Politicisation of solidarity toward out-groups: the case of refugees

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ABSTRACT

This study aims to explain the solidarity behaviour toward a specific needy group that is not part of the national community (refugees) in comparison to vulnerable in-groups (the disabled or the unemployed), taking into account the interplay between individuals' political orientations and their social dispositions based on the ranking preferences of solidarity beneficiaries. Through a multivariate regression analysis of survey data in 8 European countries, we find that respondents’ ranking preferences have a lower impact on solidarity practices toward refugees, which are strongly fostered by progressive political orientations. This means that support for refugees relies on a universalistic conception of solidarity and entails political commitment to both leftist positions on economic issues and to libertarian stances on cultural issues. The latter only affect solidarity actions toward needy out-groups, unveiling the tensions between universalistic-particularistic concerns, which are embodied in individual perception of deservingness between groups and in the cultural-identitarian dimension of political conflict.

Keywords: solidarity practices, refugees, out-groups and in-groups, deservingness, economic left-right, libertarian-authoritarian
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Introduction

The increased inflow of refugees from Syria and other regions affected by wars, the inability of the EU institutions and its member states to establish a coordinated asylum policy and mechanisms of admission and integration, the success of populist parties and the mobilization of Eurosceptic and xenophobic protests across Europe, have all raised concerns that solidarity toward vulnerable groups which are not part of national community, such as refugees, is severely at risk. Nevertheless, the refugee crisis has also highlighted the importance and growth of transnational solidarity organisations (Ataç et al., 2016). Indeed, a web of civic engagement sustained by civil society organisations has been working on a daily basis to meet the basic needs of refugees, taking the form of both advocacy and service provision. How widespread are these solidarity activities in favour of refugees? And which individual characteristics favour such activities? Building upon a comparison between needy vulnerable groups, we examine solidarity practices toward in-groups which are part of European countries national community (such as unemployed people and people with disabilities) against needy vulnerable out-groups: refugees. The main goal of the current study is to examine the explanatory factors that account for differences in individual solidarity-based behaviour toward refugees based on political attitudes and perceptions of deservingness between groups.

Understanding the attitudinal and political drivers of solidarity practices toward refugees in the European context is a goal that deserves scholars’ attention due to the centrality on the public agenda that migration-related issues have acquired lately. Migration is not a neutral issue from a political standpoint: scholars have stressed the importance of new cultural issues such as migration for contentious politics (Flanagan and Lee, 2003; Kriesi et al., 2006) and for the success of right-wing populist parties (Mudde, 2011). Consequently, we can expect that political orientations are important to explain not only anti-refugees attitudes and behaviours but also pro-refugees solidarity practices.

In addition, literature about on migration attitudes and migrants as solidarity recipients has highlighted that perceptions of deservingness are bounded by identity and reciprocity concerns that situate migrants as the least deserving solidarity recipient (van Oorschot 2000, 2006). Likewise, we expect that solidarity behaviour toward refugees also depends on individuals’ deserving rank preferences and embodies identity differentiation mechanisms by which one can assume that people will engage less in solidarity practices in favour of refugees.

Recent literature on attitudes toward welfare state redistribution shows that universalistic concerns and political values are key to understanding ranking preferences toward welfare recipients. In previous studies focused on solidarity practices in specific national contexts we highlighted the importance of political factors and perceptions of deservingness as covariates to solidarity-based behaviour in general (Maggini, 2018; Fernández G.G., 2018). Now, we aim at unveiling whether such
findings affect beneficiary group types differently and if it can be generalized through a pooled analysis of 8 countries covering part of the political, cultural and socio-economic diversity of Europe (Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Switzerland, UK). One of the major contributions of this article unveils that solidarity-based behaviour toward refugees is rooted in the cultural-identitarian political divide (particularism vs. universalism), which is channelled through political orientations and social dispositions of perceptions of deservingness. The structure of the article is as follows: the first section briefly reviews the literature on solidarity and introduces the hypotheses to be tested; the second section presents the methodological approach; the third section shows the empirical results: firstly, it provides a general picture of a variety of solidarity practices in 8 European countries with respect to a specific out-group (refugees); secondly, it shows the findings of the statistical analysis to verify our hypotheses; in the end we wrap up with concluding remarks.

**Solidarity behaviour: theory and hypotheses**

We conceive solidarity practices as actions through which individuals engage to help or support others in struggle or in need, be that by through contributions or by active support of activities. Through our own survey, we aimed explicitly to measure various forms of reported solidarity actions (e.g. donate money, donate time, engage as passive or active member of an organisation, engage in lobbying and advocacy), which cover the charitable, civic and political dimensions of solidarity. These various forms of solidarity practices give us a reliable picture about the extent to which European citizens are committed to support refugees.

With respect to solidaristic pro-social behaviour, scholars have explained solidarity practices through factors related to social traits, social capital and social beliefs (Gundelach et al. 2010; Wilson 2000). In this article, however, we are interested in covariates of target-oriented solidarity behaviour toward refugees, rather than in covariates of solidarity-based behaviour in general. Several studies on the so-called ‘deservingness’ debate about the welfare distribution have shown that in Europe immigrants are considered less entitled to welfare than native needy social categories such as the elderly, the handicapped or the unemployed (Applebaum, 2002; Bay and Pedersen, 2006; Van Oorschot, 2006; 2007; 2010). According to Van Oorschot (2006) community membership and shared obligations, characterised by 'identity' and 'reciprocity' criteria, are at the basis of the low perceived deservingness of immigrants. Indeed, through the social marker of citizenship one could argue that norms of reciprocity are stronger within groups that between groups. Crepaz and Lijphart (2008) indicate: 'being a citizen means to be endowed with a repertoire of rights and obligations that is not, by definition, available to outsiders'. Refugees, which are not part of the national community of their host society can be therefore be seen as a less deserving vulnerable out-group compared to more
deserving vulnerable in-groups such as the disabled and unemployed. Comparing the correlates of solidarity behaviour toward needy out-groups against needy in-groups can allow us to examine the tensions between universalistic-particularistic individual concerns which polarize immigration debates.

Therefore we consider two streams of literature relevant to understand the identitarian-cultural conflict – one on political factors and the other on the perception of out-groups’ deservingness. With respect to the stream of research on political correlates, scholars agree that solidarity is highly patterned by political preferences and ideological orientations (Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003; Likki and Staerklé, 2014). Political factors seem to be particularly relevant to explain solidarity toward out-groups such as refugees. Indeed, immigration-related issues are divisive issues that are at the centre of the political agenda nowadays and solidarity toward refugees apparently has become a contentious field that separates people with different political orientations. In this regard, various studies dealing with the ideological outlook of Western publics unveiled a bi-dimensional structure of the political space (see Grasso and Giugni, 2018). One dimension relates to issues of economic equality, dividing supporters of economic redistribution from supporters of laissez-faire economics (the traditional economic left-right distinction). The other dimension concerns issues of social order and cultural diversity, based on the contrast between authoritarian and libertarian positions (Kitschelt, 1994). According to Beramendi et al. (2015) the authoritarian-libertarian positions can be combined with concerns for group identity and diversity in an increasingly multicultural world (national demarcation vs. supranational integration, Kriesi et al., 2006). In this regard, scholars have shown that people with cosmopolitan attitudes are over-represented among middle classes with a high level of education (Achterberg and Houtman, 2009; Houtman et al., 2008), which usually combine cultural liberalism with pro-welfare preferences (Kitschelt and Rehm, 2014), according to the traditional unidimensional distinction between progressiveness and conservatism (Middendorp, 1978). This dichotomy states that progressive people support both economic equality and cultural pluralism, whereas conservative people support both economic freedom and cultural uniformity.

Relying on these insights, we expect that individuals with more pro-refugee sentiments hold progressive positions (both on the economic and on the cultural dimension). Namely, we hypothesise that:

H1a) Solidarity toward refugees is shaped by progressive political orientations: the more an individual is characterised in terms of libertarian values and leftist political orientations on the economy, the more s/he will support refugees.

Consequently, the libertarian cultural positions, as part of an overall progressive attitude, should be relevant to explain solidarity activism toward refugees. However, for many people the libertarian-
authoritarian cultural divide does not overlap with the left-right economic divide, given the aforementioned increasing bi-dimensionality of political space of Western countries. Indeed, electoral studies have highlighted the increasing presence of voters which combine right-wing stances on cultural (especially immigration) issues with relatively left-wing positions on workers’ protection, income redistribution and international trade (the so-called left-authoritarians, see Mudde, 2007, on welfare chauvinism). This regards especially working-class voters that have been increasingly attracted over the past decades by the conservative and authoritarian stances on immigration of right-wing populist parties (Mudde, 2011). Therefore, it is possible that needy in-groups (e.g. the unemployed) are supported not only by progressive people à la Middendorp, but also by people with left-wing positions on the economy and with authoritarian stances on the cultural dimension. Hence, we hypothesise that the cultural divide (libertarian vs authoritarian values) of the political space is relevant to explain solidarity behaviour only when refugees are the target of solidarity:

H1b) Libertarian values increase the probability of supporting the refugees out-group, but do not affect solidarity actions in favour of needy in-groups.

The above-mentioned cultural dimension of the political space distinguishes preferences for a “universalistic” conception of social order in which all individuals, regardless of their social or ethnic background, should enjoy the personal freedoms to make choices about their lives, from preferences for a “particularistic” conception that entails a clear demarcation of boundaries between those who are members of a collective heritage and tradition, and those who are not (see Häusermann and Kriesi, 2015).

This latter point would suggest that the universalistic-particularistic public divide also shapes social dispositions towards out-groups, which influence solidarity attitudes and behaviours towards refugees. In this sense, solidarity is not only attached to abstract universal communities, but also to specific reference groups. In particular, specific acts of solidarity seem to be conditional and thus tied to images and perceptions of target groups’ deservingness. In this study, we are not interested in the mechanisms explaining perceptions of deservingness. Rather, we focus on how the individual rank preferences of informal solidarity recipients affect solidarity practices toward refugees compared to needy in-groups (disabled or unemployed people). We advance that these ranking preferences also inform us about the public divide between universalistic-particularistic display in people’s attitudes and behaviours toward certain vulnerable groups. As previously mentioned, public perceptions of the relative deservingness of needy groups showed that independently of the welfare state model and context, individuals rank immigrants as less deserving according to an ‘identity’ criterion, being an out-group very different from the in-group of European citizens (van Oorschot 2000; 2006). Thus, public preferences of solidarity beneficiaries situate refugees as less deserving regardless of their
social needs and risks. Moreover, various studies, in particular in the US, have shown that social programmes targeted at groups with a negative public image are less supported by the public (Katz, 1989; Huddy et al., 2001). Consequently, we hypothesise that the probability of engaging in solidarity practices decreases toward groups that individuals perceive as less deserving on the basis of identitarian considerations:

H2) *Perceptions of deservingness based on the ranking preferences of solidarity beneficiaries affect less the solidarity practices toward out-groups (refugees) than solidarity practices toward in-groups (disabled or unemployed).*

Aside from group-specific correlates of solidarity and regardless of the target group, we assume that there are individual characteristics fostering solidarity in general. Hence, we integrate and control in our analysis of solidarity practices for other factors considered as determinants of prosocial solidarity behaviour. Among other political factors, we control for political involvement in terms of interest in politics because it is often associated with civic engagement (Scrivens and Smith, 2013) and with voting choices, especially of the young people (Maggini, 2016). Additionally, we control for social capital measures such as social trust and frequency of social connections (Putnam et al., 2003; Halpern, 2005); social beliefs such as religiosity (Abela, 2004; Lichterman, 2015) and social tolerance (Leite Viegas 2007); socio-demographic characteristics and social traits of individuals e.g. age, gender, education, income, social class (Valentova, 2016; Beyerlein and Bergstrand, 2013).

**Data and methods**

The present analysis uses data from the TransSOL survey conducted in November-December of 2016, in eight countries included in the project: Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The questionnaire contains standardized cross-national measures of people’s behaviours, attitudes and beliefs in a broad range of important societal domains. The country samples consisted of at least 2,061 to 2,221 respondents each, pooled dataset of 16,916 cases. To test our hypotheses, we carried-out statistical analyses with pooled data. Concretely, we built a multivariate logistic regression model with dummies for countries in order to control for contextual differences between countries. We operationalized the dependent variable, i.e. solidarity practices toward specific target groups, by combining a series of questions about different kinds of solidarity actions that help to mirror charity, civic and political dimensions of solidarity: donating time or money, passive and active membership in organizations, buying (or refusing to buy) products, protest participation. The reliability scale between these items is high (alpha test 0.66): thus, the items shared an important covariance, measuring the same underlying concept. Consequently, we
created a dichotomous dependent variables (0 ‘no action’, 1 ‘at least one action’) for the target groups: one for out-group (refugees) and one for in-groups (unemployed or people with disabilities). Indeed, we are aware that solidarity behaviour toward refugees, unemployed and disables could show different patterns. However, we focus on the distinction between in-groups and outgroups as it informs us how solidarity behaviour towards vulnerable groups differentiates between needy groups, which are part of the political community, and those who are not. We consider that this distinction allow us to capture the public divide between universalistic and particularistic concerns channelled through political orientations and social dispositions, as hypothesised in previous section.

As independent variables we included the following measures: political value (economic values left-right index, social values libertarian-authoritarian index) and social dispositions toward needy groups (deservingness scale).

The economic left-right orientation of respondents has been measured as an additive index of positions linked to a unique factors component from 0 to 10, with the value of 0 corresponding to the far-left and the value of 10 corresponding to the far-right. The authoritarian and libertarian values orientation was measured as an additive index of values linked to a unique factor component.

As for deservingness, our survey includes a battery of items measuring respondents’ willingness to improve the conditions of the selected target groups on 5-item scales (1—Not at all, 2—Not very, 3—Neither, 4—Quite, 5—Very much), which are highly correlated (alpha test 0.73). Hence, we created an additive scale of deservingness. Relying on a proxy to mirror the operationalization adopted by van Oorschot (2006), our assumption is that respondents’ concerns about groups conditions reflects their perception of the deservingness toward the groups and the rank-order of their informal solidarity preferences.

Finally, we added as control variables social capital measures (social trust, frequency of social contacts with friends), social beliefs (religiosity, social tolerance), the level of cognitive political involvement of respondents (interest in politics) and socio-demographic characteristics of respondents (age, gender, income, education, social class).

Before running the logistic regression model with dummies for countries (with Switzerland as reference category), all independent variables have been normalised trough rescaling.

**Empirical results**

The picture of diverse solidarity practices (donating time or money, passive and active membership, buying products, protest participation) in favour of refugees across the selected countries shows that on average 27.1% of respondents have been engaged in at least one solidarity activity, with some noteworthy differences across countries (see Figure 1): Greece and Germany are the countries with
the highest level of engagement (36.4% and 34.1%, respectively), whereas France and UK show the lowest level of engagement (20.2% and 21.7%, respectively).

If we look at the different type of solidarity practices, the charity behaviour of donating money is the most frequent action in all countries (12.2% on average) except in Greece, where donating time is the most frequent action (15.2%). Conversely, political protest-oriented activities are not widespread (4.7% on average), with a peak in Greece (8.9%). Similar patterns can be found regarding the active and passive involvement in organizations supporting refugees. Finally, buying or refusing to buy products in favour of refugees is a political action more widespread than protest-oriented actions in all countries (7.4% on average), with a peak in Greece (12.7%) where such action ranks second after donating time.

**Figure 1**

In order to confirm that refugees are considered by European citizens as an out-group less deserving of help compared to other needy groups ‘closer to us’ as being part of the national community, we performed the statistical means differences of deservingness between the three target groups (refugees, unemployed and disabled), a Tukey test of multiple means comparison⁶. The Tukey’s range test showed that means of willingness to improve the conditions of our three target groups are statistically significantly different from each other (Figure 2). Asylum seekers and refugees are perceived as the least deserving group, in comparison to the unemployed and especially to the disabled (the most deserving group as expected). Thus, these results indicate that identity-cultural tensions are translated as well on individuals' social dispositions because even though refugees are in a vulnerable situation beyond their control, as out-group they are perceived as less deserving of being helped compared to needy citizens. Foremost, these results suggest that people are more willing to provide support to people they can identify with, more than with people who cannot be blamed for their neediness because they do not have personal control over their current situation. Secondly, the results inform us on the individual rank preferences of informal solidarity which are conditioned by symbolic boundaries that prefigured the ‘anonymous others’ mainly over the distinction of ‘insider' versus 'outsider' (Reesekens and van Oorschot, 2012).

**Figure 2**

To test our hypotheses and to investigate the (different) determinants of solidarity actions in favour of refugees compared to other vulnerable groups, we included the independent variables presented in previous section in a multivariate logistic regression model with dummies for countries.
Table A2 (see the Online Appendix) presents results for the full model with all independent variables for each target group, which includes odds ratios (with robust standard errors) as well as goodness-of-fit statistics (AIC and BIC coefficients, pseudo-R-squared values of Nagelkerke). In logistic regression, the odds ratio compares the odds of the outcome event (providing solidarity) one unit apart on the predictor.

The results confirm that political factors and social dispositions of deservingness condition and affect differently solidarity practices across groups: refugees vs. disabled and unemployed people. With respect to the political factors, political covariates are strongly relevant to examine solidarity practices, especially with regard to the support to refugees’ populations. Figure 3 and 4 show the marginal effects of political orientations on solidarity practices across target groups. As expected, the more one has leftist orientations on the economy and has libertarian values, the more s/he is likely to support refugees (H1a). People who take leftist positions on economic issues are also more likely to support the needy in-groups, even though the relationship is less significant compared to the observed support toward our out-group, whereas there is no significant relationship between libertarian values and support toward the in-groups. As expected, therefore, different dimensions of the political space (left-right and libertarian-authoritarian divides) have a differentiated effect depending on the target group: libertarian positions on cultural issues increase the probability of supporting the refugees out-group, but have no impact on solidarity practices toward the needy in-groups (H1b).

These results show that the migration field is highly politicised and the cultural divide of the political space is central to explain a pro-refugees behaviour, more than the traditional economic left-right divide, which matters also for solidarity actions toward in-groups.

Likewise, our results highlight the importance of the perception of deservingness on solidarity practices across target groups. More precisely, the marginal effects on solidarity practices (see Figure 5) corroborate that deservingness has a strong impact on solidarity behaviour, which varies according to the target group (H2): its impact is lower on solidarity toward the out-group (refugees) compared to needy in-groups. Indeed, keeping all variables constant and assessing the maximum score of deservingness, the probability of engaging in a solidarity practice toward refugees is less than 40%, while for the other two vulnerable groups surpasses 60%. This confirms again that perceptions of
deservingness and their impact on solidarity behaviour toward different target groups rely on identitarian concerns (van Oorschot, 2000).

**Figure 5**

Regarding control variables, there are some predictors fostering solidarity practices in general, regardless of the target group. In particular, as shown in Table A2, religiosity, political interest and both measures of social capital (social trust and frequency of social connections with friends) are very significant (with p at 0.1%). Concerning the sociodemographic controls, age has negative effects on solidarity practices in favour of refugees, whereas it is not significant for in-groups support. Indeed, scholars have shown that young citizens are more active in non-conventional participation, according to different levels of 'biographical availability' in the life course (Beyerlein and Bergstrand, 2013). In addition, it is worth mentioning that social class categories have an effect only on solidarity practices in favour of refugees, education categories are again more relevant for supporting the out-group, whereas income level is significant (with p at 5%) and positively related only to support in favour of needy in-groups. In particular, people with low and intermediate education levels are less likely to be engaged in solidarity practices toward refugees compared to people with the highest education attainment. Moreover, belonging to upper classes increases significantly the odds of supporting refugees compared to people of working class.

**Conclusion**

This article aimed to deepen knowledge on solidarity toward needy groups in Europe which are not part of the national community (i.e. out-groups) by providing fresh empirical analyses on solidarity practices with respect to a specific out-group (refugees) in comparison to other vulnerable in-groups (the disabled or the unemployed) and to explain such solidarity actions with reference to respondents' political preferences and their ranking preferences of solidarity beneficiaries.

The overall picture which results from the analysis of solidarity practices toward refugees is that more than a quarter of respondents are engaged in pro-refugees actions. Interestingly, Greece, one of the countries which have received the highest influx of refugees since 2015 within the Eurozone, showcased the largest number of pro-refugees political actions. In the latter, there is also the highest level of overall engagement in favour of refugees, immediately followed by Germany, whereas the French and the British show the lowest level of engagement. Regarding the type of actions, charity and civic behaviour as donating money and time prevails in most countries over
political protest-oriented activities, whereas buying or refusing to buy products in favour of refugees is a more diffused political action.

Furthermore, refugees are considered as less deserving of being helped compared to the disabled and the unemployed, which asserts a criterion of deservingness based on ‘identity’ rather than on ‘control over neediness’ (van Oorschot, 2000).

In general, findings show that solidarity is a multifaceted phenomenon and its practices can be fostered by a variety of factors: social, political, attitudinal. Hereafter, focusing only on one kind of these factors would be limiting and not adequate to comprehend the complexity of reasons underlying the individual choices to support others in need (or, conversely, to not support others). In addition, our analysis shows that covariates of solidarity practices often depend on the target group.

First, political factors play a relevant role to explain support toward refugees, in comparison to other needy in-groups. In particular, libertarian values foster solidarity actions only toward refugees, whereas leftist orientations on economy also foster solidarity toward in-groups. Thus, solidarity toward refugees entails political commitment to libertarian values as opposed to authoritarian stances, confirming the specificity of this cultural dimension compared to the traditional left-right dimension and the importance of new cultural issues (e.g. migration) for contentious politics (Flanagan and Lee, 2003). This is particularly significant for a continent faced with both economic turmoil and refugee crisis in the last years, where right-wing populist parties have mobilised more on the libertarian-authoritarian dimension than on the economic left-right divide aiming at gaining votes among the lower classes by using migrants as scapegoating of their fears and economic distress (Mudde, 2011). In this regard, our data show that refugees are supported more by people in more professional classes with higher levels of education compared to working class people with lower educational levels.

Secondly, our hypothesis about the differentiated impact of deservingness on solidarity behaviour across target groups is confirmed: people support the group they consider as more worthy of being helped, but refugees are the group less positively affected by deservingness considerations when analysing solidarity behaviour. This indicates that individual rank preferences of informal solidarity beneficiaries are strongly conditioned by symbolic boundaries of ‘us’ and ‘them’. This suggest that citizenship boundaries contributes to differentiate between those who are more entitled to be helped, citizens vs. non-citizens, regardless of their actual neediness and vulnerability.

To sum up, the key lesson drawn from our analysis is that the interplay between political orientations and social dispositions should be taken into account to explain solidarity behaviour toward a needy out-group such as refugees. Hence, findings show that solidarity toward refugees displays some specificity compared to solidarity toward other vulnerable groups, unveiling tensions
between universalistic-particularistic concerns, which are embodied in individual perception of deservingness between groups and in the cultural-identitarian dimension of political conflict. Independently of the positive effect of deservingness on solidarity behaviour, we unveil that respondents’ ranking preferences have a lower impact on solidarity practices toward refugees, which are strongly fostered by progressive political orientations. In other words, support for refugees can be considered as a specific aspect of solidarity with human beings as such, and it heavily depends on both libertarian and leftist political preferences. Nevertheless, this universalistic conception of solidarity is not widespread in the whole society, but is more widespread amongst individuals in more advantaged sections of society. In a period where traditional ideological alignments are challenged by populist political entrepreneurs, which combine economic left-wing positions with conservative cultural stances (the so-called left-authoritarians), this elitist retrenchment of cosmopolitanism can be particularly problematic with respect to vulnerable groups in Europe like refugees. Thus, the challenge for policy-makers is to spread the support of solidarity toward out-groups throughout society in a context of crisis and competition over scarce resources and attached to a social model more strictly defined in terms of traditional nation state. Strengthening the welfare system, creating inclusive policies and renewing the citizenship contract are all very politicised and polarised issues to be discussed and further investigated. Hence, solidarity toward out-groups has a strong political element: it requires, in a first instance, to surpass migrants’ portrayal as a group with distinct morals, norms, and values that threaten the national community and the State safety-net as it appears that such sentiments do not simply reflect economic concerns but also rely on more general cultural conflicts and social values.
Figure 1. Type of reported solidarity activities in favour of refugees across countries (in %).
**Figure 2.** Differences of multiple means comparison of the willingness to improve the conditions of the vulnerable groups.

*Note:* b-a: Corresponds to the statistical differences between people with disability and refugees, showing that there is at least 1 positive unit scale difference between the groups means in favour of disabled people, considering as well the confidence interval. c-a: Corresponds to the statistical differences between people unemployed and refugees, showing that there is more than 0.5 positive unit scale difference between the groups means in favour of unemployed people, considering as well the confidence interval. c-b: Corresponds to the statistical differences between unemployed people and people with disability, showing that there is almost 0.5 negative unit scale difference between the groups means with regard to unemployed people, considering as well the confidence interval.
Figure 3. Marginal effects of economic left-right index on solidarity practices by target groups.
Figure 4. Marginal effects of libertarian-authoritarian index on solidarity practices by target groups.
Figure 5. Marginal effects of deservingness scale on solidarity practices by target groups.
Notes

1 Weights have been used for all analyses.

2 Details on the coding of the dependent variable and of the following independent variables are provided in the Online Appendix (see Table A1).

3 We ran a principal component factor (PCF) analysis including variables measuring respondents’ opinions on 0-10 agreement scales linked to five economic issues: “decrease taxes vs. increase taxes”, “competition is good vs. competition is harmful”, “unemployed should take any job vs. freedom of choice”, “personal responsibility vs. governmental responsibility”, “equal incomes vs. larger income differences”. All items except one (on income differences) clustered within one statistically significant dimension. For these four items, factor loadings were high (between 0.66 and 0.74) and the reliability scale was satisfactory (alpha test 0.66). Based on four above-mentioned items we built an additive index of economic left-right orientations.

4 We ran a PCF analysis including variables measuring respondents’ opinions on 0-10 agreement scales linked to values-related issues on: “children care vs. women career”, “freedom of abortion vs. prohibition of abortion”, “child adoption for homosexuals vs. prohibiting child adoption”, “tougher sentences to fight crime vs. tougher sentences bring nothing”, “parenting authority vs. child independent judgement”. We detected just one statically significant dimension. Factor loadings were particularly high (between 0.81 and 0.91) for all items and the reliability scale was very high (alpha test 0.92). Based on the five above-mentioned items it was possible to build an additive index of libertarian values.

5 Wording and recoding of all control variables in Table A1, Online Appendix.

6 In addition to the Turkey’s range test, we performed other means tests (namely, Bartlett test of homogeneity of variances, one-way analysis of means, Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test) which confirmed that means between groups are significantly different.

7 Before running the full model, we carried out separate models by blocks of independent variables (social capital measures, political factors, social beliefs), all controlled for socio-demographic characteristics. Results of the full model are confirmed.
References


