

Welfare Attitudes and Expressions of (Trans)national Solidarity

Anna Kurowska¹, Olga Eisele², Johannes M. Kiess²

¹ University of Warsaw, ² University of Siegen

For the Special Issue of American Behavioral Scientist Guest Edited by Maria Grasso and Christian Lahusen on “European Solidarity at a Crossroads? Altruistic Attitudes and Political Behaviours in Comparative European Perspective”

Corresponding author contact details:

Dr. hab. Anna Kurowska, Institute of Social Policy, University of Warsaw,
Nowy Świat 67 Street, 00-927 Warsaw, Poland

a.kurowska@uw.edu.pl

Abstract

The article explores the extent to which Europeans' welfare attitudes explain (trans)national solidarity behavior. We set our analyses against the backdrop of the broader debate of welfare state consequences: Does a strong welfare state that is considered to take care of those in need diminish or strengthen citizens' motivations to become engaged in helping *others*? We distinguish individuals' solidarity behavior towards *others* within the welfare state, i.e. citizens within one's country, and outside the welfare state community of the respondents' particular country. We further distinguish different *others* outside the welfare state, i.e., between refugees, taking the refugee crisis in the EU as a prime example, and citizens living in other countries – in EU countries and non-EU countries. As far as the main explanatory variables are concerned we derive from the concept of 'multidimensional welfare attitudes' and focus on five crucial dimensions of these attitudes, i.e., welfare goals, range, degree, redistribution, and outcomes. We draw on data collected within the EU project TransSOL and calculate a set of multilevel logistic regression models controlling for a wide range of individual (socio-demographic, economic, and political) variables. Overall, we observe that a 'crowding in' effect, i.e. higher support of the welfare state goes in line with solidary activity towards *others* including both 'outsiders' and 'insiders' of the national community.

Key words: welfarism, welfare attitudes, solidarity, economic crisis, refugees, attitudes, behaviors

Short author biographies

Anna Kurowska is associate professor at the University of Warsaw. Her research focuses on social policy and the capability approach.

Olga Eisele was post-doctoral researcher at Siegen University and is now affiliated with the University of Vienna. Her research focusses on political communication and public opinion with a focus on the media-politics relationship, legitimacy and the EU.

Johannes M. Kiess is post-doctoral researcher at Siegen University. His research focuses on political sociology, particularly on right-wing extremism, European integration, and industrial relations.

Introduction

Research on the effects of the welfare state on civil society has been abundant but has provided inconsistent results. On the one hand, some studies provide evidence for the ‘crowding out effect’ by showing that social expenditures and comprehensive social programmes ‘crowd out’ informal care relations and social networks, as well as familial and communal systems of self-help thereby “fostering social isolation and self-centeredness and leading to decline in commitment to civil norms and of participation in civil society” (Oorschot & Arts 2005: 6; see also e.g. Putnam 2000; Costa & Kahn 2003). On the other hand, other studies find no evidence of a negative impact of welfare state on civil society (see e.g. Freitag 2001; Siisiäinen 1999) or even a positive effect on civic engagement. It has thus been argued that a well-developed welfare state not only offers people the financial resources and the free time to “actively develop their social capital” but above all “sets examples of taking responsibility for others and of behaving solidaristically”, thus strengthening people’s redistributive attitudes and behaviors (Oorschot & Arts 2005: 6; see also Skocpol 1996; Hall 1999; Rothstein 2001; Salamon & Sokolowski 2003).

Solidary behavior, one of the crucial aspects of civil society¹ (Lahusen & Grasso 2018; see also Narayan 1999), may refer to different groups, i.e., people may support ‘welfare state insiders’, i.e. members of the welfare state community, but also ‘outsiders of the welfare state’, i.e. people living in other countries or coming from other countries to one’s welfare community, e.g. refugees. Here, we assume that “[g]roup-based attitudes, perceptions, and behavior arise from basic cognitive categorization processes that partition the social world into ingroups and outgroups” (Brewer 2007: 695) whereby the in-group is often preferred due to greater proximity or familiarity (e.g. Lahusen & Grasso 2018). Group memberships, however, are thought of as dynamic constructs that can overlap, change, or be re-defined depending on social contacts and experiences. In that sense, individuals may identify with many different social (in or out) groups. More importantly, the subjective combination of different group memberships determines how exclusively or inclusively in-group membership is defined (Brewer 2007) – i.e., how easily outsiders are allowed to become in-group members.

Most existing studies on solidarity behavior cited above, however, are bound to the intra-national level, i.e., refer to attitudes or behaviors of citizens towards other members of the same society (compatriots) only. In this study, we go beyond existing research by contrasting different groups (insiders and outsiders), set in different geopolitical/national contexts - own country/nation, other EU countries, non-EU countries. In doing so, we are able to compare explanations for solidarity engagement for the in-group (compatriots), for outsiders that seek to be integrated in the in-group (refugees), and outsiders outside the own country which, in the view of the respondent, may be assumed to have lower ambitions to be integrated in the in-group.

We also contribute to the existing literature on welfare state attitudes (e.g. Gelissen 2000; Roosma, Gelissen & Oorschot 2013; Svallfors 1991, 2010). We go beyond accounting for differences between welfare states at the institutional/country level by looking at welfare attitudes at the individual level. Therefore, both potential ‘crowding in’ and ‘crowding out effects’ – if present – are taken into account directly at the individual level. When exploring the impact of welfare attitudes on solidarity behavior we also take account of their multidimensional nature following Roosma, Gelissen and Oorschot (2013). This implies taking into account possibly independent and even contradictory effects of different dimensions of the welfare state and respective preferences as explanatory factors.

Theoretical Background and Hypotheses

Solidarity has been defined broadly as “preparedness to share one’s own sources with others, be that directly by donating money or time in support of others *or* by supporting the state to reallocate and redistribute some of the funds gathered through taxes or contributions” (Stjerno 2012: 2). Under this dual conceptual umbrella we can thus distinguish at least two forms of solidarity – one referring to behavior and another to attitudes. The first refers to ‘informal solidarity’, i.e. individual engagement in solidarity actions (expressions of solidarity) through formal and informal groups or networks (Lahusen & Grasso 2018). The second refers to ‘formal solidarity’, i.e. citizens’ support of the welfare state and its redistributive policies (ibidem: 5) touching on a broad stream of literature on welfare attitudes (for a comprehensive review see e.g. Roosma et al. 2013). In this study we aim to explore to what extent individual engagement in solidarity actions may be explained by people’s attitudes towards the welfare state.

We interpret welfare attitudes as an internalized form of welfare state ideals at the individual level (welfarism). Therefore we derive our research questions from the broad stream of literature on the impact of the welfare state on civil society. Here, we find two contradictory lines of argument with reference to the link between welfare attitudes and solidarity actions at the individual level. However, while this literature argues that *institutional contexts* of welfare regimes “stimulate or limit behavioral options” (Gundelach et al 2010: 631; see also Stadelmann-Steffen 2011), in this contribution we aim to transfer these assumptions to *individual welfare attitudes*. Thus, we argue that people’s perceptions and conceptions of the welfare state need to be taken into account as well, further refining the connection between institutions and actors. On the one hand we may expect that people who favor welfarism are generally more prone to hold redistributive values and thus are actively taking action on behalf of others (‘crowding-in effect’). On the other hand, some studies suggest, that there is a ‘crowding out effect’ in that a well-established welfare state may absorb citizens’ own motivations to care for others, leading to a depletion of informal social networks (see Van Oorschot et al. 2012 for a discussion). Thus, if one expresses a strong support of the welfare state she may excuse herself for not behaving solidaristically.

We assume that these two effects may act simultaneously, therefore cancelling each other out in some cases. Particularly, one can support the welfare state, hold redistributive values, and thus be more prone to take action on behalf of others but rather redirect her solidary activity towards groups of *others* which are not taken care of by the welfare state, i.e. ‘the outsiders’ instead of ‘the insiders’.

We generally expect that the support of others in terms of individuals’ behavioral expressions of solidarity is influenced by the scope of the group on behalf of which action is taken. This is against the background that people apply different criteria of deservingness to different groups. Such criteria usually cover the following aspects (Van Oorschot 2002): control, need, identity, attitude, and reciprocity. The less control the needy have over their own situation, the more needy they are, the more we identify with them, the more decent or humble their attitudes in terms of docility and gratefulness seem to us, and the more they have earned support, the more deserving we judge them to be. Group identity theory (Tajfel & Turner 1979; also Brewer 2007) argues more fundamentally that people cognitively distinguish between members of their in-group (insiders) and out-groups (outsiders). The latter, it is assumed, are often devaluated in attempts to strengthen group coherence and fence off competition in inter-group conflicts (e.g. McLaren & Johnson 2007). With our specific focus on the border-crossing aspects of solidarity, the present study concentrates on the criteria of identity, need, and control, taking into account different target groups of solidarity. More specifically, we distinguish between (1) insiders in the respondent’s country, i.e., members of the in-group within the respondent’s own country (compatriots); (2) outsiders in the respondent’s country, i.e., non-members of the in-group within the respondent’s own country (refugees); (3) EU outsiders outside the respondent’s country, i.e., citizens in other EU countries; and (4) Non-EU outsiders outside the respondent’s country, i.e., citizens of countries outside the EU.

Related to the aspect of identity (proximity) and against the backdrop of other studies implying that outsiders are seen as less deserving (Luttmer 2001; Mau & Burkhardt 2009; Kootstra 2016) we expect that people will be most prone to act solidaristically towards compatriots compared to the other groups identified above. Thus, we assume people from the respondent’s own country to be closest and most identified with. When it comes to other groups, EU citizens may be expected to be the second closest group in terms of identity. However, refugees and members of outside-EU countries (particularly the developing countries) could be seen as more deserving due to the lack of control over their situation and particular neediness. While citizens may be most prone to act solidaristically with their compatriots (insiders of the welfare state), differences in propensity to act solidaristically towards the three ‘outsider’ groups are not clear. Therefore, in this aspect our study has an explorative object.

It has been suggested that the welfare state should be assessed as a multidimensional phenomenon and thus welfare attitudes should be measured accordingly (Roosma et al. 2013). Attitudes towards such complex phenomena as the welfare state are likely to be ambivalent or even contradictory (Roosma et al. 2013). E.g. people often support substantial state involvement while simultaneously being critical of

its observed outcomes (Svallfors 2010). In order to explore the role of welfare attitudes in explaining solidarity practices of Europeans, we take into account the multidimensional nature of welfare attitudes following Roosma, Gelissen and Oorschot (2013, see also below) focusing on five distinct dimensions, namely attitudes towards the *goals*, *range*, *degree*, *redistribution* and *outcome* of the welfare state.

Summing up our theoretical discussion, we argue that people are more inclined to engage in solidarity activities based on considerations of deservingness, demarcating insiders and outsiders. In addition, solidarity activity is connected to welfarism and we assume ‘crowding in’ as well as ‘crowding out’ effects based on people’s welfare attitudes. These effects may vary between target groups and welfarism dimensions. It is therefore essential to look at each dimension and possible ‘crowding in’ and ‘crowding out’ effects separately.

The *goals* dimension of welfare state attitudes relates to three major goals of the welfare state: providing social security, imposing equality, and promoting social inclusion through participation (Roosma et al. 2013). It is worth stressing that this dimension does not refer to support of the welfare state as such, but rather to an ideal of equality, i.e. equality of outcomes (ibidem: 239), that provides the basis for a welfare state to exist. Thus, this dimension looks at what the welfare state *should aim for*, which is why we do not expect the ‘crowding out’ effect to be at play here. Therefore, we hypothesize that support of the general ideal of equality implies higher propensity of informal solidarity with others, due to a ‘crowding in effect’ (Hypothesis 1). We expect to find this effect particularly present with relation to compatriots since equality as a goal of the welfare state is related to bounded identity and thus social proximity.

Two further core dimensions of welfare state attitudes are *range* and *degree* (Roller 1995); together with the *goal* dimension they “form the substance of the welfare state” (Roosma et al. 2013: 239). Both are concerned with how the welfare state should be organized. The *range* dimension refers to the areas in life in which the state should redistribute (Roller 1995). The wider the range of the welfare state the larger the part of society covered by social transfers of different kinds. The *degree* dimension refers to how much effort government should expend in certain policy areas (Roosma et al. 2013) or “the intensity of government activity within a policy area” (Roller 1995), usually measured in terms of social expenditure. Therefore, we can assume that the stronger support for higher taxes and benefits, the stronger the support of the welfare state in its *range* dimension. Both dimensions refer to different aspects of the generosity of the welfare state. In both cases, support for a generous welfare state could have mixed effects on informal solidarity behavior, due to overlapping ‘crowding in’ and ‘crowding out’ effects. These mixed effects, we hypothesize, rather occur only in case of solidarity behaviors towards compatriots (insiders) (Hypothesis 2a), as the generous welfare state provides welfare predominantly to this group. In case of welfare state ‘outsiders’ we expect only the ‘crowding in’ effect to occur (Hypothesis 2b).

The *redistribution* dimension touches upon such questions like ‘Who should benefit from redistribution in different policy areas?’ and ‘What groups are deserving of what types of benefits and on what

conditions?’ (Roosma et al. 2013: 239). This dimension has proved hard to operationalize due to the many different aspects that would need to be taken into account to comprehensively grasp it – after all, also the in-group of compatriots consists of different groups that may be found more or less deserving of redistribution in different policy fields. Yet, welfare states are (still) mainly organized on the national level and our study is interested in general difference between in- and outsiders. We therefore focus on the question of conditionality of redistribution with reference to the distinction between citizens (compatriots), or ‘welfare state insiders’, and non-citizens, or ‘welfare state outsiders’, setting other aspects of welfare conditionality aside. Wider support of the *redistribution* dimension of the welfare state would thus mean supporting a more inclusive (universal or unconditioned) access to social transfers, potentially also for ‘outsiders of the welfare state’. As in the majority of European welfare states the system of social transfers is not immediately available for refugees we do not expect the ‘crowding out’ effect to occur with reference to the groups of ‘outsiders’. Therefore, we hypothesize a positive relationship between support for the redistribution dimension of the welfare state and informal solidarity behaviors of Europeans towards ‘outsider’ groups (Hypothesis 3).

Finally, for the *outcomes* dimension, Roosma, Gelissen and Oorschot (2013) argue that attitudes toward welfare state performance contribute to welfare state legitimacy. If the welfare state performs according to expectations and desires, its legitimacy will be greater. In the context of our study we may expect that higher evaluation of welfare state outcomes leads to stronger ‘crowding out’, although presumably only in case of solidarity with compatriots. Being content with how the welfare state works may redirect people’s solidary activity towards the groups of outsiders who do not benefit from the effective welfare state. Thus, we predict a positive relationship between the assessment of welfare state performance and solidary behaviors towards ‘outsiders’ of the welfare state (Hypothesis 4).

Data and Methods

Our analysis builds on a large scale survey conducted in the framework of the Horizon2020 project TransSOL (Transnational Solidarity at Times of Crisis)². The project includes eight European countries (Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Switzerland, and the UK) representing different types of welfare states – e.g. liberal UK, social-democratic Denmark, conservative Germany etc. (Esping-Andersen 1990; Bonoli 1997) – which have gone through very different political and social developments during the last ten years of European crises (e.g., De la Porte and Heins 2016; Kiess et al. 2017; Kriesi and Pappas 2015). Against this background, we take the nested nature of our dataset into account by estimating a multilevel model, inserting a random intercept at the country level.³ Our four models all include the same independent variables and only differ on the dependent variable (activities supporting different target groups). All included variables were standardized making coefficients and models comparable. Our dependent variable is binary; we therefore calculated logistic regression models⁴ for explaining the propensity of solidarity activism towards the four mentioned groups.

Dependent Variables: Propensity of Solidarity Activism with Different Target Groups

Our investigation builds on four dependent variables, namely solidarity activism towards the four different groups discussed above: (1) members of the in-group within the respondent's own country; (2) non-members of the in-group within the own country, i.e., refugees; (3) citizens in other EU countries; and (4) citizens of countries outside the EU. The respective questionnaire asked for these (and other) groups whether respondents had engaged previously in solidarity activities in a number of ways (see Appendix Table 1 and 4 for exact wording, scaling and descriptive statistics). The variables are used as propensity indicators for future solidarity activism based on past behavior in this respect. As dependent variables, we used the flipped final item of the variable stating that 'none of the above' activities were ever engaged in.

Independent Variables: Welfare State Preferences

To account for our main independent variables, i.e. attitudes towards the welfare state, we draw on Roosma et al. (2013: 238-240), relying on five indicators or five different dimensions of welfarism identified and discussed in the previous section: *goal*, *range*, *degree* and *redistribution* (for detailed operationalization of all dimensions please see Appendix Table 2)⁵. (1) For assessing the impact of support of welfare state *goal*, we use the question probing agreement regarding eliminating big income inequalities with respect to the goal of a "fair society". This indicator reflects the general support of equality of outcome and is very similar to the indicator used by Roosma, Gelissen and Oorschot (2013). (2) The aspect of *range* is considered via the survey item probing greater agreement with the opinion that people should take responsibility to provide for themselves (lower values) vs. greater agreement with the statement "the government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for". (3) *Degree* is included in a variable capturing the agreement on decreasing taxes (lower values) vs. increasing taxes (higher values). (4) The support for the *redistribution* dimension of the welfare state makes reference to the in- and outsider dimension which is at the focus of our analysis. It is measured with a dummy variable based on the following question: "Thinking of people coming to live in your country from other countries, when you think they should obtain the same rights to social benefits and services as citizens already living here? Please choose the option on this card that comes closest to your view". If respondents chose "Immediately on arrival" as their answer, the variable was coded 1, indicating support for the completely unconditional access to social benefits. (5) To account for satisfaction with *outcomes* of the welfare state, we include an additive index for different statements on the government's dealing of the economy, poverty, education, unemployment, health, precarious employment, migration, childcare, disabilities, and refugees. Overall, the variable ranges from 0-100 with higher values indicating higher satisfaction (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.95$).

Control Variables

Our dependent variable covers propensity indicators in terms of solidarity activism with different spatial scopes. Apart from socio-demographic characteristics (age, gender, education, income), factors that

need to be controlled for in our analysis concern, on the one hand, different spatial dimensions and preferences for redistribution, including also attitudes indicating the general ‘openness’ or exclusiveness of the in-group expressed in more or less social ties and contacts across different social groups (Brewer 2007). Such are included in the form of items probing tolerance towards others and support for redistribution for the gain of others; we also control for the aspect of reciprocity by asking about social benefits the respondent might have received herself (e.g., Keely and Tan 2008; van Oorschot et al. 2012). On the other hand, we need to control for general socio-economic patterns of engagement in solidarity activism since solidarity engagement may, notwithstanding its target groups, be motivated by political interest, ideological views (left-right; authoritarian-liberal), membership in political organisations or expressed in voting behavior (e.g., Norris 2002). We describe all control variables in detail in the Appendix.

Results

Before turning to our regression results, a brief look at the means of our four dependent variables reveals an underlying logic of proximity regarding the propensity to be active on behalf of others: It seems most likely that citizens express solidarity towards fellow citizens from their own country, and less likely towards people in other (EU and non-EU) countries, as well as for refugees. With the exception of Greece, which shows similar values for refugees, values in the other dependent variables are usually highest for citizens from outside the EU. This is an interesting pattern since the logic of proximity does not seem to explain activism; in contrast, it seems more likely that the degree of neediness in ‘developing countries’ trumps the objectively greater proximity of other EU citizens.

Moreover, the EU as a polity has come under increased criticism during the last ten years of crises (e.g. Hobolt & De Vries 2016), which may also be part of an explanation for decreased propensity to engage in solidarity actions for other EU citizens more generally. In addition, as we know from TransSOL research⁶ and other studies (e.g., Kröger 2016), the structures and incentives for transnational solidarity within the EU are not very developed and tend to be strategic rather than oriented towards furthering ‘European’ democracy (Kröger 2018) in the sense of supporting a community united in solidarity. Thus, the ‘lobby’ in terms of solidarity for other EU citizens does not seem to be very strong to begin with, which might be part of the explanation for lower levels of engagement.




Figure 1: Solidarity Activism for Different Target Groups by Country (in %)

Turning to the results of our regression analysis (table 1), we find support for most of our hypotheses on all different scopes (levels) of groups of “others” with some noteworthy differences. H_1 posited that support of the equality *goal* of the welfare state has a positive effect on the propensity to be active solidaristically but particularly in the case of solidarity with compatriots. Indeed, we find supportive evidence for this hypothesis; a significantly positive effect is observed only in the model for compatriots, yet the substantive size of the effect is rather small. Regarding H_{2a} (support for a wider *range* of the welfare state) and H_3 (unconditional *redistribution*) as well as H_4 (support for actual *outcomes* of welfare state performance), we find the expected positive effect only for activism propensity regarding refugees, other EU and outside EU citizens. Finally, support for a higher *degree* of redistribution (H_{2b}), has a positive effect only for refugees, and not for the other groups.

Table 1: Logit Regression Models on Solidarity Activism for Different Target Groups

	(1) Compatriots	(2) Refugees	(3) EU Citizens	(4) Non-EU Citizens
Goal	1.096*** (0.0289)	0.988 (0.0296)	0.993 (0.0282)	1.005 (0.0274)
Range	1.019 (0.0272)	1.087** (0.0324)	1.107*** (0.0312)	1.064* (0.0291)
Degree	1.034 (0.0288)	1.129*** (0.0347)	1.032 (0.0302)	1.048 (0.0297)
Redistribution	1.046 (0.0269)	1.194*** (0.0299)	1.094*** (0.0265)	1.118*** (0.0272)
Outcomes	1.001 (0.0275)	1.249*** (0.0375)	1.149*** (0.0327)	1.139*** (0.0315)
Tolerance towards immigration	1.133*** (0.0311)	1.506*** (0.0503)	1.130*** (0.0340)	1.216*** (0.0353)
Support of EU bailout policies	1.019 (0.0278)	1.126*** (0.0344)	1.113*** (0.0323)	1.049 (0.0292)
Importance of EU development policies	1.093** (0.0297)	1.134*** (0.0362)	1.051 (0.0311)	1.144*** (0.0327)

Migration background	0.990 (0.0269)	1.025 (0.0299)	1.043 (0.0295)	1.028 (0.0281)
Friends with different nationalities	1.138*** (0.0337)	1.057* (0.0285)	1.034 (0.0274)	1.138*** (0.0306)
Voted in nat./EU elections	1.098** (0.0320)	1.070* (0.0353)	1.057 (0.0333)	1.039 (0.0314)
Member/volunteer for org./group	2.506*** (0.115)	2.462*** (0.0870)	2.361*** (0.0815)	2.328*** (0.0830)
Received social benefits	1.052 (0.0275)	1.022 (0.0289)	1.054 (0.0285)	1.013 (0.0268)
Authoritarian vs. Liberal views	1.023 (0.0283)	1.071* (0.0327)	1.037 (0.0301)	1.068* (0.0301)
Left Right Orientation	0.926** (0.0250)	0.898*** (0.0273)	0.955 (0.0273)	0.926** (0.0257)
Political interest	1.181*** (0.0326)	1.130*** (0.0356)	1.168*** (0.0350)	1.120*** (0.0322)
Age	1.037 (0.0279)	0.943* (0.0278)	0.963 (0.0272)	1.026 (0.0280)
Gender	1.074 (0.0533)	1.111 (0.0610)	0.989 (0.0520)	1.036 (0.0525)
Education	1.132*** (0.0297)	1.087** (0.0309)	1.034 (0.0284)	1.158*** (0.0305)
Income	1.031 (0.0280)	1.013 (0.0302)	1.041 (0.0298)	1.040 (0.0286)
Random Intercept: Country	1.167 (0.0933)	1.080 (0.0449)	1.122 (0.0686)	1.069 (0.0387)
Observations	8686	8686	8686	8686
AIC	10373.9	8875.1	9559.3	10083.7

Coefficients are Odds Ratios; Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

In sum, results show consistent differences between insiders and outsiders. While stronger support for equality (welfare state goals) only influences solidarity engagement for the in-group, all other dimensions of welfarism only show significant effects for outsiders.

Discussion

Our analysis started with the assumption that not only institutional factors of welfare regimes matter for individual engagement in solidarity – be it in terms of ‘crowding in’ or ‘crowding out’ effects (Gundelach et al 2010; Stadelmann-Steffen 2011; van Oorschot et al. 2012) – but that individual’s perceptions and conceptions of welfare (welfarism) need to be taken into account. Our results highlight the importance of perceiving welfare state attitudes as a multidimensional construct (Van Oorschot et al. 2012). All welfare attitude dimensions correlated positively with solidary behaviors, indicating

‘crowding in’ effects of welfarism on solidarity activity. However, there were differences in the significance levels of the results between in- and outsiders that need explanation.

First of all, we have found a significant and positive relationship between support of the welfare states’ equality *goal* and solidarity towards compatriots (only). Referring back to the theoretical discussion, the *goal* dimension is an expression of normative standards, i.e., what the welfare state *should* be or achieve. While more research is needed to substantiate this tentative conclusion, we may read the result as the implicit expectation that within the in-group, one would become active with the ambition to achieve equality among insiders, whereas regarding solidarity with outsiders, the motivation of activism would be more about helping to meet basic, even existential needs.

Secondly, it seems that support of a comprehensive and well-performing welfare state (i.e. the other dimensions of welfarism) motivates people to be active for outsiders, but not for compatriots. This finding seems to add an interesting dimension to the discussion about a crowding out effect: Insiders may be perceived as profiting from a generous welfare state while outsiders are not – and thus insiders’ needs are not pressing enough to lead to the engagement in solidarity activism on their behalf. In that sense, proximity could have a negative impact due to better identification and knowledge of the (good) situation of compatriots who benefit from the same welfare system. Still, against the background that most people reported to have engaged in solidarity activism on behalf of compatriots (see table 1), this also highlights that attitudes towards welfarism are not as strong predictors regarding the in-group as are other variables, like political interest or activism more generally.

Third, the positive effect of support for increasing taxes (the *range* dimension of welfarism) regarding activism for refugees seems, at first sight, to be in line with the finding in the literature that immigration, when perceived as an economic threat, has a positive effect on support for welfarism (e.g., Finseraas 2008). However, our control variable on the tolerance of immigrants indicates that people that do not mind having refugees or (im)migrants as neighbours – and thus do not have negative views on immigration - were more likely to engage in solidarity activism. Thus, this finding is more in line with earlier research that found negative views on immigration to decrease support for welfarism (e.g., Keely and Tan 2008).

Conclusion

In this article we embarked from Stjerno’s (2012: 2) dual concept of solidarity as “preparedness to share one’s own sources with others, be that directly by donating money or time in support of others *or* by supporting the state to reallocate and redistribute some of the funds gathered through taxes or contributions”. We have interpreted these two different aspects of solidarity in the context of the debate about the effects of the welfare state on civil society. In doing so, we focused on the relationship between

individual solidarity activity towards others and support for the welfare state's several dimensions, conceptualized as individual level welfarism preferences.

Overall, our results mostly support findings of previous studies (e.g. Skocpol 1996; Hall 1999; Rothstein 2001; Salamon & Sokolowski 2003) showing a positive relationship between the welfare state and informal solidarity ('crowding in' effect). Generally speaking, higher support of the welfare state in its multiple dimensions goes in line with solidary activity no matter if it targets 'outsiders' or (and) 'insiders' of the welfare state. Nevertheless, as we find no statistically significant effects for our variables on welfare state *range* and *outcomes* in the model for compatriots, we attribute this to counteracting 'crowding out' effects: Thus, when one is supporting a generous welfare state or (and) is satisfied with the efficiency of the welfare state, her motivations to support the beneficiaries of this system is thus weakened. This is in line with previous literature emphasizing that in some respects the relationship between welfare state and civil engagement is a zero-sum game, but in others it is not (e.g. Finsveen & van Oorschot 2007; Stadelmann-Steffen 2011). Further research could investigate how the welfare state and its perception by citizens facilitate solidarity. More research is also needed for exploring solidarity relationships between different groups: This is especially important against the background of ongoing crises in the EU, resulting in increased inequalities which continue to endanger the cohesion of societies and the growing apart of European citizens.

All in all our study provides evidence that supports the 'crowding-in' hypothesis, i.e. higher support of the welfare state goes in line with solidary activity towards *others*, including both 'outsiders' and 'insiders' of the national community. However, this effect is counteracted by the 'crowding out' effect in case of compatriots as the welfare state's support goes predominantly to the insiders of the welfare community.

Notes:

¹ The authors argue that studies of social capital are relevant for the analysis of solidarity as this strand of literature refers to/measures a similar phenomenon (Lahusen & Grasso 2018, p. 9)

² For the survey, data retrieval using CAWI method (Computer Assisted Web Interviewing) took place between December 2016 and January 2017. We report details of all variables and recoding used for modeling as well as correlation coefficients for all variables in the Appendix.

³ The likelihood ratio test indicated that the multilevel model is preferred to a fixed effects model including country dummies.

⁴ Robustness of the model was checked by running a negative binomial regression model on a rescaled dependent count variable (additive index of all activities engaged in). Results were very similar to the ones discussed here. We also checked the general correlations of all variables included in the model and calculated the variance inflation factors for each regression model. Results did not indicate problems of multicollinearity.

⁵ Checking the overall inter-item reliability of all five indicators for welfarism shows that it is relatively low (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.35$). This underlines the importance of using all five indicators covering different, and obviously rather independent aspects of the complex phenomenon of welfarism. Further, checking the correlations between the five indicators (see Appendix Table 5) shows that, while all indicators correlate significantly, they do so to different degrees: weak clusters again support the argument to perceive of welfarism as a complex and multi-dimensional phenomenon (Roosma et al. 2013).

⁶ See also results of other TransSOL research in work package 4 on collective forms of transnational solidarity: www.transsol.eu/outputs/report.

References

- Brewer, M. B. (2007). The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations: Social Categorization, Ingroup Bias, and Outgroup Prejudice. In A. W. Kruglanski & T. E. Higgins (eds.), *Social Psychology – Handbook of Basic Principles* (pp. 695-715). New York: Guilford Press.
- Bonoli, Giuliano (1997). Classifying Welfare States: a Two-dimension Approach. *Journal of Social Policy* 26, 351-372.
- Costa, D. & Kahn, M. (2003). Understanding the American Decline in Social Capital, 1952–1998. *Kyklos* 56, 17–46.
- De la Porte, C. & Heins, E. (eds.) (2016). *The Sovereign Debt Crisis, the EU and Welfare State Reform*. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Finseraas, H. (2008). Immigration and Preferences for Redistribution: An Empirical Analysis of European Survey Data. *Comparative European Politics* 6, 407–431.
- Finsveen, E. M. & van Oorschot, W. (2007). *How does the welfare state affect social capital? A literature study*. Paper prepared for the ECPR Joint Sessions Helsinki May 2007, Workshop Social Capital, the state and Diversity.
- Freitag, M. (2001). Das Soziale Kapital der Schweiz: vergleichende Erzählungen zu Aspekten des Vertrauens und der sozialen Einbindung. *Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft* 7, 87–117.
- Gundelach, B. Freitag, M., & Stadelmann-Steffen, I. (2010). Making or Breaking informal Volunteering. *European Societies* 12, 627-652.
- Hall, P. A. (1999) Social Capital in Britain. *British Journal of Political Science* 29, 417-461.
- Hobolt, S. B. & de Vries, C. (2016). Public Support for European Integration. *Annual Review of Political Science* 19, 413-432,.
- Keely, L. T. & Tan, C. M. (2008). Understanding preferences for income redistribution. *Journal of Public Economics* 92, 944–961.
- Kiess, J., Norman, L., Temple, L. & Uba, K. (2017). Path dependency and convergence of three worlds of welfare policy during the Great Recession: UK, Germany and Sweden. *Journal of International and Comparative Social Policy* 33, 1-17.
- Kriesi, H.-P., Pappas, T. (eds) (2015). *European Populism in the Shadow of the Great Recession*. Colchester: ECPR Press.
- Kröger, S. (2016). *Europeanised Or European? Representation by Civil Society Organisations in EU Policy Making*. Colchester: ECPR Press.
- Kröger, S. (2018). Strategic or principled? The Engagements of Civil Society Organisations with the EU. *Journal of Civil Society* 14, 41-57.
- Lahusen, C. & Grasso, M. (2018). Solidarity in Europe-Europe Solidarity: An Introduction. In C. Lahusen & M. Grasso (eds), *Solidarity in Europe. Citizen's Responses in Times of Crisis* (pp.1-13). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Lubbers, M., Diehl, C., Kuhn, T., & Larsen, C.A. (2018). Migrants' support for welfare state spending in Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands. *Social Policy Administration* 52, 895-913.

- Norris, P. (2002). *Democratic Phoenix – reinventing political activism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- van Oorschot, W. & Arts, W. (2005). The Social Capital of European Welfare States: The Crowding Out Hypothesis Revisited. *Journal of European Social Policy* 15, 5–26.
- Putnam, R. D. (2000). *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Roosma, F., Gelissen, J., & van Oorschot, W. (2013). The Multidimensionality of Welfare State Attitudes: A European Cross-National Study. *Social Indicators Research* 113, 235-255.
- Rothstein, B. (2001). Social Capital in the Social Democratic Welfare State. *Politics and Society* 29, 207–241.
- Salamon, L.; & Sokolowski, S. (2003). Institutional Roots of Volunteering. In P. Dekker & L. Halman (eds), *The Values of Volunteering: Crosscultural Perspective*,(pp. 71–90). New York: Kluwer Publishers.
- Siisiainen, M. (1999). Voluntary Associations and Social Capital in Finland. In J. Van Deth, M. Maraffi, K. Newton & P. Whiteley (eds), *Social Capital and European Democracy* (pp. 120–143). London: Routledge.
- Skocpol, T. (1996). Unraveling from Above. *American Prospect* (March–April), 20–25.
- Stadelmann-Steffen, I. (2011). Social Volunteering in Welfare States: Where Crowding Out Should Occur. In *Political Studies* 59, 135-155.
- Svallfors, S. (2010). Public attitudes. In F. Castels (Ed.), *The Oxford handbook of the welfare state*. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Appendix

Table 1: Exact wording and scaling of survey items included

Variable name	Exact wording of TransSOL survey item used	Variable scaling
Propensity to engage in Solidarity Activism for <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Compatriots - Refugees - Other people in the EU - People outside EU 	Have you ever attended a march, protest or demonstration; donated money; donated time; bought or refused to buy products in support of the goals; engaged as a passive member of an organisation (paycheck membership); engaged as active member of an organisation (volunteering in an organisation)	Flip-item of ‘None of the above’ (=0)
Equality goal	In order to be considered fair, what should a society provide? Eliminating big inequalities in income between citizens (i.e., equal incomes vs. larger income differences are okay)	0-10 (completely agree with statement on the left – completely agree with statement on the right)
Range of welfare state responsibilities	People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves / The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for.	0-10 (completely agree with statement on the left – completely agree with statement on the right)
Degree of welfare state support	Government should decrease taxes a lot and spend much less on social benefits and services. / Government should increase taxes a lot and spend much more on social benefits and services.	0-10 (completely agree with statement on the left – completely agree with statement on the right)
Unconditionality of redistribution	Thinking of people coming to live in ***COUNTRY*** from other countries, when do you think they should obtain the same rights to social benefits and services as citizens already living here?	Binary variable; 1 = ‘immediately upon arrival’
Satisfaction with welfare state outcomes	How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way in which the ***NATIONALITY*** government is dealing with the following? Economy, poverty, education, unemployment, health, precarious employment, migration, childcare, disabilities, and refugees	0-10 (extremely dissatisfied – extremely satisfied)
Tolerance towards immigration	Exploratory factor analysis on different tolerance items in which four (not minding to have migrants, people of different races, Muslims, or refugees as neighbors) were found to load strongest on one factor (>0.6); predicted factor scores from a factor analysis including only these four items were then used as an index of tolerance towards immigrants more generally (Eigenvalue: 1.94).	-1.6 – 0.78 (Factor Scores)
Support for bailout policies	The EU is currently pooling funds to help EU countries having difficulties in paying their debts. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this measure?	1-5 (strongly disagree – strongly agree)
Importance of development policies	The EU provides development aid to assist certain countries outside the EU in their fight against poverty and in their development. How important do you think it is to help people in developing countries?	1-5 (not at all – very important)

Migration background	Additive index of three binary items probing (a) “were you born in *country*”, (b) “was your mother born in *country*” and (c) “was your father born in *country*”.	0 (no); 1(yes)
Friends with different nationalities	How many of your family, friends and/or acquaintances come from a different country?	Absolute number
Voted in national/eu election	Additive index of ‘voted in ***COUNTRY*** elections’ and ‘voted in EU elections’; if respondent voted at least in one, we coded 1.	Binary (1=voted in either or of elections)
Member/volunteer for org./group	Additive index of variables probing the membership in different types of organizations, e.g., trade unions, political parties, and non-governmental organizations covering different thematic areas and target groups, such as LGBT rights, refugees, disabled, or human rights	0 (no membership); 1 (membership but no volunteering); 2 (membership and volunteering)
Received benefits	During the past 12 months have you used or received any of the following kinds of public support or benefits? (Unemployment benefit or free skills training; Social housing or housing support/benefit; Child/maternity/family/one parent family support/benefit; Sickness/mobility/invalidity/disabled person's pension/benefit; In-kind support (e.g. food/free meals/clothing); Help from home care services (e.g. family assistant/social worker))	Flip variable of the item ‘none of the above’ (=0)
Authoritarian vs. Liberal views	Additive index of agreement to following statements: Abortion should not be allowed in any case vs. a woman who does not want to have a child should be allowed to have a free and safe abortion; A woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled vs. a woman can be fulfilled through her professional career; Children should be taught to obey authority vs. children should be encouraged to have an independent judgement; People who break the law should get tougher sentences vs. tougher sentences do not contribute to reduce criminality; Homosexual couples should not be allowed to adopt children under any circumstances vs. homosexual couples should be able to adopt children.	Higher values = more liberal views (0-50)
LeftRight Scale	People sometimes talk about the Left and the Right in politics. Where would you place yourself on the following?	0-10 (left-right)
Political interest	How interested, if at all, would you say you are in politics?	1-4 (not at all – very much)
Age	How old are you?	Absolute Number
Gender	Are you male or female?	1=male, 2=female
Education	What is the highest level of education that you have completed?	1-9 (primary education or less – doctoral or equivalent level)
Income	What is your household's MONTHLY net income, after tax and compulsory deductions, from all sources?	1-10 (1 st -10 th decile)

Table 2: Welfarism variables' operationalisation

Welfarism dimensions	Used item	Justification
Goal	Item on importance of increasing equality of incomes vs. large differences in incomes are okay	Similar question was used to operationalize this dimension by the authors of the concept of multidimensionality of welfare state attitudes - Roosma, Gelissen & Oorschot (2013): Scale 1-5 (Strongly agree) to reduce income levels (European Social Survey code: B30)
Range	Item on range of governmental vs. personal responsibilities	Similar question was used to operationalize this dimension by Roosma, Gelissen & Oorschot (2013): Government should be responsible for...(ESS code: D15-D20)
Degree	Item on increasing taxes with more social spending vs. decreasing taxes and less social spending	Similar question was used to operationalize this dimension by Roosma, Gelissen & Oorschot (2013): Increase taxes and social spending (ESS code: D34)
Redistribution	Item on conditionality of granting access to migrant reg. social benefits and services	Roosma, Gelissen & Oorschot (2013) couldn't operationalize this dimension as available items (in ESS) were "measured at the nominal measurement level and therefore were not suitable for further analysis in structural equation modelling with continuous variables"(p. 241). Our model does not require covariates to be continuous therefore we could include this dimension in our model.
Outcomes	Item on satisfaction of government's dealing with different policies	Roosma, Gelissen & Oorschot (2013) used very similar question in order to operationalize the outcome with reference to the goals of the welfare state: (Strongly) agree that goals are reached (ESS code: D22, D23, D26)

Table 3: Correlation matrix for all variables included

	DV compatriots	DV refugees	DV EU citizens	DV Non-EU citiz.	goal	range	degree	redistribution	outcomes	tolerance	EUdebt	EUaid	Mig Backgr.	Friends diff	Vote yes	Member OrgSol	Received Benefits	Lib Auth	LeftRight	Polint	age	Gender	education
Dv refugees																							
Dv eu citizens	0.4183	1.0000																					
Dv non-eu citizens	0.4503	0.4998	1.0000																				
Goal	0.4444	0.5142	0.5572	1.0000																			
Range	0.0540	0.0116	0.0089	0.0084	1.0000																		
Degree	0.0683	0.1152	0.1129	0.0858	0.2107	1.0000																	
Redistribution	0.0739	0.1682	0.0960	0.1242	0.0703	0.2947	1.0000																
Outcomes	0.0745	0.1731	0.1144	0.1260	0.0533	0.0837	0.1174	1.0000															
Tolerance immigrants	0.0391	0.1545	0.1141	0.1335	0.1924	0.0694	0.1651	0.0586	1.0000														
Eudebt	0.0975	0.1975	0.0801	0.1397	0.1090	0.0255	0.1375	0.1283	0.0931	1.0000													
Euaid	0.1030	0.1621	0.1259	0.1123	0.1570	0.1499	0.0832	0.1132	0.0346	0.2222	1.0000												
Migbackg-d	0.0969	0.1428	0.0733	0.1284	0.1809	0.0614	0.1347	0.1117	0.0704	0.3521	0.3189	1.0000											
Friendsd-f	0.0131	0.0403	0.0325	0.0422	0.0143	0.0162	0.0188	0.0211	0.0981	0.0690	0.0055	0.0309	1.0000										
Vote_yes	0.0646	0.0638	0.0311	0.0838	0.0006	0.0166	0.0353	0.0175	0.0471	0.1381	0.0038	0.1091	0.1977	1.0000									
Amemb_in-x	0.0405	0.0107	-0.0019	0.0043	0.0086	0.0612	0.0133	0.0181	-0.0303	0.0050	0.0341	0.0376	0.2342	0.0564	1.0000								
Benefits	0.2687	0.3854	0.3725	0.3370	0.0625	0.1476	0.1618	0.1198	0.1831	0.0506	0.0893	0.0144	0.0252	0.0006	0.0461	1.0000							
Libauth	0.0666	0.0781	0.0817	0.0533	0.0279	0.1288	0.1338	0.0454	-0.0009	0.0277	0.0312	0.0265	0.0167	0.0129	0.0609	0.1872	1.0000						
LeftRight Scale	0.0782	0.1583	0.0803	0.1295	0.0543	0.1263	0.2510	0.1263	0.0237	0.3102	0.1210	0.2018	0.0056	0.0883	0.0057	0.0586	0.0205	1.0000					
Polint	-0.0900	0.1358	-0.0678	0.1027	0.2188	0.1291	0.1915	0.1108	0.0793	0.3186	0.1804	0.2141	0.0101	0.0350	0.0162	0.0061	0.0052	0.3252	1.0000				
Age	0.1439	0.1357	0.1250	0.1397	0.0130	0.0135	0.0886	0.0671	0.0871	0.0570	0.0561	0.1355	0.0214	0.0382	0.2289	0.1042	0.0583	0.0889	-0.0142	1.0000			
Gender	-0.0507	0.1086	-0.0949	0.0637	0.0542	0.1018	0.0078	0.0622	-0.0608	0.0097	0.0949	0.0474	0.0760	0.0510	0.2087	0.1945	0.1584	0.0744	-0.0087	0.1204	1.0000		
Education	-0.0081	0.0091	-0.0128	0.0050	0.0732	0.0500	0.0148	0.0127	-0.0314	0.0416	0.0023	0.0375	0.0438	0.0249	0.0553	0.0262	0.0448	0.1405	-0.0582	0.1532	0.1293	1.0000	
Income	0.1264	0.1193	0.0820	0.1267	0.0667	0.0505	0.0243	0.0426	0.0343	0.1254	0.0912	0.0844	0.0848	0.0596	0.0613	0.0580	0.0430	0.1085	-0.0323	0.1567	0.1183	0.0100	1.0000
	0.0283	0.0194	0.0208	0.0450	0.1160	0.1357	0.0260	0.0098	0.1371	0.0101	0.0117	0.0220	0.0505	0.0033	0.1413	0.0000	0.2175	0.0005	0.0484	0.2078	0.0433	0.1003	0.2419

Table 4: Descriptive statistics for all variables included

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
DVs: Propensity to engage in Solidarity Activism for:					
Compatriots	8,686	.5881879	.4921898	0	1
Refugees	8,686	.3436565	.4749554	0	1
Other people in the EU	8,686	.3488372	.4766298	0	1
People outside EU	8,686	.4146903	.4926969	0	1
IVs					
Equality goal	8,686	3.907092	1.018653	1	5
Range of welfare state responsibilities	8,686	4.565047	2.96432	0	10
Degree of welfare state support	8,686	4.221276	2.681537	0	10
Unconditionality of redistribution	8,686	.0760995	.2651725	0	1
Satisfaction with welfare state outcomes	8,686	38.98515	23.61895	0	100
Tolerance towards immigration	8,686	.0049713	.8775435	-1.614071	.7778924
Support for bailout policies	8,686	3.210569	1.179457	1	5
Importance of development policies	8,686	3.728183	1.041413	1	5
Migration background	8,686	.2773429	.7410087	0	3
Friends with different nationalities	8,686	3.80624	9.715438	0	100
Voted in national/eu election	8,686	.84688	.3601238	0	1
Member/volunteer for org./group	8,686	2.45533	5.109331	0	30
Received benefits	8,686	.2561593	.436536	0	1
Authoritarian vs. Liberal views	8,686	26.64909	8.738459	0	50
Left Right Scale	8,686	5.093254	2.566568	0	10
Political interest	8,686	2.996431	.8252555	1	4
Age	8,686	47.51543	15.34222	18	87
Gender	8,686	1.44117	.4965555	1	2
Education	8,686	4.655998	1.872816	1	9
Income	8,686	5.205158	2.676588	1	10

Table 5: Correlations of welfarism variables

	Goal	Range	Degree	Redistribution
Range	0.2282***	--	--	--
Degree	0.0831***	0.2878***	--	--
Redistribution	0.0615***	0.0879***	0.1157***	--
Outcomes	-0.1945***	-0.0797***	0.1614***	0.0429***

*** p<0.001