***
	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.15)
The Times	0.67***	1.00***	0.73***	0.92***	1.11***	0.78***
	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.17)
Guardian	1.09***	0.95***	0.91***	1.10***	0.60***	0.45***
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.16)
Daily Mirror	0.37**	0.41*	0.43**	0.66***	0.62***	0.36*
	(0.18)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.19)
Other newspapers	0.10	-0.14	-0.02	-0.27	-0.09	-0.25*
	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.14)
Met friends once month	0.40***	0.25	0.23*	0.25*	0.25	0.31***
	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.12)
Life satisfaction	0.06***	0.03	0.04	0.10***	0.09***	0.08***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Scotland	0.33*	0.28	0.31*	0.56***	0.73***	0.60***
	(0.17)	(0.22)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.17)
Wales	0.13	-0.04	-0.07	0.05	0.16	0.22
	(0.23)	(0.32)	(0.27)	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.23)
Northern Ireland	-0.30	0.42	0.02	0.65*	0.01	0.52*
	(0.34)	(0.39)	(0.37)	(0.36)	(0.42)	(0.32)
Constant	-0.76	0.48	-0.02	-0.28	-0.51	-0.63
	(0.50)	(0.63)	(0.56)	(0.59)	(0.62)	(0.51)
N	1996	1996	1996	1996	1996	1996

*Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*
Base category for education variable is lower education. Base category for newspaper variable is 'Not reading any newspaper regularly (3+ days a week)'. Base category for constituent country variable is England.

As we shall discover, our findings suggest that although the hierarchy of solidarity outlined earlier may provide a broad understanding of the distribution of solidarity across each group, a more nuanced analysis reveals the fluidity of these hierarchies when considering a range of different variables. In order to test our hypotheses, we constructed a regression model (Table 4) to analyze the relationship between our dependent variables of solidarity practice across different geographies (inside the UK; outside the UK but inside the EU; and outside the EU) and vulnerabilities (refugee/asylum seekers; the unemployed; and the disabled) and a number of independent variables relevant to our underlying hypotheses. These include: socio-demographic variables (e.g. age, education) which are well established in the literature on political participation (Verba et al, 1995) and thus have resonance with the actual practice of solidarity; we also look at the significance of being born in the UK, which we regard as an important variable given the strong focus placed upon the issue of immigration in contemporary UK policy discourses, particularly during the Brexit referendum; we examine we include variables encompassing the vulnerability of the respondent (e.g. disability or unemployment) to gauge if exposure to such vulnerability at a time of crisis and austerity has an effect on the practice of solidarity by these groups; social capital which has also been a longstanding focus of literature on political participation (Putnam 2001; Maloney et al, 2000; Hall, 1999); life satisfaction is a variable deployed to reveal whether practices of solidarity are the purview of those who feel happy with their quality of life; newspaper readership which is another well-established factor in the political participation literature (Norris, 2000); and we look at the residency of the respondent (e.g. living in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland) to identify divergences in the practice of solidarity across the constituent nations of the UK where devolution has empowered assemblies and Parliaments. The results from the regressions we conducted are set out below, beginning with our most salient findings.

Newspaper readership

One hypothesis underpinning our analysis of the practice of solidarity is the exposure to information and despite the rise of online media, newspaper readers continue to be courted by policymakers in the UK and thus retain an important place in shaping and reflecting policy discourses and the political agenda. As Table 4 demonstrates, some of the strongest findings from our regression model are those concerning newspaper readership, which has been identified in existing studies in the UK as a factor which shapes attitudes towards each of our three vulnerable groups (Golding and Middleton, 1982; Greenslade, 2005; Briant et al, 2011). Firstly, we discover a positive and significant relationship between reading the *The Times*, *The Guardian* or *The Daily Mirror* and practices of solidarity in comparison to not reading any newspapers. These specific findings are not particularly surprising; in fact, we can hypothesise that those taking an interest in social affairs are perhaps more likely to engage in solidarity with various causes than those who do not and furthermore two of these three publications are (at least in a broad sense) left leaning and perhaps more predisposed towards taking a more sympathetic view of our vulnerable groups. Indeed, our findings chime with research

undertaken by Newton (1999) on the links between mobilization and broadsheet readership, where he finds that reading a broadsheet newspaper is strongly associated with political mobilization.

Despite these similarities, with the caveat that our study is focused specifically on solidarity not political mobilization, our findings somewhat challenge his conclusion that 'it is not the form but the content of the media, which matters' (Newton, 1999: 598) given that in Table 4 we can see that there is a positive and significant association between *The Sun* and the practice of solidarity with each vulnerable group, except for those within the UK. Moreover, reading the *Daily Mail* is positively associated with solidarity towards the unemployed and the disabled. These results are surprising given the conservative leaning history of both publications; consequently, there is perhaps some scope to consider that although content of course matters, our findings suggest the difference between reading and not reading a newspaper appears to be the key determinant in mobilising solidarity in the UK. Given the migration of much political debate in recent years from the analogue world of newspapers to the digital world of social media, with research indicating that even newspapers themselves are utilising social media as a resource for political news gathering (Broersma and Graham, 2012), we can hypothesise it is through online media that we may find associations between specific media preferences and asymmetric distributions of solidarity towards vulnerable groups.

Disability

When looking more closely at the disabled as a group, we can see from our results in Table 4 that the disabled are positively and significantly associated with solidarity practices across each of the geographic areas and all other vulnerable groups. One explanation for this could be the exposure of disabled people to multi-dimensional forms of discrimination and inequalities which may provide a cross-societal insight into the hardships suffered by different groups (EHRC, 2017). We can hypothesise that the importance of rights-based discourses among disabled people's organizations and in a similar way with disability charities in the UK may create the conditions for intersectionality between the disabled and other groups seeking rights, protection and indeed solidarity. Moreover, the 'social model of disability' (Oliver, 2012) embraced by a number of disabled people's organizations has frequently recognised injustices and inequalities in society which impact upon groups other than the disabled. Subsequently, our findings regarding the disposition of the disabled towards supporting other groups may open an avenue to consider an alternative explanation as to why the disabled are viewed as most deserving, as outlined earlier in this chapter, but instead of paternalistic attitudes through a sense of reciprocity. This may seem a less convincing argument for explaining attitudes towards the disabled in the UK, but our findings require us to consider it in the scope of our analysis.

Higher Education

When analysing our variables, one hypothesis we began with is that the practice of solidarity depends upon a higher level of education. Our hypothesis builds upon established research on political participation that education provides the necessary resources for an individual to become engaged in societal and political issues (Verba et al, 1995). Furthermore we hypothesised that those with a higher level of education had more material resources to engage in solidarity. When examining our findings in Table 4, we can see that our hypothesis is confirmed by a significant and positive relationship between being disposed towards actions of solidarity and being in higher education. The significance of our findings do reinforce the importance of education in participating in solidaristic activities; however, there are implications of our findings which suggest a wider lens of analysis is required when we consider how higher education relates to other individual resources (such as higher income, better working conditions and opportunities, a wider social network and better access to information) and as such reflects broader inequalities in society. Consequently, we are confident in the confirmation of our hypothesis that those with experience of higher education are better resourced to engage in practices of solidarity than those with fewer resources, for example in many cases those with higher levels of education have expendable resources (e.g. disposable income) to contribute towards what they consider good causes as opposed to those who are struggling to get by.

Social capital and life satisfaction

Our findings regarding social capital support of our hypothesis that the practice of solidarity depends on exposure to social networks and social interaction. In this case, social capital is defined as 'meeting socially with friends during the last month' and as we can see in Table 4, is positively and significantly associated, from a geographic perspective, with offering solidarity to those within the UK and those outside the EU as well as a similar relationship in terms of solidarity with refugees and the disabled. The importance of social capital in building social cohesion is well established in the literature (Putnam, 2001; Li et al, 2005) and our findings in the UK resonate with these works. In terms of implications for policymaking, another of our findings may be acutely relevant towards understanding how to develop solidarity in the UK. Given the significant association between higher life satisfaction and solidarity with others within the UK, as well as each of our vulnerable groups, suggests that policies geared towards individual wellbeing may have a positive impact in terms of engendering solidarity in the UK.

UK divergence

Looking at the findings of our regressions in Table 4, we can see that the divergences of solidarity between the different constituent nations in the UK outlined earlier in this chapter are confirmed by our regressions. Our results indicate that living in Scotland, in

comparison to living in England is positively and significantly associated with expressing greater solidarity with others within the UK and those living outside the European Union. Moreover, we can see that living in Scotland compared to England is also positively and significantly associated with solidarity towards each of our three vulnerable groups. Furthermore, our results indicate that living in Northern Ireland in comparison to England also renders a significant and positive association with undertaking solidarity practices towards refugees and the disabled. Therefore, our regressions do provide further evidence of a significant divergence in the disposition of individuals to engage in practices of solidarity. Consequently, we can hypothesise that these divergences will stay in place should devolved administrations remain sensitive to the support evident within their constituent nations and have the potential to grow wider should policies and discourses at the Westminster level increasingly contrast with these solidaristic dispositions and become more antagonistic towards vulnerable groups. As Keating (2003) points out, the use of values can be central in the construction of identity and he argues that territorial solidarity was more effective in confronting Thatcherism than class solidarity. Therefore, should a post-Brexit Britain continue to travel down a road of welfare retrenchment and discourses distinguishing between the deserving and undeserving, there may be irreversible constitutional consequences for the UK. This is particularly relevant for Scotland where research has indicated the potential for social policy divergence to open opportunities to reconfigure solidarity and shared values around a (Scottish) national identity of 'difference' rather than the solidarity of a retrenched British welfare state (McEwan, 2002) and where the Scottish Government has, post-Brexit, called for a second referendum on independence.

Age

A classic socio-demographic variable – age – presents us with interesting, if not entirely unsurprising results. What can be seen in Table 4 is that age is negative and significantly associated with solidarity with each of the vulnerable groups as well as each geographic area with the sole exception of those inside the UK. Therefore the younger you are in the UK, the more predisposed you are towards engaging in practices of solidarity. The implications of these findings can be seen to some extent in the vote which took place in the 2016 EU Referendum for the UK to leave the European Union, where older voters where more predisposed towards voting leave (Hobolt, 2016). Nevertheless, our findings suggest that the negative relationship between solidarity and age extends to anyone who is 'other' than within the UK. These findings also shed some light on the how policies which are restrictive towards refugees, austerity policies affecting the disabled and policies characterised by sanctions and compulsion towards the unemployed can be sustained given the higher propensity for older people to turn out at elections in the UK and reinforces the urgency for more young people to become politically engaged before any change in direction could take place (Gardiner, 2016).

Born in the UK

Being born in the UK is another variable which yields the type of findings which have strong implications for the composition of solidarity in the UK. As we can see in Table 4, there is a significant and negative relationship between those individuals who are born in the UK and solidarity with those groups from outside the UK, whether in the European Union or not. Such findings suggest that solidarity among those who are British born tends to be inward-looking and that policies towards refugees that emphasise border control rather than welcoming asylum do have a constituency in the UK. Thus, our findings perhaps represent the other side of the coin when we are considering those initiatives which are geared towards offering sanctuary to those seeking asylum. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly however, among that same group – those born in the UK – there is also a significant and negative association with solidarity with the disabled. This stands in sharp contrast to the hierarchy of solidarity we set out earlier in this chapter, but we can hypothesise that those born in the UK may be more likely to view support for the disabled as the remit of the welfare state. If this is the explanation then it is concerning because as austerity measures have affected the benefits which disabled people have been entitled to, public services have also come under budgetary pressures and as a consequence there is the potential for the hardship experienced by disabled people to be somewhat overlooked by those born in the UK who believe that the welfare state would act as a safety net, reinforced by the stigma experienced by disabled benefit claimants who retreat from social circles in order to avoid 'revealing' that they are claiming benefits (Garthwaite, 2015). A further consideration based on our finding is that those who are not born in the UK may be more solidaristic towards the disabled and we can hypothesise that, particularly given the discourses of border control in the UK, those not born in the UK may empathise with others who are cast as 'outsiders' by discourses and policy.

Unemployed

When considering our results in terms of other groups, what we can see in Table 4 is the negative and significant relationship between being female and practising solidarity, specifically with groups within the UK and those outside the EU as well as there being a similar relationship with solidarity and the unemployed. Further still, more qualitative research may unpack the specificities of the geographical dimension of solidarity (or in this case non-solidarity) and being female as well as the negative relationship with solidarity practices with the unemployed. However, more broadly, what we can say is that extant research suggests that women have been at the forefront of the austerity cuts and as a consequence may have few resources, in either money or time, to divert to solidarity practices (O'Hara, 2014). In addition to this, it is important to note that despite steps closer towards equality, women continue to perform many of the caregiving tasks across UK households, not only in terms of looking after children but also caring for sick or disabled members of the family, which research suggests has an impact on retaining employment (Carmichael, 2008).

Conclusions

In this chapter we have sought to uncover how solidarity, through activism, protest, donations of time and money and organizational membership is practiced in contemporary Britain. What the analysis of our data reveals is that solidarity is not only scarce but unevenly distributed in terms of geography and the vulnerabilities of different groups. Our findings resonate to some extent with exiting research (van Oorschot, 2006), suggesting deep rooted patterns of deservingness and established hierarchies across Europe when considering solidarity with vulnerable groups such as the disabled, refugees and the unemployed. As such, our findings offer a further contribution to this body of literature but they also present a contemporary and novel insight into how solidarity is distributed across the constituent nations of the UK, where we have observed some divergence, but also how policies and discourses in post-crisis, post-Brexit Britain may be shaping attitudes towards the three vulnerable groups and thus play a role in constructing the hierarchy of solidarity we have set out in Figure 1. Nevertheless, when we factor in our independent variables, a more complex picture emerges, one that does not disprove the existence of our hierarchy of solidarity but suggests that the hierarchy is less static than we may imagine and is made more malleable when we introduce our independent variables. The findings which then emerge point towards talking not only of hierarchies of solidarity but fluid hierarchies of solidarity which can change shape and reflect a more diverse distribution of solidarity than our initial findings suggest. This fluidity is underpinned by the asymmetric significance of our variables which reveal that access to information (through newspaper readership), exposure to vulnerability (through disability), the experience of higher education and the interaction with others through social networks are key determinants of solidarity in the UK. As a consequence, we can confirm our hypothesis that the distribution of solidarity is determined the exposure of an individual to vulnerabilities similar to those experienced by those categories, to their degree of exposure to opportunities of socialization and information sharing (social networks), as well as to their interest in societal and political issues.

In terms of the distribution of solidarity practices across the UK, our findings confirm our hypothesis of the existence of sub-national divergences. Such divergences suggest a more nuanced understanding of the variegated impact of discourses of deservingness and their commensurate policies beyond traditional welfare regime analysis. This opens the possibility for a renewed research agenda on regional and sub-national distinctiveness across Europe in terms of social solidarity. Any divergences will be relevant to developing a more fine grained analysis across each context but perhaps such an approach, as we have outlined in this chapter, is currently most relevant in the UK where such divergences may prove critical in determining the constitutional future of the British state, particularly given our findings that solidarity is most evident in two constituent nations which voted to remain part of the European Union: Scotland where there are renewed calls by the SNP for another independence referendum and Northern Ireland where Sinn Fein have called for a poll on a united Ireland. Therefore, understanding solidarity towards vulnerable groups offers an insight not only into the nature of solidarity in contemporary Britain but

also provides an indication of the challenges faced by the UK Government elected in June 2017.

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Appendix

TABLE 5: Recoding of variables

Original survey question and coding	Recoding of variable	% distributions in the sample
Age	Age2: Age Squared	-
Have you ever done one of the following in order to support the rights of people/groups in your own country? supotherc_7: none of the above	Individual has done at least one of the following in order to support the rights of people/groups in your own country (1/0) supotherc11=1: At least one of the above	0=61.74 1=38.26
Have you ever done one of the following in order to support the rights of people/groups in other countries within the European Union? supEU_7: none of the above	Individual has done at least one of the following in order to support the rights of people/groups in other countries within the European Union supEU11=1: At least one of the above	0=81.52 1=18.48
Have you ever done one of the following in order to support the rights of people/groups in countries outside the European Union? supoutsideEU_7: none of the above	Individual has done at least one of the following in order to support the rights of people/groups in countries outside the European Union? supoutsideEU11=1: At least one of the above	0=74.94 1=25.06
Have you ever done any of the following in order to support the rights of refugees/asylum seekers? refsup_7: none of the above	Individual has done at least one of the following in order to support the rights of refugees/asylum seekers? Refsup11=1: At least one of the above	0=78.59 1=21.41
Have you ever done any of the following in order to support the rights of the unemployed? unemprights_7: none of the above	Individual has done at least one of the following in order to support the rights of the unemployed? unemprights11=1: At least one of the above	0=81.47 1=18.53
Have you ever done any of the following in order to support disability rights? dissup_7: none of the above	Individual has done at least one of the following in order to support disability rights dissup11=1: At least one of the above	0=65.63 1=34.37
In what region of the UK do you live?	1=England 2=Scotland 3=Wales 4=Northern Ireland	1=84.54 2=8.50 3=4.66 4=2.30
What you have been doing for the past 7 days?	unemployed=1 if mainact==5-6	0=95.01 1=4.99
Met socially with friends during the past month	0=Less than once this month 1=At least once this month	0=25.97 1=74.03

TABLE 6: Descriptive statistics of the independent variables

	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Age	2083	47.32	16.58	18	96
Age Squared	2083	2513.69	1594.46	324	9216
Female	2083	51.3	0.50	0	1
Higher education	2083	29.9	0.47	0	1
Intermediate education	2083	33.8	0.47	0	1
Lower education	2083	36.2	0.48	0	1
Unemployed	2083	5.1	0.22	0	1
Disabled	2044	17.3	0.38	0	1
Born in UK	2083	90.2	0.30	0	1
Daily Mail	2083	21.2	0.41	0	1
The Sun	2083	12.2	0.33	0	1
The Times	2083	9.5	0.29	0	1
The Guardian	2083	10.6	0.31	0	1
Daily Mirror	2083	8.0	0.27	0	1
Other newspapers	2083	15.4	0.36	0	1
No newspaper	2083	76.9	0.32	0	1
Met friends once month	2083	73.9	0.44	0	1
Life satisfaction	2032	6.45	2.15	0	10
England	2083	84.0	0.32	0	1
Scotland	2083	8.5	0.28	0	1
Wales	2083	4.8	0.21	0	1
Northern Ireland	2083	2.8	0.16	0	1

Note: All means are reported in percentages with the exception of age, age squared and the life satisfaction scale.